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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE DIALECTICS OF METHODOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY IN HABERMAS'S EARLY THOUGHT

by

HOWARD L. HOPKINS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

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SPRING, 1986

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE DIALECTICS OF METHODOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY IN HABERMAS'S EARLY THOUGHT, submitted by Howard Hopkins in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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(Supervisor)

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Date...April 25 1986

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Flora Louise Hopkins (1914 - 1977). The promise has been kept.

ABSTRACT

During the past twenty years there has been a steadily growing debate, among English speaking philosophers of social science, concerning the strengths and weaknesses of Jurgen Habermas's notion of critical theory. The present thesis offers a new perspective on this discussion by emphasizing and elucidating the dialectical nature of Habermas's approach to both the critique of methodology and the understanding of society.

For Habermas ideology is the main impediment to gaining knowledge of society. Chapter I deals with Habermas's account of ideological influence with regard to both the nature of society and the dominant methods used by social scientists to understand society and social action. From the outset the perspective adopted in this thesis asserts the dialectical character of the various relationships involving ideology, society and methodology.

Chapter II provides an in depth analysis of key dialectical concepts such as mediation, contradiction and determinate negation. Using Hegel's dialectic of sense-certainty, a structural/conceptual account of dialectic is provided in order to prepare the way for a study of the role of dialectic in Habermas's thought.

In chapters III and IV, Habermas's meta-methodological critiques of analytic-empirical and hermeneutical approaches to the social sciences are the topics of investigation. Once again the emphasis in the thesis study is placed upon the dialectical nature of the method - object relationships, when either one of these approaches is applied to society.

Finally, in the last chapter, critical consideration is directed toward Habermas's positive methodological recommendations. The main claim of this chapter asserts that although Habermas's dialectical characterization of competing methods is accurate, the same dialectically based critique jeopardizes the potential for methodological success promised by critical theory.

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INTRODUCTION

The topic of this thesis is the development of the foundations of "critical theory" as espoused by Jürgen Habermas, and this study will concern itself with Habermas's work up to and including the distinction between "critical self-reflection" and "rational reconstruction." The strategy will be to consider the evolution of Habermas's thought in the course of his debates with Karl Popper and Hans Gadamer, who, between them, represent two of the more dominant approaches to the social sciences and to the understanding of society, neo-positivism and hermeneutics respectively.

Gradually, over the past three decades, the Frankfurt School of social theory and philosophy has managed a steadily growing success in offering Anglo-American thought a new and challenging alternative to understanding society. This thesis focuses on the methodological and epistemological development of Jürgen Habermas, the present leading representative of the Frankfurt School.

To describe this thesis in broad terms, it is necessary to talk in terms of both "spirit" and "goals." Concerning the latter, an attempt has been made to clarify and critically assess Habermas's methodological and epistemological development toward a "critical theory" of society. The two main themes in this study are Habermas's critiques of the analytic-empirical and hermeneutical approaches to social sciences. In "spirit," this thesis seeks to make accessible to Anglo-American philosophy, certain apparently esoteric notions common to the philosophical language and understanding of those reared in the

tradition of German Idealism. The focal point, in this case, is the philosophical language of Hegel and its appropriation by Habermas.

Finally, this work is essentially a consideration of problems and not a thesis about the history of philosophy. Accordingly then, a certain generosity has been granted to Habermas's interpretations of various philosophers, especially those from whom he seeks support. In this regard, the critical and exegetical force of the thesis is directed toward these notions as interpreted by Habermas and used in immediate problems. A digression into the assessment of Habermas's interpretations in this direction would constitute an entirely independent study and one which would detract from the main topics of the present work.

Chapter I

INDIVIDUALS, WHOLES, "TOTALITIES" AND IDEOLOGY

This opening chapter deals with the notion of "societal totality,"[1] and its "dialectical" nature. The strategy of beginning with this topic is justified by the following considerations. On the whole, the focal point of this work is the development of Habermas's early thought concerning methodology in the social sciences. To a large extent Habermas's position evolves in contradistinction to two already established methodological approaches; the "analytic-empirical" (Habermas's description of contemporary scientific method as interpreted by philosophical positivists) and the hermeneutical methods. The crucial point for the chosen strategy is Habermas's view of the nature of society and of how such a society can best be understood and investigated. The view of society as a "totality" in Adorno's sense of the term, a view adopted by Habermas, provides immediate cause for debate between Habermas, on the one hand, and those supporting either hermeneutics or the analytic-empirical approach, on the other. Thus the methodological debate begins with the issue of differences among theoreticians and researchers about the nature of society. The present chapter considers the notion of a "societal totality" by contrasting it with two types of non-dialectical views on society--the organic whole view and the atomistic view.

The major claim and theme for this chapter is that ideology is the key to understanding both the notion of societal totality and its dialectical aspect. To demonstrate and support this position, this

chapter divides into three sections. Section (1) introduces the issue of societal totality and how it is to be distinguished from the organic and atomistic views of society. The context of this discussion is provided by Karl Popper's interpretation of Adorno's position. The choice of this particular approach is justified in numerous ways. The Popper/Albert versus Adorno/Habermas debate was the main feature of a symposium on methodology in the social sciences held at the University of Tübingen in 1961.[2] One of the major issues of this debate concerned the validity of the "unified science" position promoted by Popper and Albert. The basic claim of this point of view is that one can successfully apply the method and techniques of empirical science (referred to by Habermas as the analytic-empirical approach) to the subject matter of the social sciences, i.e. to human society and the individuals composing it. In rejecting this position, Adorno, supported by Habermas, presents a theory about the nature of society, which is intended to reveal the shortcomings of the Popper/Albert thesis. Finally, while Popper, in the interpretation to be considered shortly, attempts to gloss over the significance of Adorno's concept of society, Habermas attempts to formulate a new approach to the study of society highlighting the epistemological and methodological significance of Adorno's notion of "societal totality" and what distinguishes this notion from Popper's view.

Section (2) treats the issue of the societal totality from a different direction, placing it in the context of the methodological debate between "methodological individualism" and "methodological holism."[3] The main point of this discussion is to emphasize the relationship of societal totality to both of the opposing sides in that debate.

Lastly, Section (3) considers the methodological and epistemological dispositions and strategies of Popper and Habermas/Adorno toward the investigation of ideology.

Section 1

". . . Adorno conceptualizes totality in the strictly dialectical sense. . . ."[4] The following passage elicited this remark by Habermas.

> Societal totality does not lead a life of its own over and above that which it unites and of which it, in its turn, is composed. It produces and reproduces itself through its individual moments. . . . This totality can no more be detached from life, from the co-operation and the antagonism of its elements than can an element be understood merely as it functions without insight into the whole which has its source (Wesen) in the motion of the individual entity itself. System and individual entity are reciprocal and can only be apprehended in their reciprocity.[5]

In addition to being quoted and adopted by Habermas, this passage is also singled out for special consideration by Karl Popper, and it is the latter's translation and interpretation which is the immediate concern of this section. The following is the original German of Adorno's text, but the arrangement and editing is done by Popper.

1. Die gesellschaftliche Totalität führt kein Eigenleben oberhalb des von ihr Zusammengefassten, aus dem sie selbst besteht.
2. Sie produziert und reproduziert sich durch ihre einzelnen Momente hindurch . . .
3. So wenig aber jenes Ganze vom Leben, von der Kooperation und dem Antagonismus seiner Elemente abzusondern ist,
4. so wenig kann irgendein Element auch bloss in seinem Funktionieren verstanden werden ohne Einsicht in des Ganze, das an der Bewegung des Einzelnen selbst sein Wesen hat.
5. System und Einzelheit sind reziprok und nur in ihrer Reziprozität zu erkennen.[6]

Popper provides the following rendering of this text.

1. Society consists of social relationships.
2. The various social relationships somehow produce society.
3. Among these relations are co-operation and antagonism; and since society consists of these relations, it is impossible to separate it from them.
4. The opposite is also true: none of the relations can be understood without the totality of all the others.
5. (A repetition of 4).[7]

Given his interpretation of Adorno, Popper is willing to agree with what the former has said regarding the societal totality; the difficulty concerns the lack of accuracy in Popper's rendering of this passage. Let us begin with the first sentence. Popper's interpretation is restricted to the way in which society is constituted and that is through social relationships. The German text conveys a somewhat different meaning and one which would seem to give more support to a dialectical position. "Societal totality" is given some sort of active role from the very beginning. Certainly society is constituted by individuals, however these elements of which it is composed are, in turn, united by it (des von ihr Zusammengefassten). That Adorno claims a uniting influence for the societal totality is completely ignored by Popper. Hence, the possibility of an opposition between individuals and "societal totality," however the meaning of this notion is to be cashed out, doesn't seem to be appreciated by Popper, whose methodological individualism commits him to viewing society as reducible to the individuals composing it, their beliefs, actions and relationships.[8]

The second sentence, if not misinterpreted, is at least oversimplified by Popper when he renders its meaning as "social

relationships producing society." The German text, however, again calls for a different reading. Adorno holds to the societal totality as an active influence and regards it as producing and reproducing itself through its individual moments. Clearly some kind of distinction is being made between the societal totality on the one hand, and its moments and composing elements on the other. For Popper meanwhile, what composes the societal totality also produces it, while the societal totality has no role whatsoever.

The third sentence of the passage can be taken as a unit, but in Popper's interpretation it is divided into lines (3) and (4). Once again Adorno claims the interdependence of two distinct sides, the elements comprising the whole and the whole or "societal totality" itself. For Popper, on the other hand, the societal totality has disappeared and one speaks only in terms of relationships and their implications for each other. In order to understand one kind of relationship one must understand all the others, and the understanding of the entire complex demands a grasp of each single relationship. Clearly this is not the meaning intended by Adorno.

The last sentence ((5) for Popper) vividly highlights the difference between Adorno and Popper. Popper simply regards this claim as a reiteration of lines (3) and (4) in which he reaffirms his position equating societal totality with the complex of relationships constituting it. Adorno, however, is asserting that there are two distinct sides, even though the one side, the system, is constituted by the other side, the individual components. Briefly then, in emphasizing the constitution of the societal totality, or the ontological

nature of society, Popper ignores the distinction of two sides and the tension between them, which is claimed by Adorno. For Adorno, the societal totality or system unites elements which relate to each other either antagonistically or co-operatively. (It is obvious that "Elemente" signifies human beings, either as individuals or in groups. Relationships do not co-operate with or antagonize each other.) Regardless of the constitution of the societal totality, either in terms of individuals or relationships among individuals, the totality, for Adorno, is considered to be a uniting influence reproducing itself as if it were something over and against the individuals constituting it. This aspect of the societal totality is entirely omitted in Popper's account.

The following passage provides a substantial clarification of how Adorno understands "societal totality."

> It (societal totality) is pre-established for all individual subjects since they obey its 'constraints' even in themselves and even in their monadological constitution and here in particular, conceptualize totality. To this extent, totality is what is most real. Since it is the sum of individuals' social relations which screen themselves off from individuals, it is also illusion--ideology. A liberated mankind would by no means be a totality. Their being-in-themselves is just as much their subjugation as it deceives them about itself as the true social substratum.[9]

Immediately the influence of the societal totality is asserted again, but what is of equal, if not greater interest, is Adorno's description of the societal totality as the sum of social relations hidden from the individuals whose actions and beliefs are determined under the constraints of such relationships. At this point one might justifiably distinguish between a liberated society and a society which is a totality. Implicit in Adorno's remarks is the standpoint that with

regard to the liberated society, it would not be correct to describe society in terms of something influencing the actions and beliefs of individuals, or as something existing independently of these constituting elements. The liberated society would be one in which the individuals are both aware of and understand the nature of the social relations realized in their actions, and, furthermore, taken to its ideal extreme, in such a society the social relationships, rather than being constraints on the wills and actions of individuals, would instead reflect the individual's will as a member of society. In terms of the passage commented on by Popper, Adorno is distinguishing between two very different types of relationship; those of which individuals are conscious and which they understand, and those relationships remaining hidden from the individuals whom they determine in actions and beliefs. Concerning society as a totality, in this case the individuals are unable to gain conscious understanding. It can be seen immediately that this epistemological restriction leads, in turn, to a restriction on individual freedom. The combination of ignorance and false beliefs, concerning hidden relationships, encroaches upon the liberty of individuals by removing these relationships and their constraints from being criticized and understood correctly as not being immune to change. Also, as long as these relationships remain hidden, it is not possible to gain a comprehensive and accurate understanding of society. Thus, using Adorno's meanings, when one talks of a "system" of "societal totality" as either "uniting" its constitutive elements or, "producing" and "reproducing" itself "through its individual moments," one is really referring to a fundamental social relationship, e.g. the

economic system, or the given social value structure, which, unbeknownst to the individuals involved, determines their actions and beliefs. When these relationships, as they appear to individuals, deceive the individuals as to the real nature of the relationship and the falsity of its claims to legitimacy, then one is dealing with ideology. The last sentence in the passage just quoted sums up Adorno's view on the effect of these hidden relationships: on the one hand, the individual is not able to realize his or her potential for freedom in the society; on the other hand, this type of existence deceives the individual regarding the true nature of society, thus reducing the possibility of social change.

With the introduction of the notion of ideology the nature of the issue between Popper and Adorno/Habermas is altered significantly. What appeared to be a constitution problem in the ontological sense, i.e. a problem of what one means by "real" sources of society's existence, has turned out to be more of an epistemological issue. In other words, the issue is not about a disagreement concerning the fundamental constituents of society, but rather, about how one is to successfully combat ideology and the false beliefs resulting from its influence. Insofar as there remains an ontological side to the discussion, it lays in the possibility of false ontology, a situation in which individuals believe that or act as though certain concepts accurately describe reality or stand for absolute and undeniable truths, when in truth neither is the case. Clearly, however, even this reference to ontology is still an epistemological and ideological issue.[10]

The importance of ideology cannot be overemphasized when considering both Habermas's critique of methodology in the social sciences, and his formulation of a critical theory of society, or "dialectical" approach to the study of society. There are two basic goals for Habermas's program, and these are goals for individuals functioning in the society, and the social scientist studying society. Both sides must achieve knowledge of society and freedom within it. In order to achieve these goals ideology, with its effects of coercion and deception, must be eliminated. These effects result when an individual uncritically or unconsciously accepts as being truly descriptive of reality or, generally, of what is the case various concepts which are in fact false, or, although true, serve as a veil to conceal various reprehensible aspects of social reality. For Habermas, the proper method for the social sciences to adopt or emulate is one which exposes ideology as false in itself and concealing undesirable social realities; i.e. the proper approach to understanding society is the method which provides the most comprehensive Ideologiekritik.[11] Just how successful Habermas is in formulating such a method is a major topic in chapters IV and V of this thesis. Meanwhile, Popper, in ignoring the opposition between ideology and the individuals, misses a claim which is crucial to the Habermas/Adorno understanding of society.

Habermas's asessment of Adorno's position is the following:

> Adorno conceives of society in categories which do not deny their origins in Hegel's logic. He conceptualizes society as totality in the strictly dialectical sense, which prohibits one from approaching the whole organically in accordance with the statement that it is more than the sum of its parts. Nor is totality a class which might be determined in its logical extension by a collection of all the elements which it comprises. To this extent, the dialectical

> concept of the whole is not subsumed under the justified critique of the logical bases of those Gestalt theories, which in their sphere recoil altogether from investigations following the formal rules of analytical techniques. . . .[12]

For now, the reference to Hegel's logic will be ignored as this topic will be dealt with in some detail in the next chapter. The first implication of Adorno's position, as understood by Habermas, is that here one is not dealing with an organic whole which is more than the sum of its parts. This claim is directed toward the essential nature and composition of the societal totality. Habermas seeks to avoid any interpretation which would assert that the society, in its constitution, is anything more than the individuals composing it. The notion of an organic whole implies that the essence of the society is something more than or more fundamental than the individuals who constitute such a whole. To grant this would mean that the essence of society is something more than the individuals, their beliefs and actions, and the social relationships resulting from them. Such a stand entails that the essence of individuals in a society is not to be found in free individuals acting and believing according to their various innate or freely developed dispositions, but rather the essence is supplied by something independent of individual wills, beliefs and actions. The claim is for an entity which ultimately determines the nature of the individual in society, i.e. something over and against the individual and determining of that individual. For Habermas/Adorno, however, that which functions in this way regarding individuals is only, ontologically, an "appearance," although it, ideology, has the same effect on individuals, influencing them as if it were a "thing-in-itself."

Before considering another passage from Adorno, it might seem that the above argument concerning "appearance" conflicts with the passage quoted on page 8 of this thesis, where Adorno describes totality as that which is "most real." The societal totality is what is most real because of the effect of ideology. The reality has its source in the actions and beliefs of the individuals affected by it.

The following passage from Adorno provides additional clarification:

> Our knowledge incorporates intellectual formations into the social dynamics, by relating them to the underlying interconnections of motivation. The undeniable appearance of their independent existence (An-sich-Sein) as well as their presumptions to truth are made subject to critical insight. The independence of spiritual products and indeed even the conditions by which they gain this independence are conceived jointly with the real historical movement under the name of 'ideology.'[13]

It is clear from this passage that Adorno understands ideology as something which has the "appearance" of being an independently existing thing-in-itself, but this is only an appearance. To allow society to be more than the sum of its parts, in the organic sense of whole, would be to allow ideology to be more than simply an appearance, but rather to be an "essence" independent of the individuals composing society. In other words, the "system" would be the real basis of society, i.e. would be more fundamental than the individuals and their wills in the society, and hence determining of their actions and beliefs. A societal totality then is a society in which individuals act and believe <u>as if</u> the social system were something existing <u>in-itself</u> and thus determines their actions and beliefs, whereas, in truth, this in-itself is really a delusory ideology. (It should also be noted that there is the

case where the individuals believe that they are truly free, when in fact their actions are ideologically determined. But this case is not relevant in a discussion of the organic notions of society.) For Habermas/Adorno, one can justifiably conclude that ontologically individuals are the basic constituents of society and that society is the result of their beliefs and actions. In asserting that totality is the sum of the relationships hidden from individuals, Adorno is describing a society based upon appearance and falsehood, in which ideology functions as if it were something ontologically independent of individuals.

On the other hand, however, as Habermas notes, one cannot understand "totality" as simply the sum of the elements which constitute it. Habermas's concern in such a case is that individuals, along with their beliefs and actions, be taken as the factors determining the nature of society, where society is a "totality." Although individuals are the constituents of society, they are not constituting society according to actions and beliefs stemming from freedom and knowledge of the truth, but rather are acting and believing in accordance with illusions which have their source in ideology. For Habermas and Adorno, to be able to equate society with the sum of its parts, individuals, it is not sufficient to be able to show that all "known" institutions and relationships have their source in the actions and beliefs of individuals, but one must also show that these actions and beliefs are freely chosen and based upon a knowledge of the <u>reality</u> of their situation, i.e. that the individuals are not victims of ideology or of relationships of which they are not aware. In a totality this is not the case.

The apparent confusion here is caused by the peculiar status of ideologically based actions and beliefs. While on the one hand, the group of relationships based upon the ideology cannot be regarded as existing in-itself, on the other hand, individuals who are determined in thought and action by ideology cannot be taken as the basis for understanding society. The implicit concern in the last clause is directed toward the possible uncritical reliance upon this source of data by methodologies.

Habermas's caution against conceiving of society as an aggregate of its parts demands that something be said concerning the scope of ideological contamination. When Adorno or Habermas speaks of present day society, with its technological-scientific epistemology and merging of socialist and capitalist socio-economic systems, and liberal-democratic ethical-political principles, as a totality, the scope of ideological influence is all-pervasive in the sense that empirical science, as it is practiced, its application to the social sciences, and the scientist or researcher are all susceptible to ideological contamination. This point will be clarified further in chapter III.

The universality of ideology extends even to the methods for which success is claimed in the critique of ideology. For Habermas/Adorno, even the scientific method, when applied to society, cannot fully immunize itself against ideology, and is therefore wanting in its capacity for Ideologiekritik. The reliance of social scientists upon the "word" and "action" of the individual, together with the limited scope for critique due to the difficulty of satisfying the precision

demanded by the scientific method, means that the individual is being considered as providing an accurate account of his or her values and as being correct in their interpretation of society. In the acceptance of the "word" and "action" of the individual, in this way, the application of the method is obviously open to ideological influence. However, the situation is compounded by the potential of the researchers themselves being influenced by the ideology and, even further, by the inability of the method to identify and criticize this influence. Ultimately then, such a method, in its application, will ignore various dominant social notions which must be critically investigated if ideology is to be combatted. For Habermas, to understand the present society as an aggregate of the individuals composing it, implies that one is taking the individuals on their own ideologically imposed terms, i.e. accepting their prima facie interests as being their true interests, and their interpretations of society and their relationships to it, as being correct. In other words, one either assumes the individuals to be free, in a way in which they may not be, or one simply ignores the fact or possibility of their being unfree, i.e. that their ideas and interests are determined "externally" and they are deceived. In such circumstances, it is easy to comprehend the connection between Habermas and Adorno: in Adorno's terms, to view society as a collection of individuals, in the way clarified above, is to forego the opportunity to attack the ideological "substratum" which determines their actions and beliefs.

A further elucidation of Habermas's position can be extracted from his assessment of Gestalt wholes. Once again he rejects any

favorable comparison between the dialectical totality as described by Adorno and the notion of a Gestalt whole; the reason being that Habermas believes, with Ernest Nagel, that Gestalt wholes are susceptible to an "additive" or atomistic analysis as carried out by the scientific method. Nagel, in The Structure of Science, argues convincingly for the following position:

> . . . the mere fact that a system is a structure of dynamically interrelated parts does not suffice, by itself, to prove that the laws of such a system cannot be reduced to some theory developed initially for certain assumed constituents of the system.[14]

Nagel's additive analysis essentially is an approach which claims that any complex can be successfully analyzed by breaking it up into discrete parts and making observations and constructing theories about these parts independently of the complex in which they originally occurred. Habermas agrees with Nagel concerning Gestalt wholes, and therefore wishes to distinguish between such wholes and the societal totality, which, for Habermas, cannot be analyzed in such a way by means of empirical science, although some method must provide such an analysis if Ideologiekritik is to be successfully carried out. As we shall see in chapter III and have already discussed in the present chapter, neither Habermas nor Adorno believes that the scientific approach can successfully separate the individual from the effects of the ideology. Hence, the observations and theories concerning the beliefs and actions of individuals, and the nature of social reality ultimately are about individuals and a society influenced ideologically, where the ideology cannot be distinguished in such observations and theories.

In either case, the organic/Gestalt or the atomistic (explanation in terms of individuals' actions and beliefs), there is no dialectical relationship. The reason for rejecting these two views as being non-dialectical is as follows. The organic view claims that the essence of the individual as a member of the societal whole is constituted by his or her being a member of that whole, i.e. the individual as a member of society, has his or her essential nature determined by being a member of the society. What this societal determinism means concretely is that there is no escape from the societal context. The individual is determined from the standpoints of freedom (actions and beliefs) and understanding (knowledge is a function of societal context). Essential nature is being characterized in terms of freedom and knowledge, and in the organic understanding of the social whole, the scope for freedom is determined by societal constraints, while knowledge, i.e. the realization of the capacity to understand and criticize society, is also determined, once again, by social constraints in the form of dominant interpretations, concepts and values. Finally then, regarding any given society at any point in its history, for the organic/Gestalt view of society, social institutions and traditions are the determining facts regarding the nature of individuals' values, beliefs and overall understanding of themselves and their society. In terms of methodology, this view leads, in turn, to the position that even as a researcher my studies will reflect ideas whose correctness is not "absolute," but has its source of justification in the dominant social milieu. To avoid the extension of this organic/Gestalt point of view into the area of social science research, one

must be able to justify the immunity of the methodology from such influences. Traditionally, this view of society has led to epistemological relativism, i.e. there can be no objective account of society, but rather every contemporary account reflects the prevailing values and concepts in the society. The opposite extreme, which tends to look at society as an aggregate of discrete parts, regards the basic parts as the individuals, their actions, beliefs, from which arise relations among them. In this view there is no need to look to the "societal" whole or social context, rather one considers the individuals, their actions, beliefs and relations in order to reveal the nature of society. More importantly, however, this standpoint regards the dominant social notions as originating from the individuals. Habermas's concern with this view of society is fundamentally the same as it was with regard to the organic/Gestalt position, i.e. the recognition of ideology. The fear in the case of the aggregate view stems from the tendency, methodologically, to rely upon the individuals, their actions, values and interpretations, as accurately indicating their true situation in society. Adorno describes the problem when he says: "Empirical social research itself becomes ideology as soon as it posits public opinion as being absolute."[15] In trusting public opinion, the subjective views of the majority of individuals are taken to be the truth, i.e. the truth of their values and the truth of the nature of society.

Clearly however, this is not enough of an argument to justify condemning this view of understanding the society, for there is more to understanding society and social events than the initial disposition

regarding the basic structure of the society. A positivist would immediately claim that the approach of empirical science has throughout its development in history and does today act as a check on subjective views which have been ideologically contaminated. The Habermas/Adorno response, and this will be elaborated upon in chapter III, is to claim that contemporary science is itself susceptible to ideological influence and this can occur in numerous ways: a) Dominant notions such as "rationality," "normal behaviour," human nature," the premises and basic rules governing the socio-economic order, etc., become accepted as <u>givens</u> and beyond critique. b) The limitations of the neo-positivist approach, due to the restrictions for application because of the rigorous nature of scientific testing, result in social scientists not being able to carry out the required testing, even if they chose to or realized the need for the critique of such notions as listed in (a). c) Finally, science itself can become ideological or represent a form of ideology due to its lack of potential for critical self-reflection. Such self-critique should be total, questioning all fundamental aspects of the method, especially those aspects pertaining to the definition of knowledge and how knowledge is achieved. The main difficulty with carrying out such a critique lies in the fact that it has become the standard for the achievement of and definition of knowledge.

In the last paragraph the concern was directed toward more methodological considerations, however, there are still what one might call <u>conceptual</u> issues in Habermas's position on how society should be initially characterized. The most important consideration is that of regarding the structure of society as a <u>totality</u>, i.e. dialectically.

It is quickly evident that neither the organic/Gestalt nor the atomistic account of society is dialectical in the sense intended by Habermas and Adorno.

In terms of the organic/Gestalt notion of society, the meaning of actions and the content of beliefs of individuals comes from the societal context. The individual's situation is one in which he or she simply reacts to the social context and understands this context in terms of dominant notions of value and truth. There is no dialectical relationship here. In a dialectical scenario, even given that one side at present dominates in terms of determining the nature of society and how it is understood and how individuals behave, there is recognition of, in this case, the potential of individuals to see through the dominant notions or ideology and to shape society according to their freely chosen values, goals and critically obtained "objective" or non-ideological understanding of themselves and their social relationships. Organic/Gestalt views tend to ignore this view of the individual because they do not regard it as a possibility that the individuals can critically distance themselves from dominant social notions in this way.

On the other hand, the notion that society can be defined and analyzed by empirical science as an aggregate of its atoms, i.e. individuals, their actions and beliefs, is also non-dialectical. The difficulty in this case is that the possibility of individuals being dominated by societal notions is excluded or ignored; rather, all such notions are to be derived from the actions and beliefs of individuals. Insofar as the individual's actions and beliefs are recognized as

echoing socially dominant notions, this recognition does not stem from an awareness of hidden social relationships and notions, i.e. from an awareness of ideology. Rather, the determinations recognized are overt in their sources, i.e. expressed fear of losing one's job, expressed fear for personal safety, observed behaviour regarding social institutions, etc. Determining factors, which are obvious in this way, do not count as ideology, although they may very well be the manifestations of ideological influence. For Habermas/Adorno, these determining elements and their influence can be fully and correctly understood only after the ideological influence has been exposed. Clearly it is the case that Habermas understands the aggregate or atomistic view of society, as one which will ignore the dialectical relationship between individuals and ideology. Implicit in Habermas's position is the view that adopting the aggregate standpoint entails certain methodological preferences, such as applying a method which regards individuals, their observed actions and expressed beliefs, as the fundamental constituents of a proper account and comprehension of society. When the individual, as he regards himself and society, is taken as epistemologically and methodologically fundamental, then Ideologiekritik is impossible. Finally, Ideologiekritik is only possible when the method recognizes the possibility of a dialectical tension between individuals and ideology occurring in a society. An approach to and view of society which recognizes one side or the other as basic, i.e. two kinds of reductionism, rules out the possibility of such critique. If one holds the organic view, not even the researcher can escape the influence of ideology. On the other hand, the aggregate view ignores the

possibility of an ideology functioning beyond the awareness of the individuals.

Having considered the rejected extreme positions, let us now turn to the notion of society as a "dialectical totality." First a qualification is in order. Certainly a society does not have to be ideologically determined in order to deserve the description of being dialectical. A dialectical relationship can exist between aspects of society which are accurately and correctly understood and not involving a hidden ideology. However, this type of dialectical relationship is not the crucial aspect of a notion of societal totality, given that the main concern of Habermas/Adorno is that of Ideologiekritik. Before social relationships can be properly understood as dialectical, one must first discern the presence and nature of ideological influence. Another way in which to indicate the different points of emphasis, is to distinguish between methodological/epistemological concerns for the understanding of society, and practical (political, ethical) concerns for changing the social structure and relationships. For Habermas, such a distinction, in terms of critical theory, is a false abstraction, as critical theory is intended to achieve both these goals. However, in the Tübingen debate, the central issue is the proper methodological approach to be adopted by the social sciences, and an important aspect of this issue is how society should be initially viewed prior to the selection or formulation of a method. Clearly then, one aspect of society as a totality is being emphasized, that which concerns society as involving a dialectical relationship between individuals and ideology. Once again, before one can set about

changing society through practical intervention, and before one can be justifiably confident in talking about the dialectical nature of various social relationships, one must first arrive at a method which can yield the correct account of society. This method must be capable of understanding a society which is a dialectical totality in the sense that it is ideologically determined. As the concern of this thesis revolves around methodological and epistemological issues in the social sciences, it is society as a totality ideologically which serves as the focal point of our study.

The dialectical relationship of significance to methodological and epistemological concerns is that between the individuals and the ideology. This relationship takes the form of a tension between individuals, who have the potential to understand accurately themselves in relation to their society, to be able to criticize their society, and, within the limits of practical and political limitations, to be able to structure society in such a way that it reflects their true goals, on the one hand, and an ideology that prevents this potential from being realized, on the other. The presence of ideology means that instead of being able to realize this capacity, a false essence is being supplied by the ideology and one which determines the individuals in their actions and beliefs, in spite of what they think. The essence of the social individual is thus supplied from a quasi-external influence, but this influence is not independent of the individual, rather it is dependent upon the individual for its own realization. At this stage of this relationship, neither side can be taken as the basis of society. The individuals, although having the capacity to be the

essence of society, cannot realize their capacity due to ideology. However, the ideology cannot be understood in terms of something truly independent of and an "in-itself" in relation to the individuals, for the ideology is, as Adorno says, only the "undeniable appearance of their independent existence (An-sich-Sein). . . ." Ultimately then, the approach to understanding society of this type must be critical and avoid reduction either to dominant social notions or the constituting individuals in themselves, for neither can be understood fully without reference to the other. To reduce all to ideology, is to deny the potential of the individuals to overcome these notions, and, for Habermas/Adorno, their inherent drive toward this overcoming, as evidenced by the antagonisms in society either among individuals or in the specific psychological conditions of individuals. To emphasize the role of individuals and, in particular, to become methodologically and epistemologically dependent upon the beliefs and actions of individuals, is to ignore the possibility of ideology or to simply succumb to its functioning in the background and its limiting of our capacities for both freedom and knowledge.

To close this section and to anticipate further discussion on dialectic, it should be noted that the solution to the problem of ideology demands that it be possible to dissolve the dialectical relationships which is the source and maintenance of the societal totality. Such a dissolution of the dialectical relationship would involve the revealing and eliminating of the contradiction existing between the claims of the ideology and the truth of social reality.

Section 2

The present section will be concerned with two topics: 1) a continuation of the investigation into the concept of "societal totality," this time in terms of the debate between methodological individualism and methodological holism; and b) the introduction of an investigation into the relationship between the scientific method and ideology.

Although there is a vast literature on the holist-individualist debate, the texts referred to and quoted in this section have been carefully chosen for their relevance to the issues of the nature of society and the Popper versus Adorno/Habermas controversy concerning approaches in the social sciences.

The main issue in this approach to the methodological individualism-methodological holism debate concerns the disposition of these positions toward the constitution of society. To introduce this topic, let us begin by dealing with Joseph Agassi's treatment of the holist-individualist debate. A methodological individualist and supporter of Popper's position in favor of the application of the scientific method to the social sciences, Agassi, in "Methodological Individualism,"[16] provides an account of the individualist-holist debate that emphasizes the "constitution" issue. The following three claims characterize the individualist position for Agassi.

1. Only individuals are responsible actors in the social and historical stage.
2. There is no mysterious entity which turns a collection of individuals into a society.
3. The social-setting is not God-given, but rather explained in terms of human action.[17]

The first statement has implicit in it a contrast to the position asserting that there is something beyond the individuals which possesses a will and purpose, and intervenes in history. It is clear from the previous section that ideology, as understood by Habermas and Adorno, does not constitute an independent will determining the actions and beliefs of historical or social individuals. To this extent, Adorno and Habermas can agree with the methodological individualist on the point in question.

The first sentence seems to have been geared toward something like Augustine's notion of divine influence or Hegel's notion of Absolute Spirit in history. The second tenet is a widening of the scope of the first and is directed toward the nature of society, as opposed to history, and is aimed at eliminating any kind of "entity," which forms a society from a collection of individuals, and here the Nazi notion of "Volk" could be one instance of such an entity. In this last case a metaphysical concept is treated as a real force determining the essence of the individuals in the nation, how they understand themselves and their relationship to the state. The individualist claim regards individuals as the only possible responsible actors in history and in a society. There is no spiritual or metaphysical entity which determines their beliefs and actions and provides them with a purpose in life.

To clarify this position in terms of Habermas/Adorno, certainly they do not subscribe to any notion of "mysterious entity"--ideology is not an entity. However, the implicit claim of the individualist supports the view that individuals themselves are responsible for

forming themselves into a society. The question of how the first society was formed is not the issue in this debate; but if the position is extended to mean any given stage in the history of a society, then the individualist claim appears somewhat extreme. While there is no entity involved, individuals seem to reproduce society on the basis of the social context (rules, conventions, tradition, concepts, values, etc.) within which they function. Granted, ideas, rules, values, etc. do not count as entities, but they are givens and do influence, and indeed, constitute our understanding of society. To argue that society is constituted by individuals in an ontological sense would not be an issue between the two sides; the problem arises regarding in what sense and whether or not a given group of individuals forming a society are, in fact, "responsible."

To claim that there is no entity purposefully guiding individuals could give the impression that individuals simply create society and freely determine their own values and goals. This view is false; rather they are given society and, to a great degree, are molded, in terms of personality, values and understanding of society, according to given social norms and dominant interpretations. The point for Habermas/Adorno is not that there is some mysterious entity operating to form individuals into a society, but rather that individuals can come to regard or unconsciously assimilate various notions and values in such a way that the latter, for all intents and purposes, have an effect as if they were mysterious, independent entities influencing and determining the nature of social actions and social structures. Given this qualification, i.e. the recognition of ideology, Habermas/Adorno

could quite easily agree with the second claim mentioned describing the methodological individualist position. Certainly, ontologically, there is no dispute about rejecting mysterious entities.

The third claim provides even further reason for concern in the light of misgivings expressed in the immediately preceding paragraph. Here the position is that society must be explained in terms of human action, and not as the product of some independent agent. The issue between the Frankfurt School representatives and the methodological individualists is now much clearer. Given that there is no mysterious entity influencing the constituting and structuring of human society, and that explanations should be in terms of human actions, beliefs, etc., the next issue can be expressed in the question: How are these beliefs and actions to be investigated, understood and explained? Before dealing with these two questions, which go to the heart of the issue between individualists and the Frankfurt School, let us turn to the "holist" position as outlined by Agassi and measure the response of Habermas and Adorno to this standpoint.

One of the holist tenets has already been dealt with in Section 1, and this is the idea that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. As has already been seen, this position involves or can involve numerous aspects which must be rejected just as much by Habermas and Adorno, as by the methodological individualists such as Popper. The following claim has been made in this regard by holists: the essence of what it is to be a social being, a member of society, stems from the individual's relationship to society.[19] The holist is here claiming that one must look outside the individual's nature in order to explain

his actions and beliefs, i.e. one must look to social institutions, concepts, tradition, etc. One can easily understand the tendency to imagine something in-itself and independent as the source of meaning for individuals in society and as the determining factor in the structuring of society, human relationships, beliefs and actions. Again, one has the tendency, in this case, toward speaking of the mysterious entity.

This position entails implications for both freedom and knowledge in society. On the one hand, individual freedom is viewed as constrained by the "whole," because the society's institutions, rules, traditions, etc. are viewed as determining actions and beliefs; on the other hand, the understanding of society is relative to the society itself, i.e. what is called the "sociology of knowledge." The individual cannot be objectively or totally critical because certain assumptions used to understand and investigate society are supplied by the influence of that society and hence are immune to criticism.

Habermas and Adorno would agree with the above implications, i.e. with the effects on the individual, but not with the origin of such effects insofar as the origin is conceived of something existing, in truth and reality, as an in-itself independent of the individuals in the society. It must be remembered that ideology, which has the same effects, is not real in this sense, but possesses only the <u>appearance</u> of being real. The view that the whole is an in-itself, that there is a mysterious entity, <u>is</u> a form of ideology on the Habermas/Adorno view. The reality is that ideology is a lie and that individuals possess the potentiality to be free from its constraints in their actions and

beliefs. To view the whole, in this organic or Gestalt sense, as real means that one views the constraints as real and hence there is no escape in terms of functioning in a way such that one has overcome these constraints. In this case there is no belief that individuals have the potential for such freedom. A societal totality, in the Habermas/Adorno sense, is a society in which the individuals behave and believe as though the whole were more than the sum of its parts.

Another feature of the holist position,[19] is the view that people's aims do not constitute society, but rather depend upon it. Once again, for Habermas/Adorno and the methodological individualist, individual freedom is a major concern. The holist position threatens the possibility of freedom with an extreme social determinism. But what would it mean for an individual, taken by himself, to contribute to the constituting of society, in a way such that this social determinism is successfully combatted? One condition, obviously, is that the individual must be free from ideological influence. This means that the individual must be able to assess critically all concepts and norms given in the society. Again the holist position seems to assert that the individual cannot reach this position of gaining a complete critical distance with regard to the society, its values and concepts. To assert, as the extreme holist would, that our aims are supplied by the society means that one is not free to determine one's own aims, so once again the societal determinism is a threat. In the societal totality, although the individuals do have the potential to criticize these aims and supplant them with others, they cannot realize this potential because of their mistaken view that these aims are

unalterable and inescapable. Hence, the individuals act and believe as if their aims originated completely in the society, as something real and independent of their influence or power to change it.

The last position attributed to the holist[20] claims the determination of all actions in the society by the social context (institutions, and given values, concepts, etc.). Again, insofar as society is intended as a mysterious entity, Habermas and Adorno must join the methodological individualist in rejecting this position.

To summarize the results of this individualist-holist comparison, there can be little doubt that the notion of a societal totality, where ideology is the effective influence on individuals rather than the mysterious social entity with a reality in-itself, means that Habermas and Adorno are closer to the methodological individualists concerning the "real" constitution of society and individuals. The marriage breaks down, however, in terms of the question already posed, i.e. how one is to investigate, understand and explain the actions and beliefs of individuals who constitute society. It would appear that only insofar as one understands methodological individualism to involve a specific methodological approach, can one reasonably defend the claim for there being a crucial point of disagreement between Habermas/Adorno and the methodological individualist.

Section 3

Adorno's position regarding the role of ideology in constituting the beliefs of individuals and further determining other beliefs and the actions of social individuals has already been introduced.

Popper, the most prominent representative of methodological individualism, also has some appreciation of ideology, and even argues against those who deny it an effective role.

> The power of ideas, and especially of moral and religious ideas, is at least as important as that of physical resources. I am well aware of the fact that some students of politics are strongly opposed to this thesis; that there is an influential school of so-called political realists who declare that 'ideologies', as they call them, have little influence upon political reality, and that whatever influence they have must be pernicious. But I do not think that this is a tenable view. Were it true, Christianity would have had no influence on history; and the United States would be inexplicable, or merely the result of a pernicious mistake.[21]

In this passage Popper clearly recognizes the influence of ideology, but emphasizes the positive and good results of this influence. But what if the influence is pernicious and how does one know until one fully understands the nature of the ideology and its effects? Popper is not so optimistic in this regard, and vehemently rejects approaches specifically designed to combat ideology as a threat to the quest for truth and freedom.

> The sociology of knowledge argues that scientific thought, and especially thought on social and political matters, does not proceed in a vacuum, but in a socially conditioned atmosphere. It is influenced largely by unconscious or subconscious elements. These elements remain hidden from the thinker's observing eye because they form, as it were, the very place which he inhabits, his social habitat. The social habitat of the thinker determines a whole system of opinions and theories which appear to him as unquestionably true or self-evident. They appear to him as if they were logically and trivially true. . . . This is why he is not even aware of having made any assumptions at all. But that he has made assumptions can be seen if we compare him with a thinker who lives in a very different social habitat; for he too will proceed from a system of apparently unquestionable assumptions, but from a very different one; and it may be so different that no intellectual bridge may exist and no compromise be possible between these two systems. Each of these different socially determined systems of assumptions is called by the sociologists of knowledge a total ideology.[22]

Clearly then, Popper and Adorno/Habermas hold very similar positions concerning the ideological "make-up" of the social individual; however, Popper is not so optimistic about the extent to which ideology can be revealed. Popper uses two umbrella phrases for the approaches to combatting ideology and they are "sociology of knowledge" and "socio-therapy" respectively.[23] The goal of these operations, in their various forms, is to free the individual from ideological constraints and influence by revealing to him or her the true nature of various beliefs as ideology, i.e. baseless or false, or both.

Popper's position is simply that, thus far (the emphasis here anticipates the main topic of this thesis as the consideration of yet another attempt to deal with ideology), the main result of socio-therapy, in whatever form, has been merely to substitute one instance of ideology for another.

> Hegelianism does it by declaring the admissibility and even fertility of contradictions. But if contradictions need not be avoided, then any criticism and any discussion becomes impossible since criticism always consists in pointing out contradictions either within the theory to be criticized, or between it and some facts of experience. . . . the psycho-analyst can always explain away any objections by showing that they are due to the repressions of the critic. . . . Marxists . . . are accustomed to explain the disagreement of an opponent by his class bias, and the sociologists of knowledge by his total ideology.[24]

Popper rejects all of the above approaches, and keeping in mind that Popper represents the empirical-scientific approach to the social sciences, the following explanation of the passage can be given. First, however, Popper's remarks concerning the Hegelian perspective will be exempted from comment at this time, as this issue will be dealt with in detail in the following chapter. Concerning the other

approaches, Popper has two criticisms. On the one hand, there is the problem of insufficient empirical evidence. Regarding the psycho-analyst neither adequate confirming evidence for, nor, more importantly, the possibility of empirical testing of the interpretation seem available. On the side of the Marxist, Popper again points to the problem of sufficient empirical evidence, especially for testing, this time concerning the causal connection asserted to hold between one's membership in a certain socio-economic class and one's understanding of society. On the other hand, there is the problem of sociological relativism. Popper expresses this difficulty in the following passage.

> . . . the socio-analysts invite the application of their own methods to themselves with an almost irresistible hospitality. For is it not their description of an intelligentsia which is only loosely anchored in tradition a very neat description of their own social group?[25]

This criticism could be levelled at the psycho-analyst and the Marxist, along with the socio-analyst. Popper's basic claim is that in all such cases one is simply substituting one ideology for another, and the power of this criticism is, in turn, based upon the absence of any means of criticizing the results of and the premises of these investigations and explanations. Popper's observations here are notable because, as we shall see in Chapters IV and V of this thesis, Habermas is faced with the same problem in his formulation of critical theory.

Popper's response to the issue of exchanging ideologies is to appeal to and defend his well-known scientific method. But even those who practice this approach are not immune to ideological influence, and Popper makes this admission unconditionally.

> . . . there is no doubt that we are all suffering under our own system of prejudices (or 'total ideologies,' . . .); that we all take many things as self-evident, that we accept them uncritically and even with the naive and cocksure belief that criticism is quite unnecessary, and scientists are no exception to this rule. . . .[26]

However, the scientist has a different approach to the problem:

> . . . they have not purged themselves by socio-analysis or any similar method; they have not attempted to climb to a higher plane from which they can understand, socio-analyse, and expurgate their ideological follies. . . . No, what we usually mean by this (scientific objectivity) term rests on different grounds. It is a matter of scientific method. And, ironically enough, objectivity is closely bound up with the social aspect of scientific method, with the fact that science and scientific objectivity do not (and cannot) result from the attempts of an individual scientist to be 'objective,' but from the friendly-hostile co-operation of many scientists. Scientific objectivity can be described as the inter-subjectivity of scientific method. But this social aspect of science is almost entirely neglected by those who call themselves sociologists of knowledge.[27]

The consolation of the scientific method is offered by its public nature, and the crux of this is twofold: a) free criticism; and b) speaking the same language, based upon "experience as the impartial arbiter" of controversies.[28] Popper sums up by saying, "This is what constitutes scientific objectivity. Everyone who has learned the technique of understanding and testing scientific theories can repeat the experiment and judge for himself."[29]

Thus Popper offers the scientific method as a mode of Ideologiekritik. In terms of the issues of constitution and investigation, it is clear that the methodological individualist and the Adorno/Habermas position both recognize the role and existence of ideology, and hence, that there is apparent agreement on the way in which individuals, as thinking and acting social participants, are constituted. This leaves only one way in which to distinguish the two

sides of the Habermas/Adorno versus Popper debate, and that is the critical assessment of and investigation of ideologies, which, in its turn, is a methodological issue.

The main tenet of Popper's position on methodology is the ideological purity of "scientific experience" or experience as "the impartial arbiter," which will not only decide disagreements and between conflicting points of view, but is also the basis for the language of discussion, and both these points will be critically considered in Chapter III. The key point to mention in our present discussion, however, is the implication of this methodological question for the issue of dialectically conceived societal totality. Implicit in Popper's claim for the scientific method is its privileged position beyond or independent of ideological impurity, at least in principle. As an impartial arbiter, scientifically acquired experience is the only means of combatting ideology. To be sure, matters are not helped by the apparent ambiguity of Popper's position. On the one hand, he says that the practitioners of the method can never totally rid themselves of prejudices of an ideological nature, but on the other, in practicing the scientific method, the results are independent of ideological contamination since the method is an "impartial arbiter."

For the moment let us leave aside the claim for the impartiality of the scientific method, as Chapter III will introduce an extensive discussion of Habermas's arguments against this position. The possibility of total ideology demands, for its successful elimination, a method which will constitute or be capable of "total critique" and Popper has denied this scope to the scientific method in admitting that

we cannot rid ourselves of all ideological prejudices even given the ideological immunity claimed for science. The main problem for the results of the scientific method is as follows: given that the method does not have universal scope, one is left with the unhappy possibility that fundamental ideological influences are functioning, with negative ramifications both politically and epistemologically, independently of and immune to the critique and investigation of the scientific method. Another way of putting the problem is by noting that the scientific method can proceed and succeed very well in its limited sphere of operations, but never challenge or reveal the total ideology, which in turn leaves society as a dialectical totality or a societal totality. Reliance upon commonly accepted social science terminology and, as Adorno notes in his discussion of the German student demonstrations in Berlin,[30] the inability of the method to encompass all relevant social variables and influences, results in ideology being safe from scientific scrutiny. The obvious conclusion then would be to assert that in spite of the success of the scientific method, the only remedy to the possibility of total ideology, is "total" Ideologiekritik.

The implications of this assessment of the scientific method reveal that Popper does not grasp the possibility of society being a dialectical totality and just what that involves. Insistence upon the impartiality of the results of the scientific method entails a rejection of the view that society is a societal totality in the sense intended by Habermas and Adorno. A method that is not universal in investigation and critique cannot correctly claim impartiality because

there is always the possibility that these unchallenged "prejudices" or ideology influences the nature and understanding of these apparently impartial results. On the one hand, Popper recognizes ideology in such a way that one can be a methodological individualist and still hold to society as a dialectical totality; on the other hand, his claim for the impartiality of the empirical scientific method contradicts the previous view of society as a victim of total ideology.

Conclusion

The main concern of this opening chapter has been to clarify the notion of society as a "totality," or society as conceived of "dialectically," by considering these notions in conjunction with a study of Popper's neo-positivist approach to the social sciences and the implications of this latter view for the possible understanding of society. The difference between the two points of view came clearly into sight only when the conflict was revealed between Popper's acceptance of the role of ideology on the one hand, and his confidence in the impartiality of the scientific method on the other.

With regard to the notion of "totality," the dialectical tension was discovered to exist between the individuals in the society and a hidden ideology. The implications of this relationship are crucial for evaluating methodological approaches in the social sciences. Adorno's claim is for what Popper has called "total ideology," meaning that the present state of society, methodologies included, is ideologically contaminated and determined. As an assessment of the results of such methodologies the implication is that such approaches are

incapable of revealing ideology for what it is, i.e. they are incapable of overcoming the dialectical relationship, marked by the mutual mediation of individual and ideology, which, in turn, would involve grasping the truth of society independent of ideological content.

Finally, there should be no mystery concerning the meaning of "dialectical" in this context. The individuals are what give the ideology existence or realize its notions through their beliefs and actions. In doing so they behave and believe as if there were something beyond themselves determining their actions and beliefs, hence, the essence of society cannot be described as the result of actions and beliefs of free individuals realizing their true natures and interests. A second feature of the dialectical situation is that it <u>can</u> be overcome, or at least there is the potential for change embodied in the belief that individuals have the capacity to reassert successfully their freedom against the influence of a <u>particular</u> ideology, for Adorno, and against ideology <u>in general</u> or <u>totally</u>, for Habermas.[31] The task of successfully remedying the ideological effects of a dialectical totality anticipates the investigation of the various aspects of dialectic, those of "contradiction," "determinate negation," and "mediation," together with the methodological approach of "immanent critique," all of which will be explored in the following chapter.

Chapter II

A PROPAEDEUTIC ON "DIALECTIC" IN EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

In Chapter I the methodological/epistemological implications of society being a totality were considered at some length. In the course of that discussion, some attempt was made to clarify the notion of "dialectic," a concept essential to the understanding of Adorno's notion of society. Dialectic will remain in the spotlight for the present chapter, because of the significance of this concept for Habermas, and the unending controversy existing between its exponents and detractors since its Hegelian development.

Habermas describes his approach to the study of society as "dialectical," and this stems from the possibility that society is a dialectical totality. Habermas's critiques of both the analytic-empirical and hermeneutical methods are based on what is deemed by him to be the failures of these approaches to grasp the dialectical nature of society and, hence, their inability to disclose ideology. To strengthen his position regarding the dialectical nature of society itself, Habermas's critique of methodology is geared toward demonstrating that these methods are, themselves, dialectically related to the society which they are attempting to understand and explain. Given the truly dialectical relationship between the method and its object, Habermas must be able to show: a) the method-object "mediation," b) the contradictions between the methods' understanding of themselves and of their relationship to their object, on the one hand, and the truth of their own natures and their relationship to their object, on

the other; and c) a "determinate negation" arising from the positions criticized, meaning that a new method and method-object relationship would arise from the "immanent critique" of the earlier approaches.

However, there are broader considerations that justify focussing, for a while at least, exclusively upon dialectic. The concept, throughout its modern history, has been a source of constant debate. In Chapter I, Popper's rejection of Hegel's position concerning contradiction was discussed, because Popper has been at the forefront of the criticism of dialectical thought. Partially as a result of such criticism, no matter how well one might argue for Habermas's position, the moment the term "dialectic" occurs, those raised in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition suffer immediate philosophical estrangement, and not without justification. Throughout the history of philosophy there have been various concepts which have been used by their supporters as if they were all-purpose philosophical elixirs, the mere reference to which is supposed to relieve us of all philosophical problems. It is a major philosophical virtue of the twentieth century's linguistic turn in philosophy, that such elixirs are no longer accepted on blind faith. Unfortunately, the concept of dialectic suffers from this stigma and demands a thorough analysis to accompany its use, if it is to attain any respectable level of philosophical credibility.

Given that to be thorough in our investigation the concept of dialectic demands special and detailed consideration, one must decide where to begin with its treatment. The strategy adopted at this time is to return to the source of the problem and that is the philosophy of

G.W.F. Hegel. But why, one might ask, must one go all the way back to German idealism in order to clarify the philosophy of the neo-Marxist Habermas? The answer to this is as simple as it is unfortunate: although Habermas adheres to the concept both explicitly and implicitly, he nowhere gives a detailed account of how he understands it, especially in the context of epistemological and methodological issues. There are two passages, one in Knowledge and Human Interests[1] and another in Legitimation Crisis,[2] in which Habermas deals with dialectic, however, in neither instance does he engage in a detailed structural account. In Legitimation Crisis, Habermas is concerned with the infamous dialectical contradiction as it occurs in a "social formation," but in Knowledge and Human Interests he addresses the problem of the critique of knowledge, i.e. the basis of methodological studies; and in this latter case, he is involved in a consideration of Hegel, expressing his rejection of idealism, but condoning the notion of "determinate negation." Once again, however, in neither case is one supplied with a structural analysis of dialectic, which would have to come to grips with the notion of a dialectical contradiction as the basis of determinate negation.

A major aspect of Habermas's debt to Hegel is his acceptance of the latter's notion of dialectical structure; however, this structure, as seen from Popper's perspective, does not have universal acceptance philosophically. Some defence is, therefore, necessary, and Hegel is the best source of analysis for dialectic, because it is in Hegel's thought that dialectic reaches its most complex development. The point at which our effort will be concentrated is the section of the

Phenomenology of Spirit entitled "Sense-certainty."[3] The choice of this section has a two-part justification: on the one hand, in sense-certainty Hegel is dealing with the simplest level of knowledge and subject-object relationship, and the simple content facilitates focussing on the structure of the relationship, and subsequent analysis; on the other hand, in this part of the Phenomenology Hegel concentrates on epistemological issues, i.e. the foundations of methodology.

Having described and justified the strategy, the format of the chapter is as follows: Section 1 will consider the structure of dialectic, and Section 2 will be devoted to a response to Popper's criticisms.

Section 1

In the first part of the Phenomenology, entitled "Consciousness" ("Bewusstsein"), Hegel's general concern is with epistemological issues,[4] and his specific concern is with what one might describe as knowledge based upon our sensory experience. With regard to this type of experience as a basis for knowledge, the various positions adopted and argued for throughout the history of philosophy have fallen between two extremes: on the one hand, there is the position that all cognitive content is to be traced back to the subject--a kind of extreme epistemological idealism; on the other, there have been those who support the view that all cognitive content comes from the object--an extreme epistemological realism.

On the meta-epistemological level of considering these various positions, Hegel echoes the sympathies of the tradition's respect for

objectivity, meaning that all precautions must be taken to avoid subjective input into the investigation, i.e. the integrity of the object (in this case, the subject-object relationship) must be preserved. In introducing the first level of "consciousness" involving a knowledge claim, Hegel briefly expresses the main tenet of his investigations.

> Wir haben uns ebenso unmittelbar oder aufnehmend zu verhalten, also nichts an ihm, wie es sich darbeitet, zu verändern und von dem Auffassen das Begreifen abzuhalten.[5]

Although this statement introduces sense-certainty, it reflects the main concern of the phenomenologist as he or she investigates various issues. The demand is that the investigator must be almost passive in "confronting" the object of consideration. Also, one must take care not to "alter" ("verändern"), in any way, this subject matter, and hence avoid interpreting what we are attempting to understand. From positivists to modern phenomenologists in philosophy, to strict empiricists in scientific laboratories, the aim or ideal has always been to achieve some cognition of the object of study, which, to as high a degree as possible, deals only with that object as it is by itself.[6]

In accordance with the objective sentiment, Hegel adopts the strategy of "immanent critique." This approach means that Hegel investigates the subject/object relationship, in this case that relationship at the level of sense-certainty, on its own terms or in terms of its own criteria and self-understanding, without the application of other external presuppositions or assumptions as standards. In other words, the reality of sense-certainty is to be contrasted with its claims.

For both the phenomenologist carrying out the inquiry and the consciousness holding the position of sense-certainty, the fate of sense-certainty is the same. The assumed, though only apparent, immediate unity of subject and object in sense-certainty breaks up into a duality of subject and object. At this very simple level of cognition the subject does not view itself as being distinct from the object, but rather the experience is one of complete unity for the subject. Hegel's position is that if such a consciousness becomes "self-reflective," i.e. if it considers or analyzes its position with all its aspects and presuppositions, consciousness will be confronted with a duality. This state of affairs leaves consciousness with two possibilities for the overcoming of the dualism: either to reduce the source of the content of knowledge to the subject or to the object. For sense-certainty these are the only two possibilities as it refuses the option that knowledge is the result of the mutual mediation by subject and object. Sense-certainty's consciousness insists that the relationship is one of "immediacy," i.e. the content of knowledge is supplied totally by the subject or by the object. Unfortunately for sense-certainty neither attempt at reduction to a one-sided epistemology is successful. Hegel first considers the possibility of the object supplying the full content of knowledge, i.e. the content of my experience comes from the object. In Hegelian terms the situation would be one in which the object is "immediate" and the subject "mediated" or simply the passive receptor for the object: again in Hegelian terms the object is "essential" (i.e. necessary and sufficient) for epistemological content, while the subject is "inessential."

Sense-certainty's grasp of the "immediate," what is experienced by consciousness "here," directly before it, and "now," at this very moment, turns out to involve more than just this simple immediate epistemological content. Sense-certainty makes the simple claim for the existence of what it experiences, and the further claim that this pure being is the essence of or content of knowledge. Further investigation, however, reveals that sense-certainty steps beyond the bounds of the claim for existence when it tries to describe or identify this existence. Designations such as "tree," "house," "nighttime" and "daytime" are all, as Jean Hyppolite says, ". . . specific determinations which presuppose an entire system of mediations."[7] In indulging in the use of such terms, the consciousness at the level of sense-certainty is going beyond its epistemological mandate. The main challenge in understanding Hegel's point here demands that we grasp the very primitive level at which sense-certainty is operating: it can claim only this existence and at this time, where any further determination of this, beyond the claim that it exists or is and that it is now, in identifying it, involves the application of concepts already held by the subject. The upshot of this discovery is that the object is not immediate but mediated, i.e. that the object does not, by itself, constitute the content of knowledge claimed by sense-certainty, but is mediated through concepts already possessed by the subject.

In an attempt to preserve this form of consciousness and the immediacy of the content of knowledge, the next move for sense-certainty is to assert the immediacy of the subject, thus making it the source of epistemological content. The subject or the "I" is now that

which gives and sustains being, and here Berkeley might be a useful example in the history of philosophy. However, once again, the subject or "I" claimed by sense-certainty cannot justify the claim to the continuity or identity of that self through the many and varied experiences it undergoes. Sense-certainty is justified in claiming only this experience (here), at this time (now), for this "I" which has this experience at this time. The problem with the "I" can be viewed in two ways: the potential conflict of claims about here and how between two different "I's," each of which asserts its claims to be the truth, or, in the same "I," but at two different "nows" experiencing two different "heres." Hegel emphasizes the first scenario. In this case, the single "I" of sense-certainty has the implication, in its claim to be the source of being and how that being is, that it speaks for every other "I." Conflict among a plurality of "I's" presents an unresolvable problem if each holds to its position, i.e. a multiplicity of conflicting claims about truth. How are we to decide in favor of one over the others, if not by referring beyond them to another standard besides the "I" or individual subjectivity, i.e. a reference to a standard for truth which is independent of the particular "I" and, hence, one that mediates it. The main candidate would seem to be some sort of appeal to the object.

In any case, the conclusion reached by Hegel demands a rejection of the claims made by sense-certainty. Both subject and object are mediated and the content of knowledge is the result of this mutual mediation. This mediation, in turn, is the basis for the next level of investigation and the next position regarding the nature of knowledge, which Hegel claims to be "perception."

The account of sense-certainty given above is certainly not intended as a comprehensive study of that section, nor has it been in the least critical of Hegel's position. However, the goal in providing this sketch of sense-certainty was neither a detailed exposition nor critical assessment, but rather the intent has been to provide an example of an investigation whose structure, due to the nature of the subject matter, is dialectical, and hence exhibits three salient features of dialectic, the notions of "mediation," "dialectical contradiction," and "determinate negation." Now let us turn to the actual structure of sense-certainty's dialectic.

Popper's method of "trial and error" serves as a foil for the discussion of dialectical structure. A central feature of the scientific method, trial and error involves the confrontation between a theory and a test instance. Ideally the test functions as a check on the theory, and if the former contradicts the theory then the theory has been falsified and must be rejected. To be a successful occurrence of trial and error, the contradicting instance need not involve, either logically or empirically, an alternative theory. It might indeed point to a specific alternative explanation, but this is gratuitous.

The "dialectical contradiction" works differently and is somewhat more complex. Although it too involves the rejection (in a way to be explained below) of theory, the negation of that former position cannot be "empty," i.e. supplying no alternative explanation, if the contradiction is to be correctly termed "dialectical." The immediate appearance of a new theory means that the negation of the old is a "determinate" negation.

Before embarking upon a structural analysis of sense-certainty in order to explain these dialectical notions, it is worth noting what has become accepted as the standard understanding of the dialectical process and this originates with Popper. The key concept is that of "aufheben," which possesses the following characteristics or stages:[8]

(1) cancellation ("aspects" of both contradictory claims are negated),

(2) preservation ("aspects" of both are preserved, i.e. deemed to be true), and

(3) transcendence (taken together, the preserved "aspects" provide a new position).

The subject-object relationship in sense-certainty is first understood as a unity, i.e. sense-certainty does not distinguish between subject and object. The first stage of investigation, by either the phenomenologist or a reflective consciousness at the level of sense-certainty, reveals the distinction between subject and object, or the "I" and the "This." To save both the immediacy or purity of its knowledge and that it knows what is, i.e. being, sense-certainty attempts a one-sided reduction in favor of the object. When this position proves incorrect, a reduction in favor of the subject as source of the content of knowledge is adopted. It is to be observed from the start that there are only three possible scenarios or "theories": a) the object is the source of the content of knowledge; b) the subject is the source of this content; or c) the content of knowledge depends on both the subject and the object, i.e. their mutual mediation. A formal symbolization of the movement through these three stages is as follows:

P = The content of knowledge has its source in the Object.

Q = The content of knowledge has its source in the Subject.

(P & Q) is rejected by sense-certainty from the outset, i.e. sense-certainty rejects the possibility of reciprocal mediation. With the awareness of the distinction between subject and object sense-certainty adopts the position of (P v Q), where the meaning of "v" is to be interpreted exclusively, hence -(P & Q) and -(-P & -Q). Next it should be noted, as has already been alluded to, that one is dealing with a severely limited set of options--there are only two possible sources of knowledge, i.e. the subject and the object. Given this limited universe of items and the restriction placed upon "v" in the disjunction (P v Q), the following symbolizations exhaustively describe the relationship between "P" and "Q" for sense-certainty.

i) if "P" then "-Q"; ii) if "Q" then "-P"; iii) if "-Q" then "P";
iv) if "-P" then "Q"

(Note: If either is the case then the other is not, and if either is not the case then the other is. The limited universe of possibilities for sense-certainty's position makes this a valid scenario.)

The results of Hegel's investigation are somewhat disturbing for sense-certainty, as Hegel reaches the conclusion, which is apparently (P & Q). However, a review of the account provided of sense-certainty, in this chapter, reveals that a better symbolization would be (P_1 & Q_1). As has already been shown, Hegel analyzes each claim, P and Q, independently. The reductionism expressed by both P and Q is shown to be false in each of the two cases. The reduction is not possible due to the nature of the knowledge claims made by sense-

certainty. On the side of the object, as understood by sense-certainty, a conceptual apparatus is needed which is not supplied by the object, but rather comes from the subject.[9] Similarly, the opposite position of reduction has to be rejected because it assumes object-input for the subject to possess knowledge. In both cases, the investigation does not simply falsify the original claim, but provides an alternative account of the nature of the content of knowledge. The results, which have been rendered P_1 and Q_1, of the critiques are not mutually exclusive as was the case with the original positions; rather, they augment each other, and <u>together</u> constitute a new explanation of the source of epistemological content. The content of the knowledge, claimed by sense-certainty, is, in actual fact, supplied by the mutual mediation, or reciprocal mediation, of the subject and the object. In Hegelian terms, neither the subject nor the object is immediate (unmediated) and sufficient by itself for knowledge; rather, the two sides taken together in their mediation are necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

Before turning to the notions of "mediation," "dialectical contradiction," and "determinate negation," two concepts should be noted which always stand in an adversarial relation to dialectic. The notion of <u>dialectic</u> on the one side, and the notions of <u>reductionism</u> and <u>dualism</u>, on the other, are always mutually exclusive,[10] and to overcome a dialectical relationship, either a dualism or a reduction must be achieved. Regarding sense-certainty, this position attempts to reduce the content of knowledge, alternatively, to either the subject or the object. The result of Hegel's phenomenological investigation

proves both these attempts to be incorrect. A more frustrating and challenging consequence, especially for those aspiring to pure objectivity of the ideal observer or subject, is that the dualism necessary to achieve such objectivity is lost to Hegel from the very start. The final assessment of sense-certainty's idea of the content of knowledge and how this content is composed leads to a mediation of contributions from subject and object. This specific instance of mediation entails the impossibility, at the level of consciousness enjoyed by sense-certainty, to separate the subjective from the objective elements, and thus to be able to distinguish between each side's respective contribution to knowledge. The achievement of such a distinction is tantamount to revealing a dualism between subjective and objective features of the cognitive experience. In this chapter, the final mediation of subject and object in sense-certainty has been focussed upon, and, for Hegel, this instance of mediation cannot be further analyzed, indeed this mediation is a necessary condition for all cognitive experience.

When one considers the mediation discussed in Chapter I the situation is quite different. There the mediation exists between individuals, their conscious and explicit awareness and understanding of society, and notions influencing their understanding, while remaining inaccessible to the person influenced by them. Such a mediation, rather than being a condition for the possibility of knowledge and an absolute and indissoluble mediation, is one which prevents us from discovering or knowing the truth, but is one that, according to Habermas (Adorno is more pessimistic regarding the potential for total critique)[11] can and must be overcome by achieving a separation or

distinction between the claims of the ideology and what is really the case.

The main reason for distinguishing between these two types of mediation is that it is one way of characterizing the critical challenge facing Habermas in his attempt to find a method for total Ideologiekritik. In short, Habermas must produce a method and means by which the mediation between individuals and ideology can be broken, and this method is, in turn, one that has to have a check against ideological contamination and hence must be capable of grasping the reality hidden and/or distortedly presented by the ideology. Whether or not Habermas succeeds in this quest for such a method will be the major consideration of Chapters IV and V.

To begin an analysis of "dialectical contradiction," it must be emphasized once again that dialectic, especially the aspect of mutual mediation, is a critical response to claims for reductionism or dualism. Sense-certainty's aim is to establish a reduction of the content of knowledge to either the subject or the object. An investigation of sense-certainty's demise reveals numerous contradictions: a) "P" is revealed to be false; b) "Q" is revealed to be false; and c) the conjunction of "-P" (P_1) and "-Q" (Q_1) falsifies the initial disjunction ($P \vee Q$). The dialectical relationship has, as a necessary feature, the stage of mutual mediation between, in this case, what is being reduced and that to which it is being reduced (all epistemological content is to be found in the object, thus leaving the subject empty of such content). In each instance of contradiction the negation of the original position possesses positive content, but providing

positive content, although necessary, is not a sufficient condition for being a dialectical contradiction. Dialectical contradiction must have both opposing options, "P" and "Q," negated in a positive fashion, and the results of the negations must combine in such a way as to indicate or demonstrate the mutual mediation of the elements regarded formerly as being independent of each other (dualism), or reducible from one side to the other (reductionism). The dialectical contradiction, therefore, involves the contradicting of two distinct claims for mutually exclusive positions, e.g. "P" and "Q." Each side or extreme is negated by a specific feature of the new position of mutual mediation.

The position taken in the present analysis of dialectical contradiction recognizes the contradiction between "P" and "Q," but emphasizes the contradiction of both these claims by the results of the phenomenological investigation, i.e. the mutual mediation of subject and object. Common philosophical parlance describes the original "P" and "Q" opposition as a confrontation between "thesis" and "antithesis." Working within this format as being the dialectical contradiction, it seems that a dialectical contradiction is such that, when analyzed, it yields a third option (mutual mediation), which falsifies the original opposing claims.

Returning to the "cancellation-preservation-transcendence" description, its appropriateness is obvious, but it remains a highly oversimplified way of understanding the dialectical movement. Both "P" and "Q" are cancelled insofar as neither is the sole supplier of content for knowledge. On the other hand, both are preserved insofar

as each does supply epistemological content. The position described as "P_1 & Q_1" transcends the original positions in that it provides a new explanation of the content of knowledge.

It should also be noted that there is no inference from a contradiction. All inferences are made on the basis of the positive content yielded by the phenomenological investigation. The contradiction, whether understood in its initial appearance as "P" and "Q," or as the falsification of these two sides "-P" (P_1) and "-Q" (Q_1), functions reflexively as a criticism of the position (P v Q), the assumption of sense-certainty.

The new position of (P_1 & Q_1) constitutes the "determinate negation" of the original position of (P v Q), and results from the separate and independent critiques of "P" and "Q." The determinate negation is the final condition for having a dialectical critique; positive content must result from the critique of the opposing positions.

To conclude this section, a few words should be said regarding the justification for this detailed account of dialectic and the choice of Hegel's investigation into sense-certainty as an example. Beginning with the second concern, the choice of sense-certainty provides an example of both a complex instance of dialectic and of "cognitive" dialectic. Given that Habermas obviously considers himself a dialectical thinker and relies upon the structural correctness of dialectic, it is encumbent upon anyone investigating Habermas to consider as closely as possible this feature of his thought. An investigation of sense-certainty offers the opportunity to study closely three of the

essential aspects of dialectic, i.e. mediation, contradiction and determinate negation, all of which are problematic for those who reject the dialectical tradition stemming from Hegel.

Sense-certainty is also an instance of "cognitive" dialectic, in that it is concerned with the cognitive relationship between subject and object, which constitutes the basis for epistemological claims. The main concern of this thesis, with regard to Habermas, is the early development of his methodological thought. The relevance of studying an instance of cognitive dialectic is clear when one considers that most methodological issues are either derivatives or examples of epistemological problems.

Both Habermas's critique of analytic-empirical and hermeneutical methods, and the proposal and formulation of an alternative approach originate from the concern to combat the deleterious effects of functioning in a society, in which our beliefs and actions are influenced by a false and delusory ideology. The relationship between the individuals and the ideology is dialectical: our understanding is mediated in its content by ideology, while the latter is mediated by us for its existence. However, although the structure is modeled on Hegel's notion of dialectic and the method of investigation is an immanent critique, if successful Habermas's endeavor will dissolve a contingent mediation which precludes the possibility of knowledge, rather than revealing an absolute mediation necessary for that possibility.

Finally, before moving on to a consideration of Popper's interpretation and critique of dialectic, in the following chapters

Habermas's debt to Hegel's dialectic will prove crucial for understanding both his critical and positive thought as it develops through the concepts of determinate negation, mediation and immanent critique (self-reflection).

Section 2

It would be difficult indeed to find another philosopher who has influenced Anglo-American philosophers regarding Hegelian thought as much as Karl Popper. Always critical, but rarely philosophically accurate in his interpretation of Hegelian concepts, Popper's animosity toward Hegel has dominated Anglo-American thinking on Hegel for the past half century. Most Popperians regard The Poverty of Historicism and the second volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies[12] as the high points in the vendetta, however, this section will concentrate on a smaller and earlier essay entitled "What is Dialectic?"[13] In this work Popper, much less verbose and polemical than in the later works, focusses all his philosophical attention on this most elusive concept.

Let us begin by providing immediately two lengthy passages from Popper, in which he offers an interpretation of dialectic and compares this with his own preferred method, that of trial and error.

> Dialectic . . . is a theory which maintains that something--more especially, human thought--develops in a way characterized by what is called the dialectic triad: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. First there is some idea or theory or movement which may be called a 'thesis.' Such a thesis will often produce opposition, because, like most things in the world, it will probably be of limited value and will have weak spots. The opposing idea or movement is called the 'antithesis,' because it is directed against the first, the thesis. The struggle between the thesis and the antithesis goes on until some solution is reached which, in a certain sense, goes beyond both thesis and antithesis by recognizing their respective values and by trying to preserve the merits and to avoid the

> limitations of both. This solution, which is the third step, is called the 'synthesis.' Once attained, the synthesis in its turn may become the first step of a new dialectic triad, and it will do so if the particular synthesis reached turns out to be one-sided or otherwise unsatisfactory.[14]
>
> Our earlier description of the trial and error method dealt only with an idea and its criticism, or, using the terminology of dialecticians, with the struggle between a thesis and its antithesis; originally we made no suggestions about a further development, we did not imply that the struggle between an idea and its criticism or between a thesis and its antithesis would lead to the elimination of the thesis (or, perhaps, of the antithesis) if it is not satisfactory; and that the competition of theories would lead to the adoption of new theories only if enough theories are at hand and are offered for trial.[15]

Clarification is needed immediately concerning Popper's use of the terms "theory" and "method." The previous section's analysis of dialectic has revealed both the complexity of this concept and the limitations on its application; however, neither of these features of dialectic is considered by Popper's analysis. With regard to the limitations on the use of dialectic, Popper seems confused about the status of the concept; although he describes it as a "theory," he goes on to compare it with the "method" of trial and error. Certainly trial and error might be seen to have a twofold function, as theory and method--a theory about how one might best approach truth and disclose falsehood, and a method of achieving such goals. Dialectic, on the other hand, exhibits no such diversity for Hegel and those who follow his understanding and use of the term. Dialectic can be understood as a theory, but not as a method. Kojeve, in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, makes this point in language both succinct and provocative.

> In Hegel there is a real Dialectic, but the philosophical method is that of a pure and simple description, which is dialectical only in the sense that it describes a dialectic of reality.[16]

There is no dialectical method in Hegel; rather, dialectic is a descriptive concept applied to circumstances which, in the course of the employment of a method of investigation, are discovered to be best characterized in this way. Hegel's method is descriptive and phenomenological--an attempt to study the subject matter as objectively as possible, while relying upon its own claims and standards to do so. Insofar as dialectic is used in a descriptive or explanatory way, it may certainly be called a "theory" concerning the nature of some aspect of reality. Regarding sense-certainty and the cognitive dialectic, Hegel's claim asserts that if consciousness, at the level of sense-certainty, engages in a thorough and critical investigation of its position, it will discover a series of subject-object relationships which follow a dialectical pattern. Popper, as we shall see below, has a similar view of dialectic as a descriptive concept--the point is that Hegel would probably agree.

The second passage alludes specifically to a major difference between the conditions for the proper descriptive applications of trial and error, on the one hand, and dialectic, on the other. An instance of trial and error demands only the falsification of a theory, but it is not necessary for a new theory to be an additional result. An instance of dialectic, on the other hand, demands that a new theory or explanation result from the critique of the old one. The new theory is a direct result of the investigation of the original theory. The latter is overthrown, not by a counter-instance, but rather by an alternative explanation, the evidence for which is supplied by the critical investigation.

Much of Popper's critique of Hegel's understanding of dialectic concerns what he regards as the metaphorical language used by dialecticians.

> An example is the dialectical saying that the thesis 'produces' its antithesis. Actually it is only our critical attitude which produces the antithesis, and where such an attitude is lacking . . . no antithesis will be produced . . . we have to be careful not to think that it is the 'struggle' between a thesis and its antithesis which 'produces' a synthesis. The struggle is one of minds; and these minds must be productive of new ideas: there are many instances of futile struggles in the history of human thought, struggles which end in nothing.[17]

Popper is correct in cautioning us about the "production metaphor," but while it might be problematic for the dialectician, it might also be a problem for Popper himself. Turning to Hegel's Phenomenology, the question must be answered whether or not the thesis "produces" the antithesis, and also, whether or not the "struggle" between thesis and antithesis "produces" the synthesis. Popper's main concern is with history and the possibility of "dialectical forces" being claimed to move history-determining events, human actions and human beliefs. Regardless of the impact of his critique on Hegel's notion of history, here, it must be kept in mind that we are dealing not with history, but rather with methodological and epistemological issues surrounding the nature of knowledge and of the cognitive relationship between the subject and object. In this regard, the most important characteristic of sense-certainty is that it espouses, in itself, a particular theory of knowledge and a particular interpretation of the subject/object relationship. It is definitely not the case that natural consciousness at the level of sense-certainty is "necessarily" bound to become aware of the contradiction implicit in its point of view. Nor does the

self-reflective consciousness "produce" a contradiction, but rather it discovers a contradiction already inherent in a certain position.

Insofar as there is the "production" of anything, there is the original production of the thesis by sense-certainty. The thesis does not produce the antithesis or the contradiction of the thesis, but rather these negations are discovered by the investigator. The sense of "production" for Hegel in the Phenomenology, in truth, is very similar to the meaning promoted by Popper. For Hegel it is only the adopting of the critically self-reflective attitude, an essential feature of true critical investigation, which enables us to discover the antithesis and to go on to disclose the determinate negation of the original position.

For Hegel one might say that it is as if one is dealing with a faulty theorem in a logical/conceptual system. In one way, the antithesis is produced by us in "constructing" the original position; but, in another way, overcoming this original position depends upon the adopting of the "critical attitude" of self-reflection through which one discovers what already is in existence. This kind of "production" is accomplished by the investigator and is a proces of making "explicit" a truth which is already "implicit" in our conceptual thesis.

Popper's choice of the term "produce" is indeed unfortunate in his account of Hegel. It is far more accurate to speak of discovering the antithesis during the study of the thesis, than to say that the antithesis is in some sense produced. It should be noted that we are discussing the present issue in the context of a method of investigation applied to an object, and not the case of so-called social forces

in a dynamic and dialectical relationship. The problem with Popper is his blanket assessment of the concept of dialectic, an assessment which does not accurately describe the dialectical relationship as established or discovered in a subject matter by means of a method of investigation. This latter case is analogous to correctly following the rules of inference and inferring a contradiction from the relationships among a given set of axioms and theorems. The contradiction has not been produced, but simply made explicit. The process of inference has brought to our consciousness and knowledge what was already in fact the case. For Hegel, given sense-certainty's initial thesis, a conceptual analysis simply reveals what necessarily is the case due to the content of the concepts. It is a conscious awareness of, rather than a production of, the antithesis which occurs when the antithesis is discovered. Finally, it is also to be noted that there is no necessity that the thesis will force itself upon us in the form of generating an antithesis, without our first having applied critical consideration to it.

A similar analysis can be undertaken with regard to the idea that a struggle between thesis and antithesis produces the synthesis. Once again, Hegel would agree with Popper that the struggle is one of minds or a struggle in the researcher's mind as he or she attempts to further investigate the subject matter. Again it is the critical mind and method which discover the synthesis.

Popper's position on the nature of the struggle and what must occur, i.e. the "supplying of new ideas," if the struggle is to be successful leads us to another problem regarding his understanding of

a "dialectical situation." In the following passage, Popper describes what a proper synthesis should be, as opposed to what the dialecticians say it is.

> And even when a synthesis has been reached, it will usually be a rather crude description of the synthesis to say that it 'preserves' the better parts of both the thesis and the antithesis. This description will be misleading even where it is true, because in addition to older ideas which it 'preserves,' the synthesis will, in every case, embody some new idea which cannot be reduced to earlier stages of the development. In other words, the synthesis will usually be much more than a construction out of material supplied by thesis and antithesis. Considering all this, the dialectic interpretation, even where it may be applicable, will hardly ever help to develop thought by its suggestion that a synthesis should be constructed out of the ideas contained in a thesis and an antithesis.[18]

On page 50 in this chapter, we introduced Popper's sketch of the stages of a dialectical situation, and the problem for Popper's analysis in the passage quoted above can be seen to lead to consequences exactly opposite to claims made for dialectic. Popper's understanding of the dialectical stages is one which leads to a narrowing rather than an expanding of the scope of investigation. Given Popper's "static" picture of the thesis/antithesis relationship, it is not surprising that the dialectician's restriction of the content of the synthesis to that content already given in the thesis and antithesis seems to him as no way to "develop thought." For Popper, self-reflection considers the thesis and antithesis, keeps some aspects which it will assimilate into the synthesis and disregards others. Given this interpretation, the fund of ideas to be dealt with would become progressively smaller, when in fact the dialectical movement constantly expands due to the "addition" of new ideas. But how can this be the case given the demand of

"immanent critique" which makes the investigation completely reliant upon the position under study for its content?

The issue is difficult, but does not defy explanation. When the phenomenologist confronts the initial position of sense-certainty, the discovery is not simply that certain "aspects" of this position are incorrect. What the investigator discovers is that the content of the subject-object relationship is radically other than what it is claimed to be by sense-certainty. The introduction of new ideas does not come from outside the investigation, but in such cases, is discovered in the course of the study. The common form of the new content is that of presuppositions, either overlooked or ignored by the original position. One might reasonably describe this content as a "remainder" which cannot be accounted for in terms of the original interpretation of the position. Popper's error is in treating the account of thesis and antithesis, as they appear immediately and prior to the beginning of the investigation, as a complete inventory of their contents. The discovery of the phenomenologist investigating sense-certainty reveals consciousness at the level of sense-certainty to have underestimated its content. The results of the investigation of thesis and antithesis are presuppositions ignored or overlooked at the level of sense-certainty, but necessary for it to possess the knowledge which it claims for itself. Hence, for Popper, the thesis and antithesis, as they appear initially and oppose each other, exhibit all their content. In this scenario the task of critical investigation is simply to distinguish and separate "aspects" to be "preserved" from those to be "cancelled." But it is here that Popper falls into a trap which he has

set largely by himself. The error of claiming that for Hegel dialectic is a method is most fully revealed when one considers the Phenomenology. The whole justification and motivation for the application of the phenomenological method stems from the fact that the original "thesis" and "antithesis" do not provide exhaustive inventories of their contents. Successive phenomenological investigations discover more and more new content wherever such investigations are undertaken, and it is this new content which both constitutes and determines the nature of the synthesis. As we witnessed in Section 1, "P_1" and "Q_1" and their mutual mediation involve notions and ideas hidden in the original positions, but which were uncovered in the course of the phenomenological analysis.

Once again, it is a necessary condition for the possibility of a dialectical progression that there be a discovery of new ideas, not through introducing them from outside, but by finding them as presuppositions and implications of the original "thesis" and "antithesis." As a consequence, the synthesis is the result of a fusion of two new interpretations. Both Hegel's development of the Phenomenology, and Habermas's critique of methodology in the social sciences involve the discovering of new ideas through the "immanent critique" of the given subject matter.

One must conclude that Hegel's position, although not mirroring that of Popper, is much more similar to it than Popper would like to admit. Popper's problem is a failure to recognize or understand the "evolutionary" character of concepts which are dialectically related. Hegel's immanent critique relies upon investigation leading to the

discovering of new ideas through a more detailed, comprehensive and critical analysis. If this evolution does not take place and is not achieved in the analysis of the concepts, i.e. through the immanent critique of the original positions, then the scenario is not dialectical.

The fact that inferences made toward the constitution of the synthesis are based upon positive information discovered through methodological analysis, brings up another issue of conflict between Popper's understanding of Hegel and the reality of the Hegelian project. In Chapter I[19] of this thesis brief reference was made to Popper's concern regarding the dialectician's and specifically Hegel's attitude toward contradiction. Popper claims that dialecticians are unconcerned about contradictions, and even make inferences on the basis of them. Certainly dialecticians are acutely aware of the possibility of contradictions, but the reason for this interest is purely critical. For the dialectician a contradiction is an indication that something has gone wrong, i.e. a contradiction means that there is a problem which must be further analyzed in order to find a solution. From Hegel to Habermas, dialectical contradictions must be overcome or resolved. The main difference between a dialectical and non-dialectical contradiction is that the former will be resolved by a particular solution implicit in the original opposing positions.

Certainly there is no inference on the basis of a contradiction; therefore, Hegel is not breaking perhaps the most fundamental rule of formal logic. The inferences made in the sense-certainty situation are all based upon the positive information discovered by the

phenomenological investigation. Popper emphasizes the contradiction between thesis and antithesis. However, the role of this contradiction must not be overestimated. If one accepts the present interpretation of Hegel's analysis of sense-certainty, it would seem that Hegel is being misleading in speaking of single contradiction being "dialectical." Insofar as there is a formal contradiction or a contradiction in the normal sense, it behaves as such. There are several contradictions in the movement from the original position of (P v Q) to the synthesis (P_1 & Q_1): a) "P_1" contradicts "P"; b) "Q_1" contradicts "Q"; c) (P_1 & Q_1) contradicts (P v Q). Rather than any single contradiction being dialectical, it seems that the entire movement of the investigation of sense-certainty is dialectical. On the one hand, Popper's "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" model is a gross oversimplification, while on the other, insofar as dialectic involves contradiction, the normal meaning of the concept "contradiction" is not contravened.

Having clarified the use and nature of contradiction in Hegel's dialectic of sense-certainty (chosen as the focal point of discussion because the ultimate concern of this thesis is with dialectic and epistemology), and answered many Popperian criticisms, let us turn to some alterations in the dialectician's glossary of terms as proposed by Popper.

Outside of the metaphors already mentioned, Popper very much wishes to replace the term "contradiction" by some term without such strictly logical connotations. His suggestions for substitution are "conflict," "opposing interest," and/or "opposing tendency."[20] As potential descriptions of the "dialectical contradiction," these terms

are uniformly dangerous. The importance of being able to describe a given situation as involving a dialectical contradiction lies in the fact that such a state of affairs cannot be correct and must be succeeded by a resolution or determinate negation.

None of the suggestions offered by Popper capture this meaning, and, in their ambiguity, provide another interpretation which eliminates an essential feature of dialectic--a feature contained in the idea of contradiction. The alternative meaning is that of an "unresolved tension." In such a case, one is confronted with two opposing tendencies that remain as an opposition even after the investigation. Opposing interests or tendencies can remain opposed in meaning, logically and in reality. Even where one becomes dominant and eliminates the other, in their respective meanings and logically the opposition still remains. In neither case, elimination or ongoing opposition, does one have a dialectical opposition. Another way of putting the problem would be to say that in the case of such unresolved tensions or those in which one side eliminates the other, the original natures of either side remain the same. Referring back to sense-certainty, the fate of the opposition between "P" and "Q," which are opposing claims regarding the nature of the content of knowledge, is that each claim is discovered to be false, and two new positions, "P_1" and "Q_1" result. The original opposition is found to be false and both sides are, in this way, cancelled, and ultimately a new position in the form of a synthesis supplants them. None of the suggestions coming from Popper make this distinction, and this distinction is essential to the demarcation of dialectical from non-dialectical oppositions. Also it is due to

this unique situation in regard to dialectical oppositions that it is crucially important to note the role and occurrence of contradictions in the course of the phenomenological investigation. Unresolved tensions can go on, meaning that the opposing sides are both totally preserved, but the tension between "P" and "Q" is one in which either one or the other can be the case, but not both. This is an honest contradiction. However, resolution in favour of the truth of one side or the other is not dialectical. Both sides must be and are eliminated by the results of investigation. Although the notion of contradiction has caused both confusion and controversy, the difficulties cannot be overcome by doing away with references to or recognition of contradictions involved in the dialectical scenario.

Before moving on to the last terminological issue, let us consider the fate of sense-certainty, if the contradictions had not been uncovered by analysis. Briefly, one is confronted by two options: (a) either the reduction to subject or object as the source of content for knowledge, or (b) some situation in which, at the level of sense-certainty, analysis of the concepts of subject and object and their relationship revealed neither a contradiction nor a new position, but an inescapable continuum of tension between subject and object. For the dialectic one needs to demonstrate the real nature of the subject and object and their relationship, i.e. that the claims are incorrect, with the "correct" claims coming out of the critique. Being stuck on the continuum would mean that the fate of knowledge would be sorted out at the level of sense-certainty. Similarly with the designations "negation" and "negation of the negation," the phenomenological

investigation yields a result which negates the concept of the object, held initially to be sense-certainty. The positive content points to the content of the object as reducible to that of the subject. However, further investigation of the new concept of the subject leads to its negation, i.e. the negation of the negation. However what is undeniable and survives is the interpretation which holds that the subject and the object each mediate the other and hence are both mediated. The point here is that the designations which have been considered can be translated into simpler language and justified in terms of the discovery of the phenomenological analysis and the movement of the argument. Popper's purpose in arguing for these semantic changes is made clear in the following passage. "For logic can be described . . . well enough for our present purposes--as a theory of deduction. We have no reason to believe that dialectic has anything to do with deduction."[21] The answer to this claim can also serve as an opportunity to restate the results of the present analysis of dialectic in sense-certainty.

The designation "dialectic," when referring to specifically the subject/object relationship as concerned with knowledge, indicates the structure and content of the investigation of natural consciousness if it were to inquire critically into its epistemological position. Our test case has been the subject/object relationship at the level of sense-certainty in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The most significant aspect of Hegel's phenomenological approach is self-reflection which involves the "immanent critique" of the subject matter, allowing it to reveal itself without imposing standards external to those of the

original position. The investigation is itself "dialectical" only insofar as it reflects the various modified stances which might be derived from the original position in the attempt to save sense-certainty as the correct view of knowledge. As Adorno has claimed,[22] dialectic is not a system of axioms or principles or concepts which one imposes upon the subject matter under consideration.

Popper is correct when he calls dialectic a "descriptive" theory, however, as we have seen, his understanding of the structure and content which would deserve this description is seriously inaccurate. Most importantly, his attempt to reduce dialectic to his own theory of trial and error is clearly not possible, especially when the "process" of trial and error is a method or part of a method for investigation. Dialectic does not designate a method, but rather is discovered by a method of investigation to be an accurate description of the structure of the relationships to be found in or derived from a given subject matter.

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce, clarify and defend some of the basic aspects of dialectic. The motivation for this undertaking is not limited to a specific interest in dialectic for itself, but rather it is the position of this author that, in order to understand the early development of Habermas's thought on methodology and the social sciences, one must be familiar with the notion of dialectic. In adopting Adorno's idea of a "societal totality" and referring to such concepts as dialectic, determinate negation, mediation and

immanent critique, Habermas has accepted as valid the conceptual apparatus of Hegelian dialectic. The main obstacle to comprehending this feature of Habermas's philosophical language is his negligence in providing an account and justification of this conceptual scheme.

Lastly, a few words must be said about the logicizing of Hegel's dialectic, and a shift of emphasis regarding the aspects of dialectic, a shift that has resulted, in part, from this interpretation of dialectic. The reading of dialectic, provided in this chapter, has been an attempt to defuse, and thus de-emphasize, the debate about "dialectical contradiction." Rather than highlighting the notion of contradiction in Hegel, the implicit shift in this chapter is to emphasize the role of "mediation." With this change of emphasis the focal point is epistemological and methodological, rather than strictly logical. This point can be elucidated in terms of epistemology. Whenever one is confronted with the task of gaining knowledge of some subject matter, one immediately adopts some sort of analytical strategy, i.e. one wants to analyze the subject matter into its various aspects in order to understand it. Ideally, our analysis will be objective, i.e. the procedure will not involve a distortion of the object such that one's understanding is not of the object as it, in fact, is. This demand can be described as the criterion of dualism. One wants, in order to justifiably claim objectivity, to be able to establish that our view of the object is or can be purified of subjective or methodological elements. Once achieved, this separation leads to a reductionistic or monistic position regarding our knowledge of the object, i.e. the content of knowledge is reducible to the object, with no subjective or methodological input.

Now let us explain these two claims in terms of the concept of "mediation." The successful realization of the separation of subjective from objective (those aspects which are features of the object, as opposed to an "objective" point of view) elements, entails that there is no mediation of the object by the subject or method. The achievement of the reduction of the content of knowledge to that of the object, is the perfect epistemological mediation. The subject or method, if objective, is, regarding its understanding of the object, totally mediated by the object as it is in its true nature.

However, for Hegel regarding the objectivity claimed by consciousness at the level of sense-certainty and for Habermas/Adorno regarding empirical scientific consciousness in its grasping of society, this one-sided objective mediation is not achieved. In neither case can the subjective or methodological elements be separated out from the grasp of the object. For Hegel the mediation may be described as absolute on the level of sense-certainty. This means that there is no way of separating the subjective and objective aspects, i.e. further analysis is impossible toward this goal. For Habermas, the mediation of method and object is only <u>contingently</u> absolute, i.e. it is absolute only for consciousness which remains totally reliant upon the empirical scientific or analytic-empirical method. As will be seen in Chapter III there are two problems for the empirical scientific approach. On the one hand, it mediates its object; on the other hand, it, in turn, is mediated by its object, but not by the object as it truly is, but rather by the object as it <u>appears</u> to be; i.e. by an ideology. The success of critical theory depends on Habermas being

able to formulate a method which will overcome this mutual mediation for consciousness and enable us to grasp the object without methodological input, and to grasp the object as it truly is, i.e. to be able to distinguish between the appearance of the object, ideology, and what is truly the case.

Returning to the notions of analysis and objectivity. It is the position of this author that it is not the notion of dialectical contradiction that blocks our attempts to understand and explain the world, but rather, the notion of mutual mediation that serves as the greatest challenge to the possibility of objective knowledge.

Chapter III

"ANALYTIC-EMPIRICAL SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: A DIALECTICAL RELATIONSHIP"

Having provided a detailed account of dialectical concepts central to the grasping of Habermas's critical and positive philosophy of the social sciences, it is now time to address the central focus of this thesis, the development of critical theory through the critiques of the analytic-empirical and hermeneutical approaches to understanding society. The theme of this chapter is Habermas's interpretation and critique of the analytic-empirical approach, and it is helpful to introduce this issue by referring back to Habermas's Hegelian roots. In criticizing the analytic-empirical method (to be defined in the course of this chapter), Habermas attempts to demonstrate that the relationship existing between this method and society is one of mutual mediation leading to determinate negation in the form of a new interpretation of the object and a new method of comprehension for the subject or researcher. The importance of giving his critique this specific goal is shown by Popper's ambiguous attitude toward ideology: on the one hand, he grants the influence of prejudices, which we cannot escape in our attempt to understand society; on the other hand, he claims that his scientific method (which Habermas regards as exemplifying the analytic-empirical approach), is impartial meaning that the results of its application are immune to prejudices. Put into Hegelian terms, this amounts to the claim that analytic-empirical science is not mediated by its object. On the face of it, there would seem to be a

problem here--after all, objectivity might be defined, in Hegelian terms, as the mediation of the subject or method by the object. There is a crucial distinction to be made here, and put briefly it might be described as the difference between being mediated by the object as it appears to be and being mediated by the object as it truly is. The latter counts as legitimate objectivity, but the former is an instance of the influence of ideology. The only way to avoid the former is through successful critique, which results in the separation of prejudices from the real content of the object. Popper's claim for impartiality may be construed as the assertion that the analytic-empirical approach achieves this separation by virtue of its methodological/epistemological safeguards such as controlled observation and repeated testing. With regard to the mediation of subject or method by the object, the claim for analytic-empirical science is that it is indeed mediated by the object, but by the object as it, in fact, is.

The reverse of the relationship is, however, completely rejected by those who promote this method. It is not the case that the method mediates the object, but rather it portrays the object or any aspect thereof as it truly is. This one-sided mediation amounts to a claim for objectivity.

This notion of impartiality implies holding to positions described in Chapter II as constantly colliding with dialectic and especially with the dialectical notion of mutual mediation involved in the idea of a societal totality. On the one hand, the impartial method is a kind of reductionism. In this case one would claim that the analytic-empirical approach provides knowledge, i.e. an account of the

way the object truly is, the content of which comes solely from that object. On the other hand, there is also a dualism, meaning that the method can successfully sift out the ideological elements thus purifying itself and its results from ideological contamination. Habermas's position is that of denying both the reductionism and dualism outlined above--asserting instead that the relationship between the practice of the method and society is dialectical involving a mutual mediation. The reductionism is rejected because of the mediation of the object by the method and the dualism must be rejected because the application of this method cannot ensure the scope of Ideologiekritik necessary to separate out all ideological influences or prejudices. Together, these claims for reductionism and dualism, are the basis for the claim to objectivity made for the analytic-empirical approach, and a detailed analysis of Habermas's critique of all these claims will be the focal point of this chapter. On the positive side, i.e. with regard to the proposal for an acceptable approach to be taken by the social sciences, although Habermas provides the goals of such an approach there is still very little in the way of a systematic account of what this new method would look like.

The textual focus of this chapter is one of Habermas's earlier essays and it is entitled "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics."[1] This article is significant for two main reasons: a) Habermas provides a concise and probing critique of the position advocating that the social sciences model themselves methodologically on the natural sciences; and b) Habermas contrasts the analytic-empirical approach with what he calls the "dialectical" approach to

the understanding of society. The format of this chapter follows closely the arguments as presented in the text, and our goal is to offer a detailed account of Habermas's critique of the analytic-empirical method and to show how this critique and his outline of the dialectical approach anticipate the subsequent developments in his thought on methodology.

Section 1

Habermas's main concern in this article is the nature of the relationship between social scientific methods and their object, human society. The first topic to be considered in this chapter is that of the relationship between theory and object. Before entering into this discussion a few words of introduction should be provided concerning Habermas's interpretation of the analytic-empirical method. Habermas is working with the notion of the deductive-nomological approach to understanding and explaining aspects and events of society. Alan Ryan gives the following account of this approach in The Philosophy of Social Sciences.[2]

> . . . a successful explanation has to obey three requirements. The first is the formal requirement that the statement laying down the laws and initial conditions should entail the statement laying down the conclusion; the second is the material requirement that the premises should be true--or more cautiously that they should be well corroborated; the last is a consequence of these requirements, that the explanans should be empirically testable, by being open to refutation should it predict what is not the case. Only under these conditions do we empirically or causally explain why an event had to happen as it did.[3]

Thus the explanation of a given event amounts to a deduction of the statement describing the event from a combination of two kinds of premise: a) statements describing universal laws, and b) statements

describing specific aspects of the situation to be explained. The logical or formal condition demands that the relationship between explanans and explanandum be one of deductive logical entailment. The material conditions demand that both the laws and initial conditions be well corroborated at least, and finally the explanans must be empirically checkable in order to avoid the use of false premises.

It certainly cannot be denied that the researchers using this method have enjoyed enormous success in the natural sciences. The complex of well supported theories and laws, deductive logic and precise observations has continually led to successful and accurate predictions. Habermas does not contest the "success" of this approach concerning nature; however, he is critical of uncritical and exclusive application to explain and understand aspects and events of society.

Successful prediction and explanation demands the acquisition of evidence through precise observations. At this point the criteria of accuracy and measurement come into play, and it is the stringent standards for accuracy and measurement which concern Habermas, for it is in this regard that one can speak of the mediation of the object by the method. One might call this phenomenon a case of "mediation by omission." Satisfying the methodological criteria results in the selection for investigation and evidence only those aspects of the object which can be subjected to the rigours of scientific observation. Those aspects which cannot be grasped in this way are dismissed. Where this approach is the standard for knowledge, features of the subject matter are excluded from consideration because we cannot obtain knowledge of them. The advantage of such an approach is the precision in

observational evidence and a high probability of correct predictions--the disadvantage is the ignoring or omission of potentially relevant information about the nature of society. Certainly every method must begin by limiting its scope of investigation; however, it is the type of limitation which is of concern here. The analytic-empirical approach in its application has the effect of eliminating from investigation any data which does not allow for "scientific" study. Given the possibility of total ideology, Habermas would seem to want an approach which could expand its scope to all aspects of society.

A second aspect of the application of the analytic-empirical approach to society which concerns Habermas, is the reliance upon social science models.[4] Whether the result of an application of the deductive-nomological method or the observation of empirical regularities, these models, insofar as they are used to simply predict events in the society or explain them by referring to laws or empirical generalizations, if unchecked, can lead to a distorted view of the object. The notion of a check is all important for Habermas, as he regards the reliance upon such models as presupposing a prior understanding of the object, or else they take the form of an imposition of content-laden concepts on the object, which is contrary to the demands of objectivity.

In both cases, the stringent demands of the method and the uncritical employment of social sciences models, Habermas is claiming the mediation of the object by the method. Although the remedy for such mediation is not yet clear, Habermas seems to be promoting a notion of objectivity which echoes the sentiments of both Hegel's

phenomenological approach and that of contemporary phenomenology. The object must be allowed to show or reveal itself, without having externally developed categories imposed upon it. The predictions may be correct and the observations accurate, but the society can still be suffering from total ideology, and, indeed, the influence of the ideology and effect might enhance the possibility of accurate predictions. While it does not appear that Habermas is rejecting in an absolute way the use of such methods, it is certainly the case that, for instance, the prior understanding of society which would confirm the validity of a given model must be itself validated or confirmed prior to the accepting and use of that model. This standpoint is demonstrated in the following passage.

> It is only the scientific apparatus which reveals an object whose structure must nevertheless previously be understood to some degree, if the categories chosen are not to remain external to it.[5]

Habermas is proposing an approach to the understanding of the object, which would operate prior to the application of the scientific method. Once again the Hegelian format reveals itself. Habermas is asserting that if real knowledge is to be produced by this method, a prior epistemological acquaintance is necessary; in the section on sense-certainty, Hegel argues that sense-certainty's knowledge claims can be granted only if one moves to the level of perception, i.e. another form of knowledge is presupposed by sense-certainty. Habermas, however, has a critical goal in mind, which does not appear to be present or to be a concern for Hegel. This prior approach would have the task of criticizing the adequacy of scientific concepts and procedures to the object.

Given Habermas's critique of the external status of scientific procedures, concepts and social science models, there are two points worthy of note in the passage quoted above. On the one hand, Habermas regards the analytic-empirical method as being incapable of self-criticism or critical self-reflection. It relies upon concepts and procedures and their unquestioned correctness in order to yield knowledge. One might even go so far as to say that such concepts and procedures define the very nature of the analytic-empirical or scientific method and knowledge. Because of the position claiming that the only real knowledge comes via this approach, any valid critique of the method would have to employ the fundamental concepts and procedures of that very method and, hence, one is locked into a methodological circularity.

On the other hand, this demand for total critical self-reflection is a necessary condition for the acceptability of a method which is to serve as the approach of the social sciences, i.e. critical theory must be capable of such self-critique. Given that the ideal of pure objectivity or the grasping of the object in an unmediated way is impossible, the most satisfactory alternative would seem to be total self-reflective critique directed toward the application and tenets of the method. In other words, our only recourse, in such a situation where objectivity in the pure sense is unattainable, is to be critically aware of the mediating concepts and procedures.

Habermas's attack on the analytic-empirical method penetrates to the most fundamental aspects of this approach. If the exponent of the analytic-empirical approach is pressed regarding justification for

knowledge claims and the critical capacity of the method then he or she must fall back upon the notion of what Popper calls the "basic statement."[6] In Conjectures and Refutations, Popper describes basic statements as stating, ". . . (truly or falsely) the existence of observable facts (occurrences) within some sufficiently narrow spatio-temporal region."[7] Added qualifications allow the conjunction of basic statements, given that they are logically consistent, to be basic also; however, conditional statements and negations of basic statements are not given this privilege. Popper distinguishes his position from that of the empiricist in the following passages:

> Empiricists usually believed that the empirical basis consisted of absolutely 'given' perceptions or observations, of 'data,' and that science could build on these data as if on rock. In opposition, I pointed out that the apparent 'data' of experience were always interpretations in the light of theories, and therefore affected by the hypothetical or conjectural character of all theories.
>
> . . . there are never any uninterpreted data experienced by us: the existence of these uninterpreted 'data' is therefore a theory, not a fact of experience, and least of all an ultimate, or 'basic' fact.
>
> Thus there is no uninterpreted empirical basis; and the test statements which form the empirical basis cannot be statements expressing uninterpreted 'data' (since no such data exist) but are, simply, statements which state observable simple facts about our physical environment. They are, of course, facts interpreted in the light of theories; they are soaked in theory, as it were.[8]

The gist of this position is that when we accept an observation as being accurate and the basic statement describing it as describing a fact, we are, therefore, also accepting various theories because all facts are theory-laden. The next and both methodologically and epistemologically prior consideration concerns what is involved in the decision to accept or reject a basic statement, and it is this issue

which draws Habermas's attention. Habermas claims a relationship of circularity to exist between the acceptance of facts or basic statements and the application of a system of laws or theories.

> . . . it would seem impossible to apply the system of laws if one had not previously agreed upon the establishment of the fact; this establishment, however, must, in its turn, be reached in a procedure which corresponds to the system of laws and, consequently, already applies to them. One cannot apply general rules if a prior decision has not been taken concerning the facts which can be subsumed under the rules; on the other hand, these facts cannot be established as relevant cases prior to an application of those rules. The inevitable circle in the application of rules is evidence of the embedding of the research process in a context which itself can no longer be explicated in an analytical-empirical manner but only hermeneutically.[9]

Let us approach the analysis and clarification of this passage by first indicating what it isn't about. Hans Albert responds by asserting that if the relationship between theory and fact or basic statement were as Habermas describes it, then every fact would be a confirmation instance of the relevant theories, i.e. there would be no possibility of falsification and the checking of theories.[10] Clearly our experience and the fate of various theories in relation to facts would contradict such a position, if indeed this is what Habermas intends. However, it is equally obvious, upon investigation, that Habermas is not denying the possibility of falsification of theories by facts or basic statements.

Habermas's problem is not with the acceptance or rejection of theories, but rather with the acceptance or rejection of facts or basic statements. The main difficulty in clarifying this issue stems from the use of the judicial analogy by both Popper and Habermas. In attempting to elucidate what he means by the "decision" which is the

foundation for the acceptance of basic statements, Popper appeals to the procedure of trial by jury.

> . . . The verdict of the jury . . ., like that of the experimenter, is an answer to a question of fact . . . which must be put to the jury in the sharpest, the most definite form. But what question is asked, and how it is put, will depend very largely on the legal situation, i.e. on the prevailing system of criminal law (corresponding to a system of theories). By its decision, the jury accepts, by agreement, a statement about a factual occurrence--a basic statement, as it were. The significance of this decision lies in the fact that from it, together with the universal statements of the system (of criminal law) certain consequences can be deduced. In other words, the decision forms the basis for the application of the system; . . .
>
> In the case of the trial by jury, it would be clearly impossible to apply the 'theory' unless there is first a verdict arrived at by decision; yet the verdict has to be found in a procedure that conforms to, and thus applies, part of the general legal code. The case is analogous to that of basic statements. Their acceptance is part of the application of a theoretical system; and it is only this application which makes any further applications of the theoretical system possible.[11]

Staying with the legal analogy, both Albert's concern regarding falsification and Habermas's charge of circularity can be clarified. Dealing first with Habermas, the passages quoted above from Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery are the cause for concern. There Popper is holding that our initial acquaintance with or recognition of facts is determined by a system of theories already established. Regardless of scientists' decision on the acceptance or rejection of the facts (regardless of the jury's decision on the nature of the facts), the system of theories (legal code) is not challenged on its correctness. It is the relationship between the basic statement and the system of theories which poses the problem for Habermas, and the second passage from Popper does little to clarify that relationship, indeed it appears to be saying the same thing as the passage from Habermas quoted on

page 85. Habermas's point is simply that the grasping of the facts and the validity of the theories appear to presuppose each other. Most importantly, a system of theories through which we understand the world is presupposed in understanding the facts, and acceptance or rejection of them. This situation leads Habermas to assert that the hermeneutical approach to understanding is the only way to elucidate and justify our choice of theories and facts. One might interpret this relationship between theory and fact as being similar to theory-ladeness of facts admitted by Popper. In either case, one has lost the appeal to analytic-empirical scientific experience as the foundation for checking all theories. An understanding of facts involves the acceptance of a system of theories.

Does this mean that falsification is ruled out, as Albert fears? Obviously this is not the case and is clear from the judicial example. The jury is presented with two conflicting views or "theories" regarding the actions and intentions of the defendant, and upon their understanding of the facts, will accept one of these theories and reject the other. However, in the broader context of the relationship between facts and theories, it appears that there are always, in theory-testing situations, two levels or roles carried about by two different groups of theories. On the one hand, there is the theory or theories being tested, and on the other, there are the theories which are accepted by us when we reach an agreement upon and accept or reject the facts and basic statements. Habermas's position does not deny the possibility or fact of falsification, or, at least, he does not deny the possibility or fact of a disagreement between theory and fact:

rather, his point appears to be that due to the dependence of acceptance of facts upon a system of theories, we must look elsewhere to adequately comprehend both the facts and their presupposed theories. Given that all scientifically established facts are theory-laden, the acceptance of either facts or the theories constituting them would be based on a circular argument if one appealed to one side or the other for justification. For Habermas this means that our recognition of basic statements as valid cannot be justified within the framework of the analytic-empirical method of science, its procedures and epistemological claims.

The attitude being criticized above takes the position that somehow the procedures, criteria and results of the method are independent of the larger social context. Habermas's critique is directed towards the goal of breaking down the self-sufficiency and independence of this method. Once again parallels with Hegel's critique of sense-certainty are obvious. The ideal position for consciousness at the level of sense-certainty was one in which the subject was totally mediated by the object, resulting in the content of knowledge coming totally and solely from the object. Hegel's investigation finds subjective content, and furthermore, discovers that the knowledge claims made for sense-certainty involve presuppositions unaccounted for in its own self-understanding. Habermas's critique of the independence claimed for the analytic-empirical approach follows a similar structure. As with sense-certainty, there are elements functioning and influencing in the application of the method, which fall out as a "remainder" beyond the critical scope of the method itself. The

unacknowledged influences stem from what Habermas calls the "social life-world," and it involves interpretations and norms reflected and expressed in the actions, expectations and beliefs of all social individuals, even researchers.[12] Although the full implication of this position will be considered later in this chapter, some observations regarding it should be made immediately.

Earlier on in this section Habermas's arguments were directed towards the demonstration of the mediation of the object by the method. The aim of the present argument is to reverse the process, showing the method to be mediated by the object. By locating the justification for basic statements in the social life-world, Habermas destroys the claim for the independent and absolute validity of the criteria and standards of the analytic-empirical method. Another way of looking at Habermas's strategy is to describe it as an argument for the position that society is a totality in a dialectical sense. Popper's claim for the impartiality of scientific experience (based upon controlled test observations) implies that science and its knowledge are not mediated by other forms of experience and hence not dialectically related to the given social content or to the societal whole. Our previous argument concerning prejudices (allowing for the possibility of total ideology) and impartiality was a criticism of the analytic-empirical science's capacity for a thoroughgoing Ideologiekritik, based upon the admission of its limited scope and inability to investigate certain prejudices. With the present argument Habermas seeks to overcome this apparent dualism between scientific experience and the prejudices or ideology of the societal object, by establishing that even this experience is

mediated by the social life-world. In other words, Habermas is carrying the attack on the capacity of scientific method for Ideologiekritik to the very core of the problem by arguing that the correct execution of the analytic-empirical method is still in need of Ideologiekritik regarding its experiential basis and its results.

> . . . the human subject, who is still caught up in the act of cognition, remains bound to the constraints of the very sphere that he wishes to analyze. He only frees himself to the extent to which he grasps the societal life-context as a totality which determines even research itself.[13]

The determining spoken of in this passage is the mediation of the method or subjective side by the object. Let us take this opportunity to further clarify this notion of mediation. The point to be made is that objectivity, in the epistemological sense, is not achieved simply by any kind of mediation of the subject by the object. In the above situation of the analytic-empirical method and society, the mediation of the former by the latter does not help the scientific method in its quest for objectivity. For the total mediation of subject by object to yield objective knowledge, the object must reveal itself to the subject or be revealed by the subject (where this action by the subject does not involve a mediation or a changing of the nature of the object) in such a way that revealing discloses the true nature of the object. The mediation of the epistemological foundations (controlled test observations) of the analytic-empirical method by society means that, at its very basis, the results of the application of the method are susceptible to ideological contamination, at least in the broad sense of involving uncriticized concepts, and perhaps in the narrower but more epistemologically dangerous sense of false concepts, i.e. concepts which conceal the truth about the object.

Habermas's argument for the susceptibility to ideology for both the results and observational basis of the analytic-empirical method is founded upon the circumstance that basic statements are accepted or rejected as a result of the intersubjectively reached consensus among researchers in the scientific community. Before returning to this issue, the ambitious nature of Habermas's attack should be noted. A weaker claim would have charged that the mediation by the object occurs in the form of models, concepts or general interpretive constructions which must be used to say something meaningful and significant about society. These "theoretical constructions,"[14] as Popper calls them, might very well be vehicles of ideology. In cases where they cannot be further analyzed or are not critically assessed, then they would certainly count as instances of mediation of the method or subject by the object. However, insofar as they are utilized to interpret already accepted and agreed upon facts, they remain external to the epistemological foundations of the method. Such a criticism is geared toward the problems with the application of the method in the social sciences, but does not strike at the method's experiential base, i.e. controlled observations and facts.

Habermas is obviously not satisfied with this level of critique, but chooses to attack the experiential base itself. In this strategy he is in agreement with Popper's claims concerning the relationship between facts and systems of theories, but calls for a treatment of the decisions made for the acceptance or rejection of basic statements to be conducted in terms of the language and experience of the social life-world, rather than keeping the investigation within the

realm of the scientific method. For Habermas, the analytic-empirical approach has failed to seal itself off, at this very fundamental level of its practice, from the potentially ideological influences of the social life-world. The issue becomes that of assessing critically the source and basis for the decisions on basic statements; in other words, a critical investigation of the experience of the social life-world, which analytic-empirical science, by itself at least, is not capable of carrying out in an ideologically free way.

Habermas's strategy in opting for the stronger criticism embroils him in a debate concerning the nature of experience--a debate reflecting a fundamental distinction between Habermas and supporters of the analytic-empirical approach. The crucial move by Habermas is the introduction of and role assigned to language, and specifically language as the vehicle of a social life-world or of the experience of individuals functioning within and interpreting that world. The following passage from Popper encapsulates the position of those who consider the scientific experience to be independent of the influence of this social life-world, especially in terms of language as it is used by practitioners of the analytic-empirical method.

> . . . scientists try to avoid talking at cross-purposes. . . . They try very seriously to speak one and the same language, even if they use different mother tongues. In the natural sciences this is achieved by recognizing experience as the impartial arbiter of their controversies. When speaking of 'experience' I have in mind experience of a 'public' character, like observations, and experiments, as opposed to experience in the sense of more 'private' aesthetic or religious experience; and an experience is 'public' if everybody who takes the trouble can repeat it.[15]

In this passage Popper makes experience, scientific experience that is, the basis for a common language among scientists. Basic statements

which describe controlled observations are the foundations of this language. Implicit in this stand is the position that scientific language is independent of the language of everyday understanding that reflects and expresses the social life-world. Much of this latter language is constituted by terms and concepts which cannot be empirically tested in the scientific manner, and therefore must be censored from a scientific form of linguistic communication.

Insofar as Habermas rejects the epistemological priority and linguistic independence of scientific experience, he joins with such philosophers as Wittgenstein and Gadamer in challenging the priority and independence of observation with regard to language. Although a comprehensive discussion of this crucial issue is not possible within the confines of this thesis, certain aspects of Habermas's position and their implications for his positive alternative in the methodology of the social sciences must be considered.

It should be noted immediately that Habermas is not involved in any sort of linguistic idealism--a position which, as will be seen later on, he appears to ascribe to Gadamer. The intersubjective consensus reached through the medium of language is not purely linguistic, but presupposes the total socio-cultural experience of the individuals involved in the decision. There is no claim by Habermas that this experience is a solely linguistic experience; however, the experience is certainly not of the controlled observation type. Habermas is attempting to establish a relationship between the scientific endeavour and the socio-cultural context or life-world in which the language and experience of the latter are epistemologically prior to the language

and experience of the former. In the mutual mediation between method and object, the language and experience of the socio-cultural context fall out as a remainder, presupposed by, but inaccessible to analytic-empirical analysis. Habermas's analysis has led him to a new and more fundamental epistemological and ontological level, that of the language and experience of the social life-world. Given that it presupposes this life-world, the scientific method is not adequate to the investigation of this new object realm. Emphasizing the role of language, Habermas proposes hermeneutics as the method to succeed the analytic-empirical approach, and hence the next target for methodological investigation and critique.

Habermas's immanent critique of various aspects of the analytic-empirical method as an approach for the social sciences has resulted in demonstrating the relationship between theory and object, as conceived in terms of this approach, to be dialectical. The determinate negation or synthesis, which falls out as a remainder, takes the form of the language and experience of the social life-world, and this, in turn, contains and functions as a vehicle for ideology. It should also not be forgotten that one constituent of the ideological context is the analytic-empirical method itself. The status of the analytic-empirical method has suffered a radical change: instead of providing an approach to the proper understanding and critique of its object, in a way, it has turned out to be another aspect of that object. As is usually the case, when a situation is discovered to be dialectical, crucial dualistic and reductionistic positions are proven to be false: for example, the dualism between scientific experience, on the one

hand, and non-scientific experience, on the other, is regarded by Habermas as having been overcome; the attempt to achieve an objective account of society, which implies a reduction of the content of knowledge to that of the object alone, is destroyed by the mediation of the object by the method. The final stage in the analysis, and the one which makes the situation truly dialectical, is that of the remainder or synthesis that leads also to a new method of investigation. The object is the social-life world and the method is hermeneutics; however, the original task remains, the quest for a method of total and comprehensive Ideologiekritik.

Finally, Habermas, throughout this article, speaks of his "dialectical" approach. It must be noted that only the possibility of society being a dialectical totality is necessary to justify Habermas's critical concern. The account of the relationship between analytic-empirical method and society can be taken as an argument in support of society's having a dialectical structure, but there is no assumption that such is the case. The dialectical approach is one which recognizes the possibility of society being dialectical and attempts, therefore, to comprehend it according to its true nature. There is no formal dialectical structure or model being forced upon the subject matter, but there are methodological implications stemming from the possibility of a societal totality which is ideologically influenced and determined. Once again the notion of total or radical critique is demanded. Habermas expresses this standpoint when he describes how we should react to theories resulting from the so-called dialectical approach.

> Theories of this more flexible type even in the subjective organization of the scientific apparatus incorporate reflexively the fact that they themselves remain a moment of the objective context which, in their turn, they subject to analysis.[16]

Briefly then, there are no concepts which are privileged such that they are immune to critique. The only appropriate critical response to the possibility of a society totally permeated by ideology, is total critique.

Section 2

The second relationship to be considered by Habermas in "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics" concerns that between theory and experience. The following passage provides a succinct summary of what Habermas believes to be the weaknesses of the analytic-empirical method, which stem from the type of experience that serves as the basis for theoretical explanation.

> Only the controlled observation of physical behaviour, which is set up in an isolated field under reproducible conditions by subjects interchangeable at will, seem to permit intersubjectively valid judgments of perception.[17]

A detailed analysis of this passage yields the following results:
a) The subject matter is chosen and organized so that it is amenable to controlled testing. Such controlled observation is the type of experience which leads to mediation by omission. This limitation of the scope of investigation due to the difficulty in achieving controlled observation means that the scientific method is not capable of the total critique necessary to remedy total ideology. b) The primary mode of study is perceptual observation. Even if the data accepted for processing includes the linguistically expressed opinions of the

individuals being "observed," the checking of such opinions is too limited for successful Ideologiekritik due to the limitations of controlled observation, i.e. there is an array of types of opinions which, because of the restrictions of controlled observation, cannot be the object of scientific investigations, knowledge, or Ideologiekritik. c) The subject matter is studied in isolation from the societal whole--once again in order to satisfy the demands of the methodology. Also, any approach not allowing for a grasp of the whole cannot engage in total Ideologiekritik. Certainly every method of understanding or explanation must start by focussing on a specific or limited area of study; however, the dialectical approach and those modelled after it attempt to expand continually the initial field of study "outward" until the whole is grasped. The methodological constraints of the analytic-empirical method, such as precise observation and capacity for prediction, preclude the possibility of such a comprehensive assessment. d) The reproducibility criterion is yet another limitation on the possible scope of investigation, and further enhances the effect of mediation by omission. e) The subjects or researchers are interchangeable, meaning that their individual and unique relationships to the societal context or social life-world are ignored and the objectivity of their various positions is considered guaranteed by the satisfactory application of the method together with its public character. This might be described as a "distortion" of the subject or researcher, akin to what Habermas describes as the "distortion" of the object. In both cases the structure of what is distorted is ignored in order to satisfy the demands of the method. In this case the researcher qua researcher

is regarded as being independent of the social life-world and its various influences. As we have seen, Habermas's argument concerning the decision to accept or reject basic statements is a denial of this isolation of the researcher. Language is the reason this isolation breaks down.

Habermas wants to base the understanding of society upon experience of the object, society, as it is in its "pre-formed" state, i.e. prior to the application of the scientific method--in other words the undistorted object. Immediately the next methodological level is that of hermeneutics, however, the significance of this section of the article is that Habermas wants a further check on hermeneutics. Although hermeneutics will provide a more comprehensive account of the nature of the object, for Habermas, hermeneutics still remains at the level of "appearance" or, in other words, is susceptible to ideological delusion. In the following passage Habermas's intentions concerning further methodological and critical strategy are confirmed.

> This prior experience of society as totality shapes the outline of the theory in which it articulates itself and through whose constructions it is checked anew against experiences. . . . Even a dialectical theory cannot clash with an experience, however restricted it may be.[18]

It seems that what Habermas expects from hermeneutics is an accurate account of how society "appears" to be or of how the individuals understand their society and their relationship to it. The point of this passage is that although the hermeneutical approach provides theory whose source is the object itself (which was not the case with the analytic-empirical approach, where theories were external due to methodological considerations), these theories must be checked because

the object producing the theories can be influenced by ideology in the Adorno/Habermas sense of this concept. Clearly then, the method of critical theory demands further elements which will at least critically augment hermeneutics.

In each case, the relationship between theory and object, and that between theory and experience, Habermas argues that the dialectical relationship reflected in each situation demands a change in method. The mutual mediation, characterized by mediation by omission on the side of the method, and ideological mediation stemming from the object, destroy the possibility of both Ideologiekritik and objectivity. The hermeneutical approach is chosen to succeed the analytic-empirical method because the former is objective in the sense that it does not mediate the object, but allows it to express itself as it appears and as it is understood by itself. However, this type of objectivity is flawed in that, for Habermas, hermeneutics is unable to distinguish between the truth, on one hand, and the claims of ideology on the other. In his demand for an experiential check on the results of hermeneutical investigation, Habermas is anticipating the debate with Gadamer concerning the latter's claim for the universality of hermeneutics. Habermas's fear is the trap of a historico-linguistic relativism, which he considers to be the ultimate consequence of basing the social sciences on hermeneutics. A full account of this debate on hermeneutics will be provided in Chapters IV and V of this thesis.

Section 3

Corresponding to Section 3 of "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," the present section considers Habermas's account of the relationship between theory and history. In this section Habermas provides more hints as to the nature and task of critical theory, and once again the recovery of some sort of "objectivity" seems to be one of the primary goals. Most importantly for Habermas, the study of history is to play a crucial role in the understanding of the contemporary society's present stage of development; therefore, historical knowledge, its character and possibility, becomes an issue between Habermas and the supporters of both analytic-empirical science and hermeneutics.

One way to introduce these debates is to consider the separation of contemporary social sciences from historical studies. In assessing the possible justification for the excluding or limiting of the use of historical studies with regard to the sociological study of contemporary society, there are two isues: How does one draw the line to cut historical data away from contemporary data? How can one justify ignoring either the causal connections running through history to the present, or the evolutionary development of concepts over history? The significance of the answer to these questions lies in the fact that there is no discernable break in the subject matter itself which can justify limiting the use of historical data: the decision to do so is made on the basis of purely methodological and epistemological considerations, when the approach is analytic-empirical. Certainly no one would deny the relevance of such studies to understanding contemporary society; the problem is the epistemological status of such studies.

The restrictive use of history in the analytic-empirical approach is justified by Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2.[19] There Popper denies the possibility of establishing historical laws. A major obstacle to formulating and justifying such laws takes the form of the impossibility of the scientific testing of these generalizations. Hence Popper rejects the notion of laws that will allow us to predict future history. When one turns to the explanation of historical events, there are further difficulties, both methodological and epistemological. Due to the problem of gaining direct access to past events, the best that can be done is the construction of the most plausible story possible from the information at hand, in order to account for a given historical occurrence. In this case, generalizations used are simply trivial laws describing tendencies in human nature, rather than historical laws.

The result for the analytic-empirical approach is that we cannot have knowledge of history in the way in which we can have knowledge of nature or contemporary society. Once again a decision is made to limit the scope of the object realm in order to accommodate methodological and epistemological demands. This limitation on the possibility of historical knowledge runs counter to both Habermas's understanding of the relationship between past and present, and his purpose for historical study and knowledge.

> A dialectical theory of society, . . ., asserts the dependence of individual phenomena upon the totality; it must reject the restrictive use of the concept of law. Its analysis aims beyond the particular dependent relations of historically neutral quantities, towards an objective context which also plays a part in determining the direction of historical development . . . they (the laws) do not take in the ubiquitous relations of individual functions and

> isolated connections, but rather such fundamental dependent relations from which a social life-world, an epochal situation as a whole, is determined as totality and is permeated in all its moments. . . .[20]

Habermas's claims for knowledge of history, although not so grand as expecting to be able to predict the future, are still very ambitious. He wishes to gain epistemologically privileged access to what he calls an "objective context" and furthermore, to demonstrate the causal connection between that context and the development of the society.

There is little surprise regarding the response of both analytic-empirical philosophers and hermeneuticists to this kind of claim for knowledge of history.

Popper's reaction would be to class this objective context as having the same status epistemologically as his notions of point of view or centre of interest. Popper makes the following comments on these notions.

> Some of these are provided by preconceived ideas which in some way resemble universal laws, such as the idea that what is important for history is the character of the 'Great Men,' or the 'national character,' or moral ideas, or economic conditions, etc. Now it is important to see that many 'historical theories' (. . . 'quasi-theories') are in their character vastly different from scientific theories. For in history . . . the facts at our disposal are often severely limited and cannot be repeated or implemented at our will. And they have been collected in accordance with a preconceived point of view; . . . if no further facts are available, it will often not be possible to test this theory or any other subsequent theory. Such untestable historical theories can then rightly be charged with being circular. . . . I shall call such historical theories, in contra-distinction to scientific theories, 'general interpretations.'[21]

The notion of general interpretation is obviously something Habermas must avoid in the establishment of his fundamental dependent relations. Habermas must find a method and evidence of such quality that he is

able to establish these relations so that their role in determining the nature of society is not just another one of many competing general interpretations, susceptible to a manifold of criticisms concerning claims to truth and objectivity. For Popper, the best that can be hoped for from engaging in such historical studies are interesting comparisons to the contemporary situation, possibly involving hints as to how contemporary problems can be solved. Habermas is obviously not interested in producing a general interpretation, but rather wants an epistemologically far more compelling position.

Switching from the problems of empirical evidence for such a claim as Habermas wishes to be able to make, Gadamer offers little consolation in terms of the researcher's own potential as an objective interpreter of the past. In Truth and Method, he remarks:

> . . . the historian usually chooses the concepts by means of which he describes the historical nature of his objects, without expressly reflecting on their origin and justification. He is simply following here his interest in the material and takes no account of the fact that the descriptive aptness of his chosen concepts can be highly detrimental to his proper purpose, inasmuch as it assimilates what is historically different to what is familiar and thus, despite all objectivity, has already subordinated the alien being of the object to its own conceptual frame of reference. Thus, despite all his scientific method, he behaves just like everyone else, as a child of his time who is dominated unquestioningly by the concepts and prejudices of his own age.[22]

Gadamer goes on to argue that to respond to this situation by demanding that the researcher's own concepts be left aside is both impossible and destructive to the very possibility of understanding history. Our own concepts and dispositions are the only means we possess of gaining any comprehension of history, regardless of the relativistic consequences. For Gadamer the final result of historical study and interpretation is

a "fusion of horizons," on the one side that of history, and on the other that of our own social life-world. There can be no separation enabling us to stand back and distinguish the two horizons. The degree to which we can interpret or understand the past, is the degree to which the fusion has already taken place. Gadamer grants that history has meaning of its own, but the relationship between interpreter and historical evidence is one of mutual mediation. History as a thing-in-itself cannot be known by us.

Popper, indeed, appears even more extreme than Gadamer when he asserts that "history has no meaning. . . ."[23] The notion of "meaning" for Popper seems to be equivalent to "end" or "purpose," but is still relevant to Habermas's expectations for historical studies. Taking power politics as an example of general interpretation, Popper claims:

> . . . we can interpret it, with an eye to those problems of power politics whose solution we choose to attempt in our time. We can interpret the history of power politics from the point of view of our fight for the open society, for a rule of reason, for justice. . . . Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and although history has no meaning, we can give it meaning. . . . Facts, whether those of nature or those of history, cannot determine the ends we are going to choose. It is we who introduce purpose and meaning into nature and history.[24]

Popper is making a metaphysical point just as much as he is providing an epistemological argument in this passage. With the spectre of various deterministic views of history, where history and the individuals involved are driven by historical purposes beyond their control, Popper responds by denying that history has any meaning whatsoever, outside of the meaning that each individual gives to it.

Once again the possibility of an absolute or practically inseparable mediation faces Habermas, threatening the potential for Ideologiekritik and objectivity. Habermas is not after simply interesting interpretations of historical events, but wants to be able to explain the large-scale development of society at a given stage in its history. To discuss the arguments of Popper and Gadamer in terms of ideology, it would appear that ideological influence is inescapable for either one. For Popper the kind of large-scale explanation desired by Habermas would be just one interpretation among many others, each reflecting the specific subjective interests of the researcher. Such interpretations can be judged by their fruitfulness as plausible explanations of historical events and in the understanding of contemporary problems. Conceivably then, the researcher's uncritically or unconsciously held ideological dispositions would be reflected in his particular interpretation. Thus rather than being of assistance in disclosing the ideological delusions of contemporary society through an objective understanding of its historical development, such an interpretation would only serve to forward the cause of the contemporary ideology. This prior mediation of the researcher by the ideology confronts Habermas with a serious problem given that he expects the study of history to help reveal the ideological influence in contemporary society. How can one be confident concerning the objectivity of historical research, when the researcher can be carrying the contemporary ideology into his understanding of history?

Although he contends, as opposed to Popper, that history has meaning, Gadamer's assessment of the study of history offers the same

challenge to Habermas. In the case of a fusion of horizons, the meaning of the period under study and the social life-world reflected by the reseacher mediate each other making it difficult to discern how Habermas's desire for objectivity can be satisfied. Once again, Habermas needs a method which can separate ideological claims from the truth of the matter. In other words, he must find a way to distinguish between the mediating elements.

Habermas's position, as opposed to the stands of Gadamer and Popper, exhibits the following aspects: a) Contra Popper, on the one hand history has meaning in the sense of purpose, and on the other we can avoid the arbitrarily chosen points of view and gain knowledge of the fundamental causal and determining influences which permeate the life-world of a given historical period; b) Contra Gadamer, it is possible to escape the relativity facing the historian in the form of a necessary fusion of horizons and the subjective meaning-comprehending hermeneutics.

It is in the context of the next part of the claim against Popper's position, that one might introduce the notion of "cognitive interest," however, with no more detail at present, than a reference to how the particular interest in emancipation functions with regard to history and the understanding of it by a contemporary commentator. The interest in emancipation is hinted at in the section of "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," but a much clearer account is provided in Werner Marx's essay, "Habermas' Philosophical Conception of History." In the following passage Marx comments upon Habermas's inaugural address.

> . . . Habermas explicitly speaks of the one "idea" which the human species has "to realize" through history. This idea, the "single one . . . of which we are master in the sense of philosophical tradition," is for him "maturity" or pure responsibility. It is "realized," he remarks, "through the human species in the manner of an "advance" to an "emancipated society." . . .[25]

While this appears a very laudatory selection for the meaning and purpose of human history, Habermas at this point is far from establishing that this interest occupies such a fundamental position of influence in history. However, it is clear now just what direction Habermas will take concerning the historical study. History will be studied from the point of view of the status and progress of realizing in society, the emancipatory interest possessed by all human beings. What makes this interest so special and not just another point of view will be discussed in Chapter V.

With regard to the position espoused by Gadamer, Habermas recognizes a role for hermeneutics, or what he calls the "subjective meaning-comprehending" hermeneutics, and this appreciation of hermeneutics is derived from the approach which Habermas will take to the understanding of history. Habermas claims that society, contemporary or at any point in history, is a dialectical totality; however, it must be noted that such a notion does not function as a methodological presupposition, but rather as a hypothesis which must be demonstrated, i.e. in terms of the mutual mediation of society and the individuals constituting it. For Habermas, the laws or historical regularities, which he wishes to establish, signify developments ". . . mediated through the consciousness of the acting subjects. . . ."[26] To this extent there is a task for subjective meaning-comprehending

hermeneutics, however, coming to an understanding of the expressed thoughts of the individuals involved, i.e. viewing the society completely in terms of and reliant upon the understanding of the society held by the actors, is insufficient for Habermas's goal of demonstrating the existence and influence of fundamental dependent relations which determine the very nature of the societal life-world. The possibility of the individuals being deceived in their understanding of their society demands a method for checking the results of the hermeneutical investigation and Habermas refers to such an approach as an "objective meaning-comprehending" theory which will recognize and criticize the reified concepts of the historical subjects. For Habermas critical theory must be able to criticize both the contemporary society and its history. Habermas quotes Adorno in describing the task of critical theory.

> [It] . . . must transform the concepts which it brings, as it were, from outside into those which the object has of itself, into what the object, left to itself, seeks to be, and confront it with what it is. . . .[27]

This strategy will be clarified in Chapter V in terms of the psychoanalytic model for critical theory. At this time let it suffice to say that critical theory as an approach to the understanding of history must find some means or method of getting beyond the information gathered through hermeneutical investigation. As yet, this method is not clearly outlined by Habermas. To conclude this section, there are two main reasons why Habermas wants this objective knowledge of history. On the one hand, such knowledge would serve to augment immediately present evidence concerning the nature of contemporary

society. Habermas at one point remarks, "Society reveals itself in the laws of its historical development primarily from that which it is not. . . ."[28] Ultimately the task of critical theory is directed toward the contemporary society and the knowledge of the history of the society's development will provide support for the demonstration of the discrepancy between the dominant view and understanding of the society, and the reality which is the society. On the other hand, the study of history will contribute to prescribing a direction and broad course of action for the future of the society. It should be emphasized how ambitious a project this is and the immensity of the epistemological burden to be placed on our knowledge of history. Although Habermas does not claim the existence of laws acting throughout history, but limits his laws to the given historical epoch, his position remains diametrically opposed to Popper's. Most significantly over and against Popper's view of the relativism of historical interpretation, Habermas asserts that, with the correct method and interest, one can obtain objective knowledge of the determining influences of society at any given point in its history.

In stressing the dependence of critical theory and the understanding of contemporary society on our understanding of its history, Habermas places himself in the historical tradition of Hegel and Marx. Even if one haggles over whether or not history proceeds dialectically and if so, what is the content of this movement, it is still undeniable that history is constituted by a much frayed but continuous chain composed by a mixture of elements, either organically evolving or causally connected in a mechanistic sense. The challenge becomes how to know the past, and at this point Habermas simply isn't clear on that issue.

Once again Habermas emphasizes his desire to overcome the gap between theory and what theory claims to be about. For Habermas the demand is that the theory be based upon an objective knowledge of the nature of the object. Habermas believes that the correct approach will demonstrate both what society appears and claims to be, and what it is in actuality. It is only when this point is reached, being able to demonstrate what something actually is, can it be said that theory and its subject matter are properly related, i.e. the former is derived from and accurately reflects the latter.

A final hint regarding the relationship of historical and contemporary study of society provides the next problem to be considered in "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics." The only way in which the study of society can proceed historically and systematically is under the influence of practical intent.

> Only in this way, with practical intent, can social sciences proceed both historically and systematically, whereby, of course, this intention must also, in its turn, be reflected from within the same objective context whose analysis it facilitates.[29]

The point being made in this instance is that social sciences, as theory, must proceed with the aim of social action or change, and the objective context must share this same goal. Once more the concern is for the integrity of the object, i.e. society. The practical intention of the social scientist can only have legitimacy or be justifiably acted upon if it is reflected by the society itself. The question remains as to how one establishes the correctness of expressed practical intent.

Section 4

Habermas expects the study of history to provide guidance for the future development of contemporary society. However, for history to be utilized in this way the social sciences or theory must be guided by practical intent. Habermas approaches this problem of the relationship between social theory and practice by providing a critique of the relationship between analytic-empirical theory and practically chosen ends.

Habermas concedes that social scientific theory which reflects the analytic-empirical approach does enjoy success, where success means providing knowledge with which future developments can be predicted. Such knowledge is useful to society's planners and administrators, however, the practically chosen ends, which this knowledge will contribute to attaining, are not given any comparable theoretical or scientific justification. Habermas wants to overcome the dualism of theory and practice so as to provide theoretical justification for the chosen practice; not a justification in the sense of showing that it is possible to effect the practice, but rather a justification which entails that the practice is correct. In other words Habermas wants theoretical justification of the goal, that it is right for the society, not knowledge which is used simply as a means to achieve the goal.

Another aspect of this notion of practice which must be considered is that for neo-Marxism and the Frankfurt School, especially Habermas and Adorno, there is no limit to the scale of practice which might be undertaken. The methodological demands of the analytic-

empirical procedures result in limited and modest recommendations for change and offer results for a very limited scope of action within the society. The so-called dialectical view of society, when operating as a critical concept, recognizes no limitation for the scope of action, but will recommend even changes which will fundamentally alter the nature of society and modify the lives of all individuals in the society. One might call this a recommendation for revolutionary change. This position can be contrasted with Popper's approach of piecemeal social engineering. Popper is not in favour of revolutionary change involving an overturning of basic social structures and argues that our knowledge is too limited to justify such a change on a massive and all-permeating scale. The neo-Marxist response to Popper's conservative approach is to assert that given these limitations on scope, the social sciences can engage in only the treating of symptoms, with no hope of reaching and solving the underlying sources of these symptoms--sources which are to be discovered by investigating far deeper into the structure of society.

The crux of the issue is epistemological, as Habermas proposes an approach that will not be limited by having to rely upon analytic-empirical knowledge which is restricted in scope by having to satisfy conditions of controlled observation and testing. Habermas aspires to uncovering the fundamental elements which determine the nature of the society--a total critique.

For Habermas, however, the basic problem of contemporary modern society is the ideology and social forces veiled by it, restricting the freedom of the individuals. The task of critical theory is to

demonstrate the loss of freedom and make recommendations as to how emancipation can be achieved. Habermas confronts Popper's Burkian disposition with a utopian vision of an emancipated society, a vision which should be the goal of history.

As we have seen, Habermas needs to establish a theoretical justification for practice and this demand leads to the final stage in the critique of the analytic-empirical approach in the social sciences. Habermas must demonstrate that the fact/value distinction is not universal and that there is a realm in which certain unique kinds of values and the possibility of determining facts epistemologically are inseparable.

Section 5

The possibility of both joining theory and history and overcoming the gap between theory and practice, both of which are conditions for the success or even possibility of a critical theory of society, reduces to the fact/value distinction. Theory is based upon facts and recommendations for practice are reflections of values, hence Habermas is faced with an obstacle to normative knowledge which has its most famous defense in Hume's A Treatise On Human Understanding.[30] Here Hume argues quite convincingly that no description of what is the case, i.e. the facts of the matter, will allow one to derive or justify what ought to be the case or what should be the case. Values are derived solely from desires and passions and cannot be inferred from empirical facts or descriptions of what is the case, or from rational thought. No justification can come from these quarters in support of what ought

to be the case. Such values can motivate the search for knowledge and provide the search with a goal to achieve, however, it provides the end to which knowledge is the means and the two sides are independent as described above.

The challenge to Habermas is as follows: If theory, a correct account of what is the case, is to be in any way united with practice, where theory justifies what practice wants to achieve, the facts, upon which theory is based, must express values, i.e. knowledge must be, in itself, value laden.

Scott Warren gives the following account of the argument for joining theory and practice.

> Perhaps most essential to the argument for a unity of theory and practice is the idea that it cannot be achieved artificially. It is not an argument for a third party to take the insights of pure theory discovered through disinterested and detached contemplation or observation and to 'apply' those insights to an independently proceeding social reality. Rather, it is a demand for the practical interest in emancipating and transforming an alienated human world to become an intrinsic and inseparable component of the theoretical enterprise itself. It asks that concrete practical interest become the radical foundation for the theoretical process of political inquiry. This interest must constitute and guide the process of inquiry.[31]

Warren certainly understands the problem and expresses Habermas's goal regarding the function of the interest in emancipation, however, the difficulty is how to make emancipation, that concrete practical interest, intrinsic to and inseparable from the theoretical enterprise. This issue will be dealt with at length in Chapter V, but for now, we must content ourselves with the introduction of the notion of interest which will be the foundation for Habermas's union of the emancipatory interest and theoretical inquiry.

To begin with, Habermas is aiming at a complete overcoming of the fact-value distinction in the sense that each fact, accepted as such, involves a value in the form of a cognitive interest. Its acceptance as a fact arises from or depends upon the satisfaction of one of these interests. In other words, Habermas's position demands that certain values be recognized and established as essential to the determination of reality as it is for us, and to the determination of what counts as knowledge. In Section 1 of this chapter, Habermas's challenge to basic statements has been considered from the point of view of establishing the mediation of the methodology by the object, and thus supporting the idea of society as a dialectical totality. In this section, the emphasis will be placed upon the critique of basic statements as an argument against the fact/value distinction.

As we have seen, Habermas locates the source of the acceptance of basic statements in the intersubjective agreement of individuals using meanings which are part of the pre-scientific life-world. What Habermas regards as a circular argument in which basic statements and rules for acceptance presuppose each other, yields the following result.

> The inevitable circle in the application of rules is evidence of the embedding of the research process in a context which itself can no longer be explicated in an analytic-empirical manner but only hermeneutically. The postulates of strict cognition naturally conceal a non-explicated pre-understanding which, in fact, they presuppose. . . .[32]

The result of this development is that facts become a matter of intersubjective agreement or consensus through communication among individuals. While this argument clearly supports the notion of a dialectical

relationship between methodology and object, it is not that clear how it helps Habermas overcome the fact/value distinction. The answer, however, can be derived from Habermas's explanation of the basis for our acceptance of basic statements as being empirically valid.

> In the last instance, therefore, the empirical validity of basic statements, and thereby the plausibility of law-like hypothesis and empirical scientific theories as a whole, is related to the criteria for assessing the results of action which have been socially adopted in the necessarily intersubjective context of working groups. It is here that the hermeneutic pre-understanding, concealed by the analytical theory of science, is formed, a pre-understanding which first makes possible the application of rules for the acceptance of basic statements.[33]

Habermas finds the justification for acceptance of basic statements in the realm of criteria for assessing the success or failure of social actions. This position is characterized by viewing science as a form of labor which is physical activity with the goal of wanting to effect a change in physical reality. Support for this position comes from emphasizing that the establishment of facts involves controlled observation and testing. Habermas seems to regard analytic-empirical science as first and foremost an activity which involves the influencing and modifying of the object due to the demands of the methodology, in this case controlled observation. This view of science stands in opposition to the view that science is essentially contemplative in nature. Our acceptance of observation statements is based upon criteria for successful action. These criteria are decided by intersubjective agreement among individuals in the society; this still leaves us with the problem of the basis for the choice of such criteria, and it is at this point that Habermas introduces a <u>dominant</u> interest.

> The practical interest in the domination of objective processes apparently stands out from all other interests of practical life. The interest in the sustenance of life through societal labor under the constraint of natural circumstances seems to have been virtually constant throughout the previous stages in the development of the human race. For this reason, a consensus concerning the meaning of technical domination can be achieved without any difficulty, in principle, within historical and cultural boundaries; the intersubjective validity of empirical-scientific statements which follows the criteria of this pre-understanding is therefore secured.[34]

There is a wide ranging significance for this explanation of the basis for consensus and the ease with which consensus or intersubjective agreement is reached concerning observation or basic statements. This dominating interest is not one among numerous values and interests which have their source in the given socio-cultural context and which would be themselves accounted for in terms of hermeneutic understanding. Rather, this interest in technical domination has its source beyond the confines of any given cultural or historical context--it is a constant in the development of the human species. Implicit in this reference to the species, is a division between two sources of understanding of the world: a) on the one hand, one's view of the world is constituted of experiences and meanings which have their source in the given socio-cultural context; b) on the other hand, one's view of the world is determined by experiences and meanings determined by one's being a member of the human species and these are constant regardless of the socio-cultural context. The dialectical relationship between analytic-empirical methodology and society, led to hermeneutics and the pre-scientific life-world as being the source of our understanding of society. Although successful in his critique of analytic-empirical science, the victory was gained at the cost of making standards and

criteria for knowledge relative to a given socio-cultural or socio-linguistic context, and this situation challenges the possibility of Habermas's desire for a scientific understanding of society. As will become clear in the next chapter, Habermas will look to the relationship of the human species to its environment as the source for standards and criteria, of an absolute nature, by which we gain an understanding and are able to explain events in the world.

The epistemological power of basic statements originates in the successful establishment of technical control or in successful instrumental action. For Habermas analytic-empirical knowledge is not based solely upon controlled observation and a system of theories, but rather equal if not more significance should be granted to successful instrumental action. The emphasis switches from passive observation or contemplation, to successful active intervention in the physical world.

The relationship between empirical facts and values has changed due to the nature of empirical observations that are the basis of descriptions which one would call facts. It does not seem that Habermas has been engaged in trying to derive an "ought" from an "is"; however, it is the case that satisfying the interest in technical control or domination is both a necessary and sufficient condition for claiming analytic-empirical knowledge of something. The significance of the fate of analytic-empirical knowledge is that its justification and its meaning do not come from the search for truth or demonstrating what is the case, but rather from the achievement of technical control. The epistemological basis and the value of this knowledge are to be found in the satisfying of the technical interest; hence the claim that truth

is the only value influencing analytic-empirical science is rejected. Its real interest or inherent value is in technical control. What Habermas seems to have accomplished is the deriving of facts, as expressed in basic statements, from a species interest. A specific value or interest has become the epistemological basis for facts and in this sense the fact/value gap has been overcome.

The full implications of this achievement can be seen from referring back to the division between theory and practice as social action whose content expresses various values such as the good life. In terms of analytic-empirical knowledge of society, theory no longer appears to be value-neutral or value-free and distinct from practice. Rather, theory now reflects a certain interest or value, that of technical control, and if theory is to be achieved then this interest must be realized or satisfied in terms of action which has concrete social implications. In the following chapters a more detailed account of knowledge-constitutive interests will be provided, however, for the present purpose of elucidating the implications of Habermas's account of the relationship between the technical interest and analytic-empirical science, the following passage from Theory and Practice is useful.

Because of the role of the interest in technical control with regard to scientific knowledge, Habermas asserts the following:

> The function of the knowledge of modern science must therefore be understood in connection with the system of social labor: it extends and rationalizes our power of technical control over the objects or . . . objectified processes of nature and society.
>
> . . . The methodology of the empirical sciences is tacitly but effectively rooted in a technical cognitive interest that excludes

> all other interests; consequently all other relations to life-praxis can be blocked out under the slogan of ethical neutrality or value-freedom.[35]

Habermas's connection of scientific knowledge, in the above sense, and the interest in technical control displays the error of the claim to value-freedom for such scientific activity. Given that empirical science reflects and actualizes the interest in technical control, it must compete with other values in a normative debate concerning what is the right or best course of action for society. Against its competitors it claims efficiency, capacity for prediction and precision, etc., all backed by its impressive record of "success" in enabling us to control our natural environment through technological developments. Understanding rationality exclusively in terms of purposive-rational action or means-ends relationships, its own success in this context makes it the only rational means of acting and behaving.

Finally, in regard to its effect upon society, the analytic-empirical approach is forced, ironically enough, into a debate on what should or ought to be the best course of action and strategy for the development of society. Its interest in technical control, rather than in the discovery of the truth as a means to some practically decided end, destroys its claim of value-freedom. The result is a tacitly held equation between practice and technical control. Practice, the purpose of which is to realize the good life for the individuals in the society, is now synonymous with purposive-rational action achieved through technical control.

Concluding Remarks

For the most part this chapter has been a commentary on Habermas's essay entitled "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics." In the course of this article Habermas provides a critique of various claims made for and by the analytic-empirical method of science, and he adopts a format which considers the development of theory with regard to the object, experience, history, practice and value.

Concerning the nature of the critique, it is largely immanent, investigating the claims associated with analytic-empirical science in these various relationships and revealing these claims to be false, through an analysis of the nature of science and its procedures. One might describe the focus of the attack as directed toward science's claim to objectivity regarding its subject matter. Habermas's critique has demonstrated that not only does science mediate its object due to the constraints of the method, its standards and criteria, but also, it, in turn, has its epistemological foundations and source in society itself. In each section Habermas attempts to establish the mutual mediation between, on the one hand, the analytic-empirical method and the theories resulting from its application, and, on the other, the society which is the object of that method. Habermas's immanent critique of the analytic-empirical method and its relationship to society results in a synthesis which encompasses the method itself. The resulting understanding of the object of study, the social life-world, yields an area for research which is both more comprehensive and foundational epistemologically than society as approached through the

analytic-empirical method. As has been stated on several occasions in this thesis, total ideology or its possibility demands total or comprehensive critique. Analytic-empirical science's mediation by omission precludes the possibility of such a critique. At the same time, the social life-world is more foundational epistemologically because neither the scientific experience nor its language is separable from the experience of the social life-world and the language which reflects that experience. The dialectical synthesis takes the form of the social life-world and our experience of it. The importance of the role of language results in hermeneutics being chosen as the next methodological stage for critique by Habermas.

Habermas's position on the inter-subjective consensus deciding the fate of basic statements is captured in this passage from Raymond Geuss:

> Traditional empiricism mistook this requirement of 'publicity' and connected it not with the possibility of universal free inter-subjective agreement, but with 'observation,' and so ultimately with a kind of direct sensory stimulation. This mistake is easy to make. Observation statements are probably the most striking case of statements on which there will be widespread agreement, but the reason they play such a central role in our empirical knowledge is not that they 'stand closest to sensation,' but that consensus about them is most widespread and unproblematic.[36]

To develop this position in terms of Habermas, the experience of the social life-world, the language which reflects and expresses that experience, and the technical cognitive interest possessed by members of the human species all are factors contributing to the ease with which consensus is reached concerning basic statements.

The introduction of the interest in technical control anticipates the next stage in Habermas's methodological critique. Although

our next chapter is devoted to a detailed account of the nature and function of so-called knowledge-constitutive interests in Habermas's critical theory, the very brief exposure to the technical cognitive interest in the present chapter should not go without some response. We have already described Habermas's critique of the analytic-empirical approach to knowledge as, essentially, a critique of its claim to objectivity. The successful achievement of this critique can certainly be regarded as a decisive success for Habermas, however, it also has a somewhat negative side in terms of Habermas's goal of Ideologiekritik. Put simply, Habermas must be able to achieve some sort of epistemological and methodological objectivity concerning society, meaning that the approach must be immune to ideology and must also be able to penetrate society so as to disclose ideology as being delusory. On the surface at least, the determinate negation of the critique directed toward analytic-empirical science and its view of society seems to leave Habermas further away from rather than closer to attaining his goal. The mediation of analytic-empirical science by the social life-world confronts Habermas with the threat of epistemological relativity. It is in light of this development that the introduction of the notion of cognitive interest gains a crucial importance, both epistemologically and methodologically. The technical cognitive interest does not have its source in a given socio-historical or historico-linguistic context, but rather is a, dare we use the term, "essential" feature of what it is to be a member of the human species, regardless of historical context. With this independence from the historical context and its influence on the reaching of a consensus, it is clear

that the notion of a cognitive interest is an attempt by Habermas to re-establish objectivity, even though, as we shall see, it is an objectivity quite different from that claimed by analytic-empirical science.

On the positive side, some of the aspects of critical theory and social sciences which function in accordance with this approach, can be gleaned from "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics." The new approach depends upon the successful application of hermeneutical procedures. The hermeneutical method is to be applied to the contemporary society and its historical development; however, the results of the hermeneutical investigations are to be contrasted with a truly objective experience. This latter feature is left as a demand for critical theory, but Habermas does not explain just how this experience is to be achieved. Habermas adds another aspect to the task of social science, that of practically guiding and prescribing the direction of further societal development and change. Rather than accepting the separation of the application of social science and the choosing of social goals, a position implying the validity of the fact-value distinction, Habermas expects critical theoretical social sciences to epistemologically and rationally establish normative social policy. The introduction of the notion of cognitive interest, making technical cognitive interest a standard for and part of an account of knowledge of the physical world, provides a hint as to how Habermas will attempt to construct a normative epistemology. In the immediately following chapter we will engage in an in-depth study of the role and function of knowledge constitutive interests.

Finally a few words should be said about the possibility and nature of a role for aspects of the analytic-empirical method in a Habermasian concept of the social sciences. The following observations are relevant to this issue, and are aspects of Habermas's alternative approach.

1. In attempting to understand and explain various aspects of and events in society, our approach should not be limited to theories which can be, in the mode of the analytic-empirical method, either confirmed or falsified practically or in principle.

2. The approach should not be restricted to data from observations which can be control-tested.

3. The results of the hermeneutical investigation must be tested or checked against experience, although that type of experience is not to be identified with controlled observation. Habermas, in the essay dealt with in this chapter, is not specific about the type of experience involved here, although some sort of empirical observation, not so restrictive as that described in basic statements, seems to be implied. Later on, in Chapter IV, it will appear that the psycho-analytically produced experience is a candidate.

4. Although Habermas does not deal with the possibilities, there seem to be applications of the analytic-empirical method to society, such as correlations between types of human behaviour and events, and even the making of predictions, which do not necessarily promote or help sustain ideology. Such applications of the analytic-empirical approach would not seem to be objectionable to the critical theorist as long as they are augmented by effective Ideologiekritik. The position

being taken by this author is that, even given the interest in technical control, it is not clear that Habermas unconditionally rules out or is justified in ruling out all roles for analytic-empirical method in the social sciences. On the contrary, it seems that once an effective Ideologiekritik has been carried out, the purified data, if amenable to the analytic-empirical approach, should be subjected to it if this application would enhance our knowledge of society. Habermas's concern is that knowledge, rationality and proper investigatory procedure not be defined in terms of and determined by the analytic-empirical method, to the exclusion of all other methods.

5. One must not be restricted to the fact-value distinction as a criterion for epistemology. Knowledge reflects values in the form of cognitive interests.

Chapter IV

"KNOWLEDGE-CONSTITUTIVE INTERESTS," OBJECTIFIED REALITIES AND METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In Chapters I and II various characteristics of the notion of "dialectic" were investigated because of the crucial role played by this notion in the development of Habermas's early work. Both epistemologically and methodologically the concept of mediation is of central importance. Habermas's immanent critique of the analytic-empirical method argues that the method and the object mediate each other, the most significant aspect of this relationship being the mediation of the method by the object as it appears and not as it really is. The main challenge for Habermas is to discover or formulate an approach which is able to get beyond the appearance and reveal the reality of society and the ideological influences functioning therein. In order to assess and understand how Habermas attempts to achieve this goal the present chapter, following from Chapter III, will consider two themes: a) the notion of knowledge-constitutive interests--specifically the practical or communicative interest and the technical interest; and b) the critique of hermeneutics and the Habermas-Gadamer debate.

Regarding the latter, it is clear from the last chapter that hermeneutics cannot be the final methodological stage for Ideologiekritik. Hermeneutics' advantage over the analytic-empirical method lies in the fact that the former provides a comprehensive view of the object as it appears. Not being tied to restrictive methodological demands and a limited scope of acceptable data, hermeneutics

focusses upon a broader range of concepts and meanings which constitute our interpretive experience of society. The problem occurs because, although it is more comprehensive and sensitive to the object's self-understanding, this approach remains susceptibile to ideological deception.

Concerning the former, although Habermas says little to clarify the notion of a technical cognitive interest in "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," it is obvious both that this notion has an important epistemological role to play regarding our understanding of society, and that knowledge-constitutive interests do not arise from a specific socio-historical context, but rather from the nature of the human species and its environment. In the case of the technical cognitive interest, it appears to have an epistemological influence internal rather than external to the goal of achieving knowledge: i.e. it is not simply another motivation or end to which knowledge is the means, but rather this interest plays a role in deciding the meaning of what knowledge is and what it is to possess knowledge.

Lastly, before entering into the main arguments and content of this chapter, a further observation can be made toward elucidating the problem confronting Habermas. Habermas's dilemma can be reasonably interpreted as being caught between Scylla of pure empiricism and the Charybdis of linguistic-historical idealism. Although he wants to avoid the approach to understanding society which is based upon precise controlled observations and predictions, Habermas does not want to entirely relinquish the empirical element of the social sciences. Specifically observations which can help establish causal influences

and connections are to be part of Ideologiekritik, and a critical supplement to hermeneutics. On the other hand, there remains the historico-linguistic data of hermeneutics, which must be recognized, although kept in check. The application of empirical methods in any form must be carried out respecting the historico-linguistic nature of our understanding of society and of its very nature. The thematic question in this chapter is the following: Given the apparent foundational function of the social life-world with respect to epistemology, how can Habermas avoid the relativism of the historico-linguistic context: a relativism which threatens to deny the possibility of the objectivity necessary for Ideologiekritik?

Section 1

This section will focus upon the notion of knowledge-constitutive interests as represented by the technical and practical or communicative cognitive interests. Habermas's critique of the method or subject-object relationship as construed by a scientistic view of the analytic-empirical approach replaces the context-independent subject and method, with a researcher and approach influenced by the social life-world. Specifically, the cognitive subject is found not to be Cartesian; rather, the subject uses a method whose criteria for success and standards of validity are not based upon absolute and socio-historically independent foundations such as observed facts. In Chapter III we recounted Habermas's argument attempting to locate and ground the decision to accept basic statements in the intersubjective agreement of a community of individuals who are influenced in all decisions by their

experience of the social life-world, an experience which permeates the understanding and application of the analytic-empirical method. However, Habermas does not wish to leave the analytic-empirical approach totally at the mercy of the historico-linguistic context of the social life-world. A new element, in the form of the technical cognitive interest, is introduced into the decision making process--an element which finally determines the result of such decisions.

Although it is not yet clear how the goal is to be achieved, the immediate suspicion would seem to be that Habermas is introducing knowledge-constitutive interests in an effort to establish an epistemological basis independent of any particular social life-world. In other words, Habermas is seeking to avoid linguistic-historical relativism. The promotion of knowledge-constitutive interests has its roots in both Kantian and Marxist philosophies.

On the Kantian side these interests, at least the technical and practical, are given a transcendental function. They make knowledge possible and determine the nature of the methods by which we will come to understand the world as either natural or social. Unlike Kant, however, Habermas does not provide a "transcendental deduction" in which abstract categories are deduced from the experience of an abstract "I" totally divorced from its natural and social contexts. Although they have a transcendental function, rather than being deduced in the Kantian manner, they are justified and established ". . . through a process of rationally reconstructing the conditions of how experience can be objective."[1] In this case, the life-form specific to the members of the human species is taken as fundamental epistemologically,

although its empirical and contingent nature cannot be denied. In this appeal to the nature of the species, Habermas is exposing his Marxist roots.

At this point, Habermas echoes Marx in the latter's critique of Hegel's Phenomenology. Habermas regards Marx's position as that of nature being the "absolute ground of mind";[2] whereas for Hegel, as quoted by Marx in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,[3] mind (Geist) ". . . is the truth and thus the absolute ground of nature." The key difference between Habermas and Marx lies in the latter's derivation of social relationships solely from the development of the forces of production or scientific-technical progress.[4] For Habermas the relationship between the species and nature is not the sole foundation of social relationships; rather there are two equally basic relationships of the species to the environment: a) the development of the relationship between the human species and nature in accordance with instrumental action and the interest in technical control; and b) the communicative interaction of individuals and their interest in communication, which function within the constraints of social institutions. The interests, technical and communicative, are regarded by Habermas as being invariant and essential characteristics of the species and they determine how the world is to be understood regardless of the social life-world.

Let us now consider a comment from Habermas in which he provides further information concerning these cognitive interests and their specific functions.

> I have let myself be guided by the problem posed by the system of primitive terms (or the "transcendental framework") within which we organize our experience a priori and prior to all science, and do so in such a manner that, of course, the formation of the scientific object domains is also prejudiced by this. In the functional sphere of instrumental we encounter objects of the type of moving bodies; here we experience things, events, and conditions which are, in principle, capable of being manipulated. In interactions (or at the level of intersubjective communication) we encounter objects of the type of speaking and acting subjects; here we experience persons, utterances, and conditions which in principle are structured and to be understood symbolically. The object domains of the empirical-analytic and of the hermeneutic sciences are based on these objectifications of reality, which we undertake daily always from the viewpoint either of technical control or intersubjective communication. This is revealed by a methodological comparison of the fundamental theoretical concepts, the logical construction of the theorems, the relationship of theory to the object domain, the criteria of verification, the testing procedures and so forth.[5]

The a priori nature of the technical and practical cognitive interests is such that there is no conscious act of judgment involved; they are transcendentally involved in determining the ways in which we experience our environment. Accompanying our understanding of the world in terms of these interests, there is the disposition to engage in two primary types of actions: instrumental action toward the strictly physical and natural aspects of the world; and communicative action with regard to other human beings. Again it must be emphasized that Habermas's knowing subjects do not gain knowledge through contemplation and passive observation; rather, their knowledge is demonstrated and based in successful actions, either instrumental or communicative.

To further emphasize the special nature of these cognitive interests, in the following passage Habermas outlines their relationship to certain approaches to both epistemology and human behaviour.

> These interests of knowledge are of significance neither for the psychology nor for the sociology of knowledge, nor for the critique

> of ideology in any narrower sense; for they are invariant. Nor, on the other hand, can they be traced back to the biological heritage of concrete motivational potential: for they are abstract. Rather, they result from the imperatives of a socio-cultural life-form dependent on labor and language.[6]

Such interests are not to be regarded as either psychological dispositions or relativistic sociological influences for explaining knowledge. The former would result in regarding cognitive interests as features of human psychology, which along with other human capacities such as perception and language, determine how we know. Cognitive interests are not one among many types of epistemologically influencing features of the human species. On the contrary, they are more fundamental and provide the initial understanding of the world and what will count as knowledge of that world. Language and perception function in the way in which they do epistemologically due to the prior grasp of the world in terms of cognitive interests, and this point will be filled out in the course of this chapter. Knowledge-constitutive interests cannot be understood in terms of the psychology of the human species, but are the result of the confrontation between this species and the special character of its environment.

Secondly, they are not to be numbered among various sociological influences on the nature of our knowledge or on the study of knowledge: rather, they make knowledge possible, and explain what it means to possess knowledge for Habermas. They are not relative to and do not originate from any given social context, but rather are invariant and essential aspects of the human species as it grasps the world at any given stage in its historical and social development. They are thus independent of the sociology of knowledge.

Thirdly, it would appear that since all knowledge and claims to knowledge presuppose the functioning of these interests, they are not relevant to Ideologiekritik.

Lastly, they are not to be confused with dispositions originating in the specific biological nature of human beings. Rather than a biological response, they are the epistemological aspects of a species attempting to survive and develop its potential within the constraints of its environment. They are not motivations or goals to the service and satisfaction of which knowledge is utilized and instrumentally directed, but rather they provide the experience by which knowledge is achieved. They reflect the actions, instrumental and communicative, in terms of which we attain knowledge.

In the following passage, Habermas attempts to clarify the epistemological functions of these interests.

> Therefore the technical and practical interests of knowledge are not regulators of cognition which have to be eliminated for the sake of the objectivity of knowledge; instead, they themselves determine the aspect under which reality is objectified, and can thus be made accessible to experience to begin with. They are the conditions which are necessary in order that subjects capable of speech and action may have experience which can lay claim to objectivity . . . the expression "interest" is intended to indicate the unity of the life context in which cognition is embedded: expressions capable of truth have reference to a reality which is objectified (i.e. simultaneously disclosed and constituted) as such in two different contexts of action and experience. The underlying "interest" established the unity between this constitutive context in which knowledge is rooted and the structure of the possible application which this knowledge can have.[7]

The crucial term in this passage is "objectification" which Habermas regards as involving both "disclosing" ("freilegen") and "constituting" ("konstituieren"). The environment, meaning the situation of the human species and its world, demands a life-form which depends upon labor and

language. The cognitive interests reflect this environment together with the actions by which this environment is sustained and developed. At this point it would seem that the actions are at least as fundamental as the interests which reflect them. Through our actions, instrumental and communicative, reality is both constituted as it is "for us" and also disclosed to us, i.e. the actions are the means by which we can have knowledge of this reality. Finally, a cautious interpretation of the last sentence asserts that the task of the interests is to ensure the agreement between the respective forms of action and experience reflected by each, and the realm of application for the knowledge gained from these actions and experiences. What is being anticipated here is the independence of the two realms of action and experience, the realities constituted, and the interests, technical and communicative (or practical). Regarding these two constituted realms of reality, for Habermas to eliminate the cognitive interests involved is to deny the nature of the experience and the possibility of knowledge of reality as it is "for us."

There is one weakness in Habermas's position, which although not of paramount importance to this thesis, should be mentioned due to its frequent occurrence in the tradition of German philosophy going back to Kant. Hegel criticized Kant for the notion of the "thing-in-itself." For Hegel this was merely a convenient construction of the subject which refused to admit to itself that it, the subject, constituted the truth of the "other" and indeed its very "being." Like Kant, Habermas wants to hold on to the notion of a thing-in-itself concerning "reality." The "other" does exist as an "in-itself" over and against

us; however, our own experience and knowledge of it is experience and knowledge as it is "for us," i.e. in terms of "categories which we apply to it, and apart from experiencing it in this way, we can have no experience of the "other" as it is "in itself." McCarthy provides a detailed analysis of Habermas's struggle with this dilemma in the former's exceptional commentary entitled The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas.[8] The result of this study is a position in which Habermas appears to simply assert that nature-in-itself is an abstraction necessary for our thought. In this regard Habermas doesn't seem to have gotten beyond the position which he attributes to Marx in Knowledge and Human Interests.[9] The main point of relevance for this thesis may be expressed by saying that, for Habermas, objective knowledge is knowledge of what has been objectified relative to knowledge-constitutive interests and their corresponding actions and forms of experience.

So far in this chapter, we have considered the knowledge-constitutive nature of these special interests, attempting to clarify Habermas's arguments for the transcendental role played by cognitive interests in making objective knowledge possible. It is now time to turn to the different ways in which objectification takes place for each interest and to try to grasp the relationship between the interests by considering their objectifying functions and modes of inquiry. The following passage deals with the methods of inquiry which reflect the technical and communicative interests respectively and the objectifying roles.

> The hermeneutic sciences are anchored in interactions mediated by ordinary language just as are the empirical-analytic sciences in the behavioural system of instrumental action. Both are governed by cognitive interests rooted in the life contexts of communicative and instrumental action. Whereas empirical-analytical methods aim at disclosing and comprehending reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control, hermeneutic methods aim at maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary-language communication and in action according to common norms. . . . It (the practical interest) is distinguished from the technical cognitive interest in that it aims not at the comprehension of an objectified reality but at the maintenance of the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, within whose horizon reality can first appear as something.[10]

In this passage the hermeneutical and analytic-empirical modes of inquiry are paired to their respective basic forms of action, the former to communicative action and the latter to instrumental action. These pairings decide the realm and scope for investigation of the two methods for inquiry and the gaining of knowledge.

In terms of comparison, there are two points worthy of note. First, the analytic-empirical approach reflects its interest and instrumental action insofar as it aims at disclosing and comprehending reality in accordance with the interest in technical control. It is to be noted here that the methods of inquiry do <u>not</u> constitute reality, as that task has been already achieved by the interest and is presupposed for the applications of methods. However, it is curious that there is no mention of the given set of theories and hypotheses which, no doubt, confront and are part of the reservoir of information available to the scientist. The situation is somewhat different with regard to the hermeneutical sciences. Habermas regards them as almost "passive" as compared to the analytic-empirical sciences. He does not speak in terms of disclosing and comprehending reality, which would be analogous

to the development of new theories and rejection of false ones, or the replacing of weaker theories by stronger ones, i.e. the promotion of the growth and development of our knowledge of the social life-world interpreted by and experienced through communicative action. Rather, the hermeneutic sciences aim at "maintaining" ("sichern") the ". . . intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary-language communication and in action according to common norms. . . ." Anticipating the Habermas-Gadamer debate, Habermas seems to be already prejudicing the issue regarding the function and critical capacity of the hermeneutical sciences. Certainly concepts and interpretations evolve and change through history, but such alteration does not count toward the disclosing and comprehending of the true nature of social reality.

The term "sichern" has the connotation of "protecting" or "guarding." The position which seems implicit in Habermas's description of the task accorded to the hermeneutical sciences is that they "protect" a given system of ideas, concepts and norms which facilitate communication and mutual understanding.

The hermeneutical sciences are immediately placed in a "passive" disposition concerning the reality objectified by communicative action and the practical interest. In the last sentence of the passage Habermas denies hermeneutics the task of comprehending "an objectified reality." It would seem that in being a successfully participating member of a language community, it is sufficient just to have already mastered a web of meanings through which one is able to communicate with others and interpret the world. Hermeneutical sciences, however, do not comprehend the social life-world in its objective reality, i.e.

they are not capable of Ideologiekritik. Hermeneutics plays a role only when there is a breakdown in the system of interpretations providing mutual understanding and the means of successful communication. In this context the German text of the last passage quoted deserves consideration.

> Vom technischen Erkenntnisinteresse unterscheidet es sich dadurch, dass es nicht auf die Erfassung einer objektivierten Wirklichkeit, sondern auf die Wahrung der Intersubjektivität einer Verstädigung gerichtet ist, in deren Horizont die Wirklichkeit erst als etwas ercheinen kann.[11]

Practical interest's role is to ". . . direct attention to the maintenance of (". . . auf die Wahrung . . . gerichtet ist, . . .") the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding." Only the technical cognitive interest aims at a "comprehension" ("Erfassung") of an objectified reality.

Before leaving this passage, it is curious that in the last sentence it is the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding that allows reality to appear as something for the subject. In this claim, the scope of the term "reality" ("Wirklichkeit") is ambiguous: does it refer to all reality or just that reality objectified in terms of language users and their communication? The crucial issue for the relationship between both the roles of the interests, and also between their methods of inquiry concerns whether or not this intersubjectivity of understanding is necessary for the reality as objectified by the technical cognitive interest to appear as something. Certainly regarding the initial objectification, there cannot be such a dependence of the technical cognitive interest's reality upon that of the practical interests. If such a state of affairs did pertain, it would lend

further support for Gadamer's position of the universality of hermeneutics: a position Habermas rejects in his debate with Gadamer. Although Habermas is not concerned about how the analytic-empirical method is applied within the sphere of reality proper to its cognitive interest, he does appear to be concerned to keep that sphere independent in its objectification and not derived from the social life-world or socio-linguistic context. It is relevant to recall the situation at the end of "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," where the interest in technical control was made the foundation for the possibility of a firm consensus and intersubjective agreement being reached regarding the acceptance of basic statements.

Keeping this ambiguity in mind, let us consider the following passage:

> The relations of language, action, and experience differ in principle for the two forms of science. In the behavioral system of instrumental action, reality is constituted as the totality of what can be experienced from the viewpoint of possible technical control. The reality that is objectified under these transcendental conditions has its counterpart in a specifically restricted mode of experience. The language of empirical-analytic statements about reality is formed under the same conditions. Theoretical sentences belong to an either formalized or at least formalizable language. . . . Both restricted language and restricted experience are defined by being results of operations, whether with signs or moving bodies. . . .
>
> . . . Language is separated out of its embeddedness in interactions and attains monologic closure. Action is severed from communication and reduced to the solitary act of the purposive-rational utilization of means. And individuated experience is eliminated in favor of the repeatable experience of the results of instrumental action. In short, the conditions of communicative action do not apply.[12]

This passage is a detailed account of what we have already dealt with at the end of "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics." Habermas

is describing the extent of the control which the technical interest can claim regarding the method of inquiry into its objectified reality. Both language and experience are restricted, as the instrumental action determines what is acceptable in terms of both descriptive language and valid experience.

Regarding the influence of communicative action on language and experience, Habermas says the following:

> In the context of communicative action, language and experience are not subject to the transcendental conditions of action itself. Here the role of transcendental framework is taken instead by the grammar of ordinary language, which simultaneously governs the non-verbal elements of a habitual mode of life conduct or practice. The grammar of language games links symbols, actions, and expressions. It establishes schemata of world interpretation and interaction. . . . Reality is constituted in a framework that is the form of life of communicating groups and is organized through ordinary language. What is real is that which can be experienced according to the interpretations of a prevailing symbolic system. . . . For the object domain of the cultural sciences is not constituted only under the transcendental conditions of the methodology of inquiry; it is confronted as something already constituted.[13]

There are two points worthy of note in the comparison of these last two passages. On the one hand, Habermas asserts the dominance of the technical cognitive interest over the influence of communicative action and the practical interest with regard to the former's sphere of reality. On the other hand, there is a notable difference in the ways in which the two cognitive interests are related to their respective spheres of reality. In the case of the world of nature, the interest in technical control and the system of instrumental action are the transcendental conditions of natural reality. Habermas is also unconcerned about the accuracy and correctness of various theories in describing the natural world. However, regarding the social life-world

neither the practical interest nor communicative action are the transcendental conditions of this reality. Rather, in this case our experiences are determined by the interpretations of a prevailing symbolic system and the grammar of a given language, and, more importantly, the accuracy and correctness of these interpretations of the social life-world is of crucial significance to Habermas. To draw an analogy with analytic-empirical science, the situation with regard to the understanding of the social life-world is the same as if certain theories were necessary to have any interpretation at all of the natural world. Again, while this doesn't bother Habermas in the realm of the natural world, the analogous state of affairs occurring in the social life-world means that the possibility of a true understanding of society is ruled out due to interpretations which are beyond criticism, i.e. beyond Ideologiekritik. The loss of freedom and knowledge which is the primary result of ideological influence enhances the importance of obtaining the correct interpretation of the social life-world, but clearly hermeneutics is incapable of the necessary critical investigation. In arguing that a certain group of interpretations and specific language constitute the transcendental conditions for our grasping and understanding of the social life-world, Habermas wants to give support to the position that the practice of hermeneutics is dependent upon these prevailing interpretations and the language in which they are expressed. Thus, the maintenance of successful communication and the mending of breakdowns through hermeneutical investigation both presuppose accepting in an uncritical way a framework of language and interpretations. That these latter may be expressions of and embody

ideological influence, it is beyond the scope of hermeneutics to discern. By making language and a given set of interpretations transcendental in their relationship to the social life-world, Habermas's position entails that insofar as we have an understanding of the social life-world through communicative action and hermeneutical investigation, this understanding is possible only given our acceptance and application of these interpretations and the given language.

Another way of understanding the difference between the relationships between the two interests and their respective realities is to consider Habermas's assertion that theory and experience are separate in the analytic-empirical sciences, but are not independent in the cultural sciences.[14] Let us recall that in "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics" Habermas criticized the analytic-empirical approach as a methodological model for the social sciences because of the independence of theory and experience. This independence takes the form of the experience of the social life-world having its validity ignored by the researcher, who immediately imposes upon this experience the criteria for acceptable data as outlined by the demands of the methodological procedures. It is this separation of theory and experience which contributes to a "dialectical" relationship between theory and object, in that the theory is determined or arrived at independently of the object insofar as the methodological constraints determine what is for the researcher the only valid type of experience of the object. The independence of both with regard to the object means that our understanding of the object, or the object insofar as it is comprehended by us, is mediated by subjective and methodological

considerations. Once again, because, for Habermas, our real interest in natural science is technical control, the accuracy and truth of the theory as a description of the world is really of no concern. Indeed, for Habermas one might say that descriptions deemed to be true in the realm of analytic-empirical science are statements the evidence for which is based upon the successful application of control procedures.

On the side of the cultural sciences, theory and experience are united, meaning our experience of the social life-world is the source of our theories explaining and understanding it. This experience is not honed and checked by methodological constraints, i.e. it is not mediated by the method and its criteria. Rather this is the pure experience and interpretation one has of the social life-world. In other words, the subject is mediated by the object--the object as it "appears." The chief task of the cultural sciences, modelled on hermeneutics, is to repair disruptions in communicative experience based upon confusion and disagreement over meanings. The new interpretation, offered to resolve the problem and to restore intersubjective understanding, is directed toward both the ". . . experiences acquired in a world constituted through ordinary language and at the very grammatical rules that constitute this world. Such interpretation is linguistic analysis and experience at once."[15] Given this account of the effect of new interpretations, one might take the optimistic position that such new interpretations could go to the very interpretive foundation of our understanding of the social life-world, thus allowing the possibility for altering interpretations in a way contrary to the hidden ideology. This could conceivably take place, but such an

occurrence leaves hermeneutics a long way from providing adequate Ideologiekritik. Given Habermas's assessment of the cultural sciences, these sources of knowledge face the following problems as prospective modes of Ideologiekritik. 1) They are essentially passive, reacting only to disruptions in the realm of communicative discourse. This disposition has the implication that, given the absence of such disruptions, ideology can function without fear of discovery. 2) In the resolving of the different points of view involved in the disruption of communication, Habermas contends that the hermeneuticist will decide the issue in terms favorable to the given "tradition." This notion will be dealt with in detail later on; however, for now, it has the significance of prejudicing the hermeneuticist's efforts at resolution. A disruption of communication is not regarded as potentially challenging the fundamental meanings and interpretations of the social life-world. Rather, these fundamental elements of our understanding and experience of the social life-world are accepted as true and brought to bear on the disruption problem, thus influencing the formation of the alternative interpretation. Another way of describing this process is to say that it is an instance of "tradition" at work. Given the transcendental status of the "tradition," as understood by Habermas, it is difficult to see how hermeneutics could ever be capable of Ideologiekritik.

Before moving on to the next section, let us review and assess the findings of this unit. The focus of this section has been provided by two of Habermas's knowledge-constitutive interests, the technical and practical or communicative. First a few words should be said about

what the author has not set out to do in this chapter, and that is to challenge the arguments for the existence of knowledge-constitutive interests. This question will not be a major issue in this thesis, however, the method by which the existence and nature of such interests is to be demonstrated, i.e. "rational reconstruction" will be treated in the following chapter. This thesis has taken an alternative direction extending a certain degree of generosity toward Habermas's theory of cognitive interests in order to assess critical theory's potential for Ideologiekritik given the acceptability of these cognitive interests. To this end we have given a very positive account of the two interests considered thus far, together with Habermas's views on their respective potentials for Ideologiekritik. Let us make a few summary remarks under two headings: a) methods and Ideologiekritik; b) the challenge confronting Habermas as he attempts to find the type of experience appropriate to the accurate understanding of the social life-world.

a) Our treatment of the analytic-empirical approach occupied all of Chapter III and a consideration of the cognitive interest associated transcendentally with this method has been one of the major themes of the present chapter. There have been numerous reasons provided by Habermas for rejecting this approach (at least his scientistic interpretation of it) as a means of Ideologiekritik. First, the demands of the method for precise observation and repeatable testing severely limit the scope of this approach. This mediation by omission means that the method is not capable of the total critical investigation necessary to expose total ideology. The key point is that our observations can be precise, tests can be repeated and successful predictions

achieved, but all of this successful application of the procedures can leave a hidden but effective ideology untouched. Secondly, in order to extend the scope of application of analytic-empirical techniques, various general notions and social science models are used to interpret scientifically gathered data and to help select data or areas of investigation. The uncritical appropriation of such elements further nullifies the objectivity of the application of analytic-empirical procedures. Dominant views of the good life, human nature, and rationality are all examples of such operative notions. Thirdly, the technical cognitive interest is not the interest of society. Once again, accepting as fact both the existence of such interests and their spheres of operation, the interest in society, for Habermas, is the interest in individual freedom. Knowledge gathered through procedures of controlled testing and knowledge the essence of which is successful prediction of events and behaviour can, at the least, ignore the interest in freedom, and, at most, even prohibit its realization by leading to a more orderly and structured society of a type that maximizes the possibility of predictive knowledge. Put in epistemological terms, the situation is one in which knowledge of society is a function of one's ability to predict social events and human behaviour. Habermas presses this point by giving the interest in technical control transcendental dominance or priority over any notion of observing the truth or the facts of the situation. In so doing, Habermas is, in effect, asserting that truth doesn't matter in determining whether or not one has scientific knowledge in this sense; rather, knowledge is achieved when one exhibits technical control, i.e. when one can engage in controlled

testing, achieve successful predictions, and ultimately change or add certain variables knowing, i.e. being able to predict, what the result will be. It is at least correct to say in Habermas's favor, that the more structured and determining of individual behaviour a society is, the more we can "know" about it in terms of knowledge based on controlled testing and successful prediction. However, it does not appear that this extreme indictment of the analytic-empirical approach is meant to rule it out completely from helping us to understand society. Certainly empirical observations and noting correlations among events and aspects of individual behaviour have a role in comprehending society. Habermas's fear seems to be that this approach will rule out all other means of understanding society, and if this were the case then the possibility of combatting ideology, which restricts freedom, would be almost eliminated for reasons noted above in this paragraph. Finally, Habermas is concerned that the method itself will become another form of ideology, in which the notions of what counts as knowledge and how to achieve knowledge will be uncritically accepted as true. In any case, any application of the analytic-empirical method which would be acceptable, must occur after the proper Ideologiekritik has been carried out, so as to ensure the correctness of the information and its independence from ideological contamination.

With regard to hermeneutics, Habermas has, at least initially, far more sympathy with the application of this method toward the understanding of society. As opposed to the application of the analytic-empirical approach to society, hermeneutics does not mediate its object. In this case it is what Habermas regards as the passive

acceptance on the behalf of the method of given meanings and interpretations that prevents hermeneutics from carrying out Ideologiekritik. In the overall process ending in Ideologiekritik, hermeneutics certainly has a role to play in that it is its task to give as accurate an account as possible of society and the understanding possessed by individuals as these elements occur in their ideologically determined form. The task of the next step, Ideologiekritik, is to oppose this appearance of society and the views of individuals with the truth, with what is really the case. This latter goal, however, cannot be achieved by hermeneutics, for reasons alrady described in this section.

b) Turning to types of experience dealt with by these methodological approaches, the question that arises concerns what type of experience will provide an accurate description of the true nature of the social life-world. The simplicity of the point to be made here does not take away from its importance. Habermas has ruled out the scientific experience of the analytic-empirical approach, but must also find a type of experience that avoids the transcendental influence of dominant language and interpretations. Given the allowance of some sort of observational experience, and there is nothing in Habermas's work to deny that such an empirical experience could be part of Ideologiekritik, there is still the difficulty that this observation will be interpreted in the light of the dominant language and interpretations of the "tradition." The danger is that Habermas has gone too far in his recognition of the epistemological influence of the tradition. The challenge is to establish some kind of experience of the world which will be independent of the tradition and its potentially ideological foundations. This issue leads us directly into the next section and a consideration of the Habermas-Gadamer debate.

Section 2

The usefulness of any method of inquiry is evaluated to a large extent by its critical power, i.e. its capacity, not only to discover new knowledge, but also to be able to establish new positions over and against already established positions expressing contrary points of view. A second aspect of this critical function is the capacity to successfully adopt a critical stance toward the most fundamental elements of previously established positions. Habermas expects critical theory to satisfy both of these critical conditions.

Thus far the account of knowledge-constitutive interests has been concerned more with their objectifying roles and how they make experience and knowledge possible rather than with the actual achievement of knowledge, but ultimately it is the achievement of knowledge, and specifically "critical" knowledge, which is the main issue for Habermas.

Each of the two knowledge-constitutive interests considered so far possesses a mode of inquiry which is appropriate to the content and aim of the interest. "Critical theory" must function as a mode of inquiry whose task is to gain knowledge of society, society conceived of as a "dialectical totality." In Chapter III analytic-empirical science was considered as a possible model or actual candidate for a methodology of society. The rejection of this approach was based on the traditional epistemological ground of the ideal of objectivity which Habermas adopted from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. It should also be noted that Habermas does claim additional support for his argument against the analytic-empirical approach by asserting that it does

not reflect our interest in society. Although he alludes to the interest in emancipation, there is still no argument for this interest.

Given the success of the argument against the analytic-empirical method, the next possibility is hermeneutics, and Habermas's immanent critique of the analytic-empirical approach leads directly to hermeneutics as the next methodological stage. It is now time to consider why hermeneutics is not acceptable to Habermas and how he proposes to escape the confines of tradition, the source and limits of the subject matter of hermeneutics.

Habermas's concern may be briefly stated by asserting that the tradition represents society as it appears to be or claims to be, rather than society as it really is. Thus if a method of inquiry is dependent upon the appearance of an object for its information and investigation, then it is not possible for such a method to discover and reveal what the object really is or its true nature. Another way of putting this point is to claim that Habermas is challenging the self-reflective and critical capacity of hermeneutics, but this charge is based upon a particular way of understanding the reliance of hermeneutics upon tradition.

In connecting hermeneutics with the practical or communicative cognitive interest, Habermas interprets the role of hermeneutics as being essentially non-critical. It accepts the grammar, language and prevailing web of meanings which are provided or given in the socio-linguistic context, and is applied only when the practical interest is not satisfied, i.e. only when intersubjective agreement breaks down. Even then, the task of hermeneutics is not to analyze critically

concepts and claims as to their validity or truth, but rather simply to restore the intersubjective agreement and mutual understanding.

Given the nature and possibility of society being a "dialectical totality," Habermas's concern is understandable. As a critical concept, "dialectical totality" expresses the possibility of individuals being the victims of deception, either "pure" or "forced," due to the influence of "society." The deception takes the form of the "tradition" as a facade concealing what society really it.

There are two main issues in the Gadamer/Habermas debate: a) the accuracy of Habermas's account of Gadamer's position and, more specifically, the role of tradition with regard to hermeneutical analysis; and b) psychoanalysis as a model for critical theory and the former's ability to get "beyond" the bounds of tradition.

For Habermas, hermeneutics must accept, as being beyond critique and hence as valid, various notions expressed by the tradition. In his "Replik" to Habermas, Gadamer describes the relationship between hermeneutics and tradition in the following way:

> In this idea there is no way a preference for the conventional, to which one must then blindly subjugate oneself. The phrase 'connection with the tradition' (Anschluss an die Tradition) means, rather, only that tradition is not merely what one knows to be and is conscious of as one's own origins, so that tradition cannot be preserved (aufgehoben) in an adequate historical consciousness. Changing the established forms is no less a kind of connection with the tradition than defending the established forms. Tradition exists only in constant alteration. "To gain a connection" (Anschluss gewinnen) with the tradition is a formulation intended to call attention to an experience whereby our plans and wishes are always in advance of reality, and are, so to speak, even without connection with reality. What then becomes important is to mediate between desirable anticipation and practicable possibilities, between sheer wishes and actual intentions--that is, to imagine the anticipations in the substance of reality.[16]

Gadamer is denying that hermeneutical investigation involves some sort of allegiance to any of the given concepts in the socio-linguistic tradition. It is certainly the case that the hermeneuticist does not have to commit him or herself to any specific interpretation or notion or norm in the tradition. As David Hoy points out, there is no "dogmatic" holding to tradition for the hermeneuticist.[17] The problem, however, seems to revolve around hermeneutical capacity to criticize the tradition.

In the passage quoted from Gadamer, he makes the point that tradition changes and it would be difficult to deny that tradition does evolve in and through language. Hermeneutics can be regarded as at least increasing the possibility of change when it intervenes to re-establish intersubjective understanding. However, while change of some sort might take place due to either the "natural" evolution of the concept or alteration brought about through hermeneutical investigation, there is always the possibility that such changes are modifications only to the "appearance" rather than to the "reality" underlying that appearance. Habermas's response then would be to question the capacity of hermeneutics to get beyond the tradition in the sense that it would not be dependent on assuming the validity of other concepts in order to critically assess the concept or interpretation which is the focal point of its investigation.

Habermas's position is provided in a concentrated form in the essay entitled, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method."

> The objectivity of a 'happening of tradition' that is made up of symbolic meanings is not objective enough. Hermeneutics comes up against walls of the traditional framework from the inside, as it

> were. As soon as these boundaries have been experienced and recognized, cultural traditions can no longer be posed as absolute. It makes good sense to conceive of language as a kind of metainstitution on which all social institutions are dependent; for social action is constituted only in ordinary language communication. But this metainstitution of language as tradition is evidently dependent in turn on social processes that are not reducible to normative relationships. Language is also a medium of domination and social power; it serves to legitimate relations of organized force. Insofar as the legitimations do not articulate the power relations whose institutionalization they make possible, insofar as these relations merely manifest themselves in the legitimations, language is also ideological. Here it is a question not of deceptions within language but of deception with language as such. Hermeneutic experience that encounters this dependency of the symbolic framework on actual conditions changes into critique of ideology.
>
> The nonnormative forces that infiltrate language as a metainstitution originate not only from systems of domination but also from social labor. . . . Today the institutionalized research practice of the empirical sciences secures a flow of information that was formerly accumulated prescientifically in systems of social labor. . . . I suspect that the institutional changes brought about by scientific-technical progress indirectly exert an influence on the lingustic schemata of world-comprehension not unlike that formerly exerted by changes in the mode of production.[18]

In this passage Habermas concisely encapsulates the challenge presented by language to the possibility of "critical theory." Language is presented here, in dialectical terms, as both mediating and mediated. The previous analysis of the relationship between the transcendental framework of grammar and ordinary language on one side, and the influence of the technical cognitive interest on the other, is an example of Habermas attempting to clarify this dual role of language.

While no one would dispute the dialectical interplay between ordinary language and experience, the problem is to be able to recognize and distinguish how language influences the nature of an experience, and how experience of "the world" influences language. In other words, Habermas is confronting the grey area between linguistic idealism and pure empiricism.

The task of hermeneutics, if it is to play a role in "critical theory," is to reveal instances in which the "symbolic framework" of language is determined by the "power relations" actually existing in society. The problem for hermeneutics, then, is to get beyond the "appearance," which occurs in the form of "legitimations," to the "reality" of the institutionalized power relations, concealed by legitimations expressed in language.

Clearly this is no simple request and Gadamer expresses the main difficulty in the following passage:

> Nobody will deny that the practical application of modern science fundamentally changes our world and therewith also our language. But precisely: 'also our language.' That in no way means, as Habermas imputes to me, that the linguistically articulated consciousness determines the material being of practical life (Lebenspraxis). It only means that there is no social reality with all its coercions that for its part does not get represented again in a linguistically articulated consciousness. Reality does not happen 'behind the back of language,' but rather behind the back of the person who lives with the subjective belief that he understands the world (or no longer understands it). Reality also happens in language.[19]

Gadamer's main point in this passage is that despite its coercion, any aspect of or given social reality will be represented in the "linguistically articulated consciousness." Gadamer seems to be countering by asserting that if the coercive social reality exists then it will reveal itself in language and consciousness. If the individual is not aware of it, then language is not to be blamed, but rather there is an error on the part of the individual who mistakenly misinterprets his or her linguistically mediated experience. Again, Gadamer's position appears to be that if coercion of this sort does affect us, then it will also be reflected in linguistically articulated consciousness.

Habermas would certainly agree, as is clear from the passage quoted on pages 153 and 154 of this thesis, that an experience of social reality, by an individual, will be linguistically mediated. The problem for Habermas is that power relations, which are coercive, will manifest themselves in linguistically mediated experience as legitimations. Gadamer is correct in pointing out that the expression 'behind the back,' is better used in reference to the individual ignorant of what is happening as opposed to language; however, could it not be the case that the individual is deceived by his own linguistically mediated experience? Once again, both sides agree that an experience of the coercive power must be mediated by language or else there would be no experience. Habermas's claim, however, is that the coercive power can be "expressed" in language in the form of a legitimation. A succinctly put Habermasian response would be that although the social reality does become linguistically articulated in consciousness, this does not mean that the articulation is correct.

The problem facing Habermas is similar in an interesting way to the confrontation between Habermas and Albert over the relationship between the rules by which basic statements are accepted and the observations which those statements describe. In that case, Habermas also had to get beyond a circular argument, where each side was explained alternately in terms of the other. Habermas confronts a similar dilemma in regard to the relationship of reciprocal mediation between ordinary language and our experience. In the former situation Habermas argued that the realm of prescientific experience and the intersubjective agreement of individuals through ordinary language,

together, were the source of the rules for the acceptance as valid of empirical statements. The immediate problem is somewhat more difficult, i.e. how to get beyond the mutual mediation of language and experience in such a way as to offer a critique of this relationship with regard to the understanding of social reality.

Although Habermas claims that hermeneutics does have a positive role to play in "critical theory," it is equally clear that a hermeneutics which cannot get beyond the given manifestation of reality is not adequate, by itself, to this task of disclosing the "dialectical totality" which is society. Habermas needs another method and he finds at least a model for that method in the form of psychoanalysis.

Chapter V of this thesis will deal at length with psychoanalysis as an example of a truly "self-reflective" method, i.e. truly self-critical, and the emancipatory interest which is realized by this approach. However, without jumping ahead and anticipating the following chapter, certain aspects of the "content" of the "analyzed subject's" experience have interesting implications for the Habermas/Gadamer debate and specifically for the possibility of the psychoanalytic approach breaking beyond the parameters of the tradition-bound linguistic realm.

In "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," Habermas expresses the need for some sort of experiential check on the results of hermeneutical investigation. In the experience of the psychiatric patient, he believes he has found the type of experience which has the desired epistemological and critical force necessary to carry out or constitute a critique of the socio-linguistic context. The situation

of the patient is one in which a "part" of his total life experience (that experience which is completely mediated and permeated by tradition-bound ordinary language) has been "hidden" by him in his subconsciousness. For Habermas this experience represents the truth of the matter or, at least, must be accepted as evidence justifying further investigation. Habermas, however, seems to lean toward the former and stronger claim for the experience, as it almost counts as being analogous to a Popperian falsification instance in terms of the wealth of other experience which the patient had access to under normal conscious conditions or through memory.

Implied in this epistemological evaluation of the patient's recalled experience is that, at some point, despite the influence of the tradition-bound understanding of society, the individual had an experience which apparently directly contradicts the "tradition" and its linguistically expressed legitimations.

This situation forces one to reconsider Habermas's position concerning the nature of "tradition." The once hidden but now disclosed experience is not an experience beyond the mediation of ordinary language. Habermas grants that all experience of the social and natural worlds is mediated in some way by the grammar, ordinary language and web of symbolic meanings. An investigation of this experience, therefore, would have to involve hermeneutical analysis. Given the disagreement between this experience and that or those which constitute the viewpoint of the "tradition," one would most certainly have a case of a breakdown in the consistency of the total experience of the given socio-linguistic context. It would seem then that, for Habermas, the

tradition refers to the socio-linguistic context of dominant structures of meaning, structures of meaning which are accessible to consciousness. An experience like that of the psychiatric patient would not be counted as part of the tradition understood in this way.

Habermas's problem with hermeneutics as a method of inquiry stems from its dependence upon what is given to it for analysis. Hermeneutics "succumbs" to the tradition not because it accepts tradition as true or beyond critique, but rather because the so-called tradition is its sole source of subject matter for investigation. In a way one might say that Habermas's real concern is with the "universality of tradition," rather than with the "universality of hermeneutics."

The tradition, however, given the nature of the uncovered experience, is obviously not universal. Even given the dominance of ordinary language by social forces, the subject has had an experience which runs counter to the dominant point of view and is an instance of the social "reality" revealing its true nature. Critique seems to depend upon the individual somehow experiencing the social forces and recognizing them as such. There are two possibilities for deception, which one might distinguish as "pure" and "forced."

Being the victim of a lie would be an example of "pure" deception. In this situation there would seem to be a problem for both hermeneutics and psychoanalysis. Both respond to a disruption of communication and understanding--hermeneutics depends upon a "public" disturbance where the individuals involved or individual is conscious of the meaning problem involved and psychoanalysis relying upon the

individual breakdown in communication "internally" to be realized consciously by the individual, although he or she does not realize the experiential or conceptual source of the crisis. If tradition is successful in this kind of deceit then another method of inquiry seems to be necessary, especially given Habermas's faith in the dominance of the tradition.

Habermas, however, does not regard this type of deception as an issue, but seems to share Gadamer's faith that ". . . there is no social reality with all its coercions that for its part does not get represented again in a linguistically articulated consciousness."[20] Habermas is depending upon deception which is self-induced and influenced by the coercive forces of the society. Insofar as this is the case, he is optimistic that the individual has had an experience or is capable of experience which cuts through the veil of "appearance" or the tradition. Here is an expression of the faith of those in the Hegelian tradition, i.e. that the "essence" will reveal itself in the "appearance." In fact Hegel's treatment of various forms of knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit is a series (in the dialectical sense of the term) of instances where phenomenological analysis in the form of the immanent critique by self-reflection has disclosed the "essence" or "reality" of the subject-object relationship by investigating the "appearance." Here again the distinction between deception and self-deception is of importance. The individual who is simply deceived does not have an experience which would serve to counter the false belief he or she holds. The individual who is a victim of self-deception does possess an experiential reference which would contradict and reveal

the falsity of the erroneous belief. The obstacles to discovering the truth of the matter are different in each case. In the case of deception a method of inquiry is required which will lead to a "new" experience that constituted evidence against previously held positions. In the case of self-deception, the method of inquiry must somehow reveal or reinterpret an "old" experience, which provides conflicting evidence.

While the psychoanalytic model, as we shall see in more detail in the following chapter, is an example of a self-reflective approach, there is an additional problem hindering the possibility of successful self-reflection. Somehow the coercion which is responsible for the individual denying the experience must be overcome and this is where hermeneutics is inadequate as a method of inquiry. Another way of putting this point is to say that the problem is not simply epistemological, but rather involves a psychological element which must be eliminated if the epistemological goal is to be achieved. It appears that, for Habermas, there are two types of coercion operating with regard to the individual. On the one hand, there is the coercion of the social forces, and on the other, the coercion supplied by the individual on him or herself which blocks the recognition of past experience. This second force is one for which the individual must take responsibility and before that influence is cleared away, there is no possibility of the social force of dominance being correctly understood.

The main result of the investigation concerning the Habermas/Gadamer debate has been to interpret Habermas in such a way that he

is perhaps closer to Gadamer's position than he would like to be. Habermas's error can be traced back to the transcendental function of grammar and ordinary language which provide the basis for mutual understanding or intersubjective agreement among individuals in a society. Ordinary language involves interpretations and concepts and, hence, Habermas comes to regard these interpretations and concepts as also functioning in a transcendental way. The difficulty with this point of view can be seen very clearly by comparing it to analytic-empirical science, if one takes the same attitude toward theories as Habermas does toward interpretations in ordinary language. Theory falsification would be impossible under such conditions, yet theory falsification is a common occurrence and experience does free itself from dominant theories. However, it must be remembered that in the sphere of operation proper to analytic-empirical methodology, theories do not function as the transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience, rather, it is the technical cognitive interest and the behavioral system of instrumental action which enjoy the transcendental role. In allowing the "interpretations of a prevailing symbolic system" or the tradition to function in a fully transcendental way, Habermas would rule out the possibility of an experiential challenge to this given account of reality. But clearly the tradition does not succeed in this transcendental function, for if it did then how is one to explain experiences like those of psychiatric patients? Despite the influence of tradition, the individual, in this case, has had an experience which contradicts some aspect of the transcendental conditions. Indeed, the occurrence of such an experience is evidence that the "interpretations of a prevailing symbolic system" do not function in such a transcendental manner.

Given the transcendental role of ordinary language interpretations, Habermas should be forced to produce an experience which is not mediated in any way by ordinary language and this is a challenge. Certainly the experience disclosed by psychoanalytic therapy is mediated by ordinary language, but this does not, as that case shows, entail that it must be consistent with the tradition. Habermas, however, does accept the challenge stated earlier in this paragraph, and the final paragraph of his review of Truth and Method. Referring to Gadamer, Habermas asserts the following:

> He does not see that in the dimension of the "happening of tradition" he must always conceive as mediated what, according to the ontological difference, cannot be mediated--linguistic structures and the empirical conditions under which they change historically.[21]

"Empirical conditions" refers to labor and social power relations (domination). Habermas claims that because of the ontological difference between labor and domination, on the one hand, and language, on the other, there can be no mediation. Perhaps it would be more accurate to claim that for Habermas, these "empirical conditions" do mediate the linguistic infrastructure, insofar as they act as "categories of constraint" which "affect the very grammatical rules according to which we interpret the world."[26] The mediation, however, is one way only as interpretations do not count as mediations--they do not alter the nature of the empirical constraint. Gadamer's response would not be to contest the existence of these constraints "in-themselves," but rather to question the nature of our experience of these constraints. The position of the hermeneuticist would be that regardless of their existence "in-themselves," when they are part of our experience, i.e.

when they exist "for-us," that experience is mediated by language. However, as has been argued already in this chapter, mediation of experience by language does not mean that the constraint of reality is not discernable through such experience. For Habermas, on the other hand, given his view of the transcendental function of the tradition, experience mediated by language should not be capable of discerning such an influence if the content of the tradition says otherwise. As has already been noted, Habermas seems to need a method of inquiry which yields results that are not mediated by ordinary language. The conclusion of this chapter must be that psychoanalysis, insofar as the result is the patient's hidden experience, is not a successful choice as a model for this method of inquiry.

Concluding Remarks

The result of this chapter has been to reveal the full extent of the challenge, methodological and epistemological, which Habermas has set for his task of achieving a "critical theory" of society.

The first section of the chapter dealt with the nature and function of the technical and practical knowledge-constitutive interests, and their potential for Ideologiekritik. The focus of the investigation was directed toward the different transcendental functions and content associated with these two interests.

Habermas's argument for the transcendental function of the tradition severely limits the critical and epistemological scope of the cultural sciences, or hermeneutics. Developed initially in the first section of this chapter, the role of tradition was central to the discussion of the Habermas/Gadamer debate in the second section.

In Chapter III, the analytic-empirical approach was found to be unacceptable because of its mediation of the object. The nature or extent of this mediation becomes much clearer given the account of the technical cognitive interest and instrumental action as, together, being responsible for the transcendental objectifying of reality. The transcendental function means that society is objectified in terms of natural or physical reality. With the transcendental determining of experience, method of inquiry and language, the application of the method results in the censoring of the society as object by ignoring or rejecting many of its characteristics, thus breaking the epistemological and methodological ideal of the integrity of the object.

Implicit in Habermas's critique of hermeneutics is the notion that society is a dialectical totality. The significance of this concept lies in the fact that it describes society as containing social influences which determine the interpretations constituting part of our ordinary language. Habermas takes the position that these interpretations function transcendentally, determining our experience of society. Given the influence of social forces on the content of the transcendental conditions of our experience, hermeneutics cannot constitute a critique of society. The hermeneutical experience is, likewise, determined by these transcendental conditions and the content of meanings constituting our understanding of society.

That society is "dialectical" means, therefore, that social forces have a twofold influence on the individuals in the society: on the one hand, there are rules, conventions and laws, etc., which determine social action; on the other hand, the individual's understanding

of the society is also determined by the social forces as they "mediate" the interpretations which are the transcendental conditions of the individual's experience of society.

Habermas must find a way to gain access to the reality of society in its relationship to the individuals constituting it. The dialectical relationship between individuals and society takes the form of social forces influencing the actions of individuals, but these social forces are dependent upon the individuals and their actions for the very existence of the forces in reality. The challenge for Habermas is both social and epistemological: social, in the sense that forces of coercion preclude the possibility of knowledge, and epistemological, in that the dialectical interdependence of subject and object must also be overcome, i.e. the dependence of experience on ordinary language which is, in turn, determined by influences from society.

Lastly, it will be recalled that when threatened by linguistic relativism regarding our knowledge of natural or physical reality, Habermas introduced the notion of technical cognitive interest, arising not from the social life-world or socio-cultural context, but rather from the life-form of the species. In the case of this realm of knowledge, even though consensus is reached by individuals whose thought and language is determined largely by the social life-world, the technical cognitive interest appears to override this influence and ultimately allows consensus to be achieved. In the following chapter the emancipatory interest will be considered and assessed in terms of its potential to achieve the epistemological solution to the problem of a knowledge of society which can provide Ideologiekritik, and thus overcome or override the influence of thought and language reflecting the social life-world or the "tradition."

Chapter V

THE INTEREST IN EMANCIPATION, CRITICAL SELF-REFLECTION, RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND "PRIVILEGED" SCIENCES

The title provides a concise, yet comprehensive, account of the contents of this chapter. The consideration of the genesis of Habermas's critical theory has been followed through his critiques of established forms of social-scientific inquiry, hermeneutics and analytic-empirical science. The problems confronting Habermas in constructing a methodology, which would be a critical theory of society, have already been indicated in the conclusion of Chapter IV. Habermas must somehow get beyond the transcendental influence on experience and language exercised by tradition. Habermas suggests and defends three notions of knowledge-constitutive interests: the technical, the practical and the emancipatory. The first two were dealt with in Chapter IV; an investigation of the third cognitive interest will constitute the first section of this chapter.

The second section will be concerned with the key concepts of "self-reflection," "immanent critique" and "dialectical totality," and the function of each in the strategy of Habermas up to this point. Self-reflection and immanent critique are both forms of critical inquiry, while "dialectical totality" is a critical concept. The meaning and significance of this distinction will be brought out in this section.

The third section involves a return to the suggestion that psychoanalysis can serve as a model for a critically self-reflective method, and hence as a model for critical theory.

The final section of this chapter will consider the relationship between critical self-reflection and "rational reconstruction." With this latter concept, one has reached the present stage in the methodological development of Habermas's thought. So-called "reconstructive sciences" now form the theoretical foundations, indeed the epistemological and normative foundations, of critical theory. This is to say that rationally reconstructive sciences will be the sources of justification for knowledge-constitutive interests,[1] and will provide theories regarding the development of moral and critical consciousness in individuals, the development of human society from its earliest beginnings, and the development of language as speech.[2]

Section 1

A discussion of the emancipatory interest cannot be complete without also investigating Habermas's notion of "reason" or "rational thought." The split between fact and value is complemented in the epistemological tradition of empiricism and positivism by the gap between theory and value. The consequence for rational thought is that it operates on the theoretical side of thinking, and, hence, regarding the normative prescription and criticism of values, such judgments cannot have rational foundations in epistemology. In opposition to this situation, Habermas wants critical theory to be able to provide normative guidance to society and a critique of its goals and values, which are rationally justifiable. To achieve this aim Habermas proposes an alternative conception of rational thought, i.e. a form of rational thought which possesses its own interest, an interest not only

geared toward theoretical understanding, but also reflecting the major interest of individuals in society.

The function of the cognitive interests considered so far, the technical and the practical, has been to influence the way in which human beings experience and understand reality. The result for knowledge is that it becomes based upon cognitive interests and successful actions expressing those interests. This "dynamic unity" of knowledge and interest contradicts such positions as the value freedom of social science and the fact-value distinction. Notwithstanding his arguments in support of the technical and practical cognitive interests, Habermas, prior to the introduction of the emancipatory interest, still fears the possibility of these interests being psychologized and rejected as inhibiting the quest for knowledge. For Habermas, the significance of establishing the emancipatory interest, with regard to the other cognitive interests, is that rational thought itself is demonstrated to be interested.

> . . . we can methodologically ascertain the knowledge-constitutive interests of the natural and cultural sciences only once we have entered the dimension of self-reflection. It is in accomplishing self-reflection that reason grasps itself as interested.[3]

Certainly rational thought is at work and present in regard to the technical and practical interests and their respective methods of inquiry, but in both cases rational thought operates in a "limited" epistemological context and in terms of actions (technical and practical) which are not self-reflective. Habermas wants to show that rational thought, in itself, is interested when considered in terms of the pursuit of knowledge.

To begin, let us consider the interpretation of rational thought that has been dominant in the tradition leading up to neo-positivism. Perhaps Hobbes and Hume best represent the notion of "reason" as a faculty or form of thought. For these two philosophers, reason or rational thought is essentially calculative. It operates correctly in terms of the laws of deductive logic, an understanding of inductive thought, and the rules of inference characteristic of these two modes of thinking. There are two other relevant features of this form of reason. On the one hand, the interests and values are motivating factors and help us to decide when to use our reasoning powers and to what end, but they play no role in the correct operation of reason or rational thought, nor would they be considered in any way as "aspects" or "characteristics" of reason. The two sides are logically distinct and, as Hume claimed, reason is the slave of the passions. In addition, reason was also considered as separable from its historical context and this was due to its reliance on only abstract and absolute axioms of thinking, either taken from or modeled after the sciences of mathematics and logic.

When put into use in order to achieve knowledge, this kind of rational thought operates with information that, in its turn, rules out influence and content from values and interests: rather, the data used is a combination of facts and well-confirmed theories. Thus one has what could be called "rational epistemology."

Habermas is an exponent of an entirely different notion of rational thought, and claims Fichte for historical support, rather than Hobbes and Hume. Kortian, in his work Metacritique, captures the

essence of Habermas's appeal to Fichte.

> By conceiving of intellectual intuition as a reflected action, Fichte transforms the primacy of practical reason, and hence the dependence of theoretical reason on practical reason, into a principle. This radicalisation of Kant is tantamount to founding the unity of theoretical reason and practical reason on the primacy of the latter. This provides Habermas with the theoretical framework he requires in order to determine the relations between action, knowledge, the interest of reason and emancipation. Habermas, who understands the Fichtean act of self-reflection as extending the Kantian concept of critique, is now able to define critique as the unity of knowledge and interest. The act of self-reflection thus ordains the status of philosophical discourse. In a prospective moment, this act is understood as normative, and appears as motivated by an interest of reason in emancipation. In a retrospective and reconstructive moment, this reflection is required to reveal the interested character of all theoretical knowledge, hence presupposing the primacy of action. This concept of action therefore embraces both an ethical and social dimension and an anthropological and epistemological dimension. The primacy of the practical is expressed in the form of the thesis implicit in all Habermas's theoretical works: action is the presupposition of knowledge, wanting-to-act is the presupposition of being-able-to-know.[4]

In response to Hume's reduction of morality to the passions, thus rejecting the notion of abstract moral principles of right and wrong, justice and injustice, etc., Kant attempts to derive moral principles from practical reason. As a consequence of modelling practical reason upon pure theoretical reason, and allowing the latter to be in and by itself independent of any interest, Kant confronts a split between the two forms of reason. Fichte's reply is to make practical reason, reason reflecting a moral quality, the model for pure theoretical reason.

The first step in clarifying both Kortian's interpretation and Fichte's position is to consider the nature of "action" in this context. Habermas understands the issue in the following way.

> Fichte . . . comprehends the act of reason, intellectual intuition, as a reflected action that returns into itself, and makes the primacy of practical reason into a principle. . . . The organization of reason is subordinate to the practical intention of a subject that posits itself. As Fichte's doctrine of knowledge

> shows, reason is immediately practical in the form of original self-reflection. By becoming transparent to itself in its self-producing, the ego frees itself from dogmatism. The moral quality of a will to emancipation is required for the ego to raise itself to intellectual intuition.[5]

The importance of the notion of action has already been revealed in the investigation of both the technical and practical interests; both of which originate from actions and reflect actions that are basic to the life situation of the species. More specifically, the success of instrumental and communicative actions is the foundation of knowledge in their respective realms of operation. These forms of action, which reflect the life-form of the species, determine both the way in which we experience the world and the way in which we gain knowledge of it. It would appear that for Habermas, the successful engaging in such action is equivalent to having knowledge.

Given the epistemologically fundamental role played by instrumental and communicative action with regard to the knowledge gained from analytic-empirical and cultural sciences, it should not be surprising that Habermas interprets thought directed toward the self and by the self as being another type of action, and one that is a condition of self-knowledge. Ultimately interested in deriving a critical knowledge of the nature of society, Habermas turns to the individual self-consciousness as the basic source and means of attaining knowledge. Knowledge of the society is to be approached through knowledge of the individual; however, the threats and obstacles to obtaining knowledge demand an approach very different from that proposed by methodological individualism, considered in Chapter I of this thesis. For both Habermas and Fichte, the problems encountered in the course of

critical self-reflection, where one assesses the concepts and beliefs constituting the self's understanding of both itself and its relationship to what appears to be "other" to it, are neither solely nor purely epistemological in the "theoretical" sense. Regarding Habermas's goal of gaining knowledge of the self, this aim is jeopardized by the possibility of the self unconsciously concealing certain concepts, beliefs or experiences from the possibility of critique. The problem can be understood as a kind of self-imposed censorship and it is not to be solved by a purely epistemological investigation or discovery. Rather, the self must yield up the hidden information so that it can become a part of the critical epistemological study. However, in freeing up this information, the self is involved in liberating itself from the bonds of censorship. Given the possibility of such self-imposed repression, accomplished at the unconscious level, some way must be found to redeem its information or the sceptic has a powerful argument against our capacity to know and understand ourselves, and ultimately, our relationship to society. Another way of highlighting the contrast with purely epistemological problems is by using the following analogy: the situation is similar to the difference between someone being unable to understand another person speaking because he does not understand the speaker's language, on the one hand, and someone who does understand the language, but either refuses to listen to or is unable to hear certain portions of what is being said. In the case of the "captive" self, the listener doesn't even know that he is involved in the censorship.

Clearly then the discovery of the information must also involve the "liberating" of the self from the self-imposed censorship and this is precisely how Habermas understands the "act" of self-reflection. Self-reflection, the "action" of rational thought directed toward obtaining knowledge of the self (i.e. knowledge of how the self understands both itself and the world which is its life-context) is, at the same time, an emancipatory action. Without the carrying out of this action, the entire epistemological edifice claimed by the subject is in jeopardy; for the self can harbour concealed various notions, which, if left beyond critique, will deceive the subject in its understanding of nature, society or itself. Hence the liberating effect of self-reflection has epistemological implications for the possibility of knowledge in general.

By making the possibility of knowledge dependent upon the emancipatory action of self-reflection, Fichte makes theoretical reason and the success of its epistemological endeavours dependent upon practical reason, and hence, self-reflection is an action at once both normative and theoretical, as Kortian has pointed out. Again, it must be emphasized that one is not, in this instance, dealing with an interest which merely "directs" the focus of epistemological concerns and the application of reason. Rather, the satisfying of this interest is a precondition of the very possibility of knowledge. With an interest fulfilling this function of making knowledge possible, Habermas has an argument against both Kant and Hume: on the one hand, responding to Kant, theoretical knowledge is now contingent upon satisfying the practical interest in emancipation; on the other hand, concerning Hume,

there is now an interest or value which "serves" rational thought, and indeed makes it possible. Hume's notion of rational thought reflects rationality as it is understood by analytic-empirical thought. Habermas regards this instrumental reason as misunderstood when applied to the empirical world, i.e. it is not purely calculative, but presupposes the technical interest, and also, he would reject it as being seriously inadequate as a comprehensive account of rational thought in general. Rational thought as it is carried out by an individual, a member of society, and directed toward his or her own self-understanding and the understanding of society, is not purely calculative and motivated by various subjective desires and drives which are "external" to the thought and its content. Rather the knowledge-constitutive interests are universal dispositions to their respective objectified realities, and are "internal" to the understanding of reality by determining the nature of our experience of it and, hence, our knowledge. For rational thought as engaged in by self-reflection, if the interest in emancipation is not recognized and realized, then knowledge is not possible.

One possible response to this position is simply to assert that a call for radical epistemological critique would be sufficient to achieve the same results as outlined above. With such a critique there is no need for assuming or arguing for an interest in emancipation. Rather one is engaged in a strictly "theoretical" endeavour. This position hearkens back to Descartes and demands a response. Habermas's reply would be to assert immediately that the successful employment of the program of radical critique presupposes the prior emancipation of

the self through self-reflection. Radical critique presupposes that the only problems to be considered are those of a purely epistemological nature; however, the possible obstacles to knowledge which Habermas is concerned with are not epistemological, but are instances of self-imposed restriction of the "will" to critique, promoted, in turn, by forces external to the individual. In modern times the work of Freud has demonstrated the self's or subject's potential to unconsciously "protect" part of its content from its own consciousness and hence from critique.

Given the possibility of such a state of affairs in the self, if critique is to be successful it must take the form of self-reflection. The will to critique must be accompanied by the will to emancipation. Ultimately critical knowledge is dependent upon the interest in emancipation of the self. An interest in truth or knowledge is not enough by itself to attain this goal. Knowledge of the self, in this sense, means that the self is free of self-imposed deception. Here the notion of "action," rather than the standard and traditional understanding of reason as standing back and critically contemplating is far more appropriate. Certainly self-reflection involves such an element, however, contemplation has the connotation of passivity on the part of the subject. On the other hand, "emancipating" anything clearly implies committing an action regarding the thing in question or effecting a change in it.

One might want to assert that rational thought is active in that it calculates and analyzes the data it receives or possesses. This is probably true; however, these are purely epistemological

actions which change ideas, concepts, theories and beliefs, etc. The change effected by self-reflection is a change in the self and its disposition toward certain notions--not through analyzing these notions in this purely epistemological sense, but in causing the "release" of these notions so they can be analyzed epistemologically. To speak of either freeing the "notion" or freeing the "self" makes little difference as they are two aspects of the same action. In liberating the "notion" or "experience" for critique, one is also liberating the self from a self-imposed deception and a dogmatism which restricts the self's capacity for thought and action.

To clarify further the "knowledge-constitutive" nature of the emancipatory interest, a comparison and contrast with the two other cognitive interests is useful. The significant feature of the following passage concerns the way in which the emancipatory interest is "fundamental" to the other two interests, and yet in another sense, the emancipatory interest is claimed, by Habermas, to be derivative in its relationship to them.

> Compared with the technical and practical interests in knowledge, which are both grounded in deeply rooted structures of action and experience--i.e. in the constituent elements of social systems--the emancipatory interest in knowledge has a derivative status. It guarantees the connection between theoretical knowledge and an 'object domain' of practical life which comes into existence as a result of systematically distorted communication and thinly legitimated repression. The type of action and experience corresponding to this object domain, is therefore, also derivative. The experience of this pseudo-natural object, domain is reflexive in its own way, intertwined as it is with actions aiming at the negation of pseudo-natural constraints: I experience the compulsion stemming from unanalyzed (but self-produced) objectivations only at the point where I become analytically conscious of and try to dissolve this pseudo-objectivity which is rooted in unconscious motives or repressed interests.[6]

Habermas begins by allowing that the interest in emancipation is not an interest originating in the life-form of the species; rather, what is implicit here is that the emancipatory interest originates in the socio-cultural context and is dependent, for its "actualization," upon certain specific social relationships holding in that context. From the second sentence, it appears that the interest in emancipation cannot be correctly described as "reality objectifying," as opposed to the "lower" interests; indeed the main function of the interest in emancipation seems to be just the opposite, i.e. its primary role is that of "de-objectification." The object domain of the emancipatory interest is composed of "pseudo-natural objects," i.e. objects which are regarded by the unreflective subject as being ontologically independent (existing in-themselves) of him or her, and real. Due to the self-imposed censorship of the subject, these pseudo-objects appear to be beyond critique. Correspondingly, the liberating action and experience derived from the interest in emancipation are also "derivative" in that they result as a response or reaction to this already given "object domain." The experience of the action of self-reflection comes as a result of the uncovering of the true nature of these "pseudo-objects," and the subject coming to an awareness of their true nature.

The derivative or dependent status of the emancipatory interest and the actions reflecting it are further characterized in the following passage from Theory and Practice.

> This interest can only develop to the degree to which repressive force, in the form of the normative exercises of power, presents itself permanently in structures of distorted communication--that is, to the extent that domination is institutionalized.[7]

There are two types of domination or coercion affecting the individual, who stands in need of the liberating activity of critical self-reflection. On the one hand, there is the influence exercised by institutionalized social forces of domination; on the other, there is the reaction of the dominated individual, who represses this experience and re-interprets it as an experience of a "natural" force or an independent reality, the existence of which is not dependent on his or her own actions and the actions of the individuals of the society. The ultimate aim of critical theory is to free individuals, victims of this latter form of self-induced coercion, and thus enable them to criticize society and bring about a change which will eliminate the social forces themselves.

Before proceeding, it should be clarified just how the interest in emancipation is both "fundamental" epistemologically, but yet "derivative" when compared to the other interests. It has already been explained how the technical and practical interests are "active" immediately due to the life-form of the species and the environment in which it finds itself. These cognitive interests and corresponding actions and modes of inquiry do not presuppose self-reflection and the emancipatory interest in order to yield knowledge. Both interests can be satisfied, on the one hand empirically, in terms of the needs of the species in its life-form, and on the other epistemologically, in terms of gaining knowledge of their respective objectified object domains. Self-reflection is not presupposed for the achievement of any of these goals.

There are, however, two aspects of the influences of the technical and practical interests, which motivate the "derivation" of the emancipatory interest and self-reflection. On the one hand, neither mode of inquiry is capable of critical self-reflection, and, on the other hand, both interests can promote the exercise of forces of dominance, which limit the freedom of the individual in society, and provide obstacles to knowledge.

Beginning with the analytic-empirical method, as Habermas has shown, it is not capable of self-reflection and a critique of its own foundations. The method itself is not self-reflective, but assumes standards and criteria beyond the justification of the method itself. In terms then of epistemology, the method is not capable of radical critique. Because of this limitation, individuals espousing the approach become victims of dogmatism--a dogmatism made more undesirable due to the normative as well as the theoretical implications. On the normative side, the analytic-empirical approach has social influence and exercises domination over the thoughts and actions of individuals when it becomes a social institution. Thus as the standard of knowledge, the method, in its application to human society, objectifies its subject matter in accordance with the technical cognitive interest and instrumental action. Briefly put, when the analytic-empirical approach directs itself to society as an object of investigation, it must provide normative justification for itself, as is the case with any aspect or implication of social policy. The response to this challenge for such justification is to equate "techne" with "praxis." Society is asked to regard the results of this approach, i.e. the extension of technical control of the environment, where the environment is now society itself, as, unquestionably, the best means of improving the

existence of individuals in society achieving the "good life." As has already been mentioned in this thesis, the credentials of the method are impressive: beginning with the industrial revolution, an unparalleled growth in our dominance over nature; an equally extensive growth in predictive knowledge; a vast improvement in the material quality of life, etc. Undisputably a form of knowledge which is bound to make the trains run on time, it quickly begins to blur the means-ends distinction, becoming almost an end in itself, i.e. if one adopts this approach then the positive value of the result is already secured.

At this point then, the analytic-empirical approach has become a "social force," and self-reflection, together with the interest in emancipation, are the only means of making critique possible.

Turning to the cultural sciences and the practical interest, this mode of inquiry, at least as understood by Habermas, is transcendentally tied to accepting the given interpretations of the social world. Serving as a medium for forces of domination, the critical achievement and capacity of the cultural sciences seems limited to at most, cosmetic changes. Incapable of the critique necessary to disclose the effects of institutionalized social forces, it is doomed to promote them due to their mediation of socio-linguistic context.

The derivative nature of the emancipatory interest and self-reflection can be found in relation to the development of institutionalized social forces. Neither of the other two modes of inquiry is capable of either theoretical or normative critique of such forces; indeed, the technical cognitive interest can even become such a force through its methodology, and the transcendental conditions of the

experiences had in terms of the socio-linguistic context only serve to promote the existence of these forces.

The "actualizing" of the "potential" for the emancipatory interest and self-reflection is dependent upon the growth and effects of these institutionalized social forces. In this sense they are derivative. In strictly epistemological terms, self-reflection is a fundamental mode of critique, encompassing both purely epistemological critique and the revealing of non-epistemological influences which have epistemological implications. The critical significance of the self-reflective activity is claimed by Habermas in the following passage:

> . . . we can methodologically ascertain the knowledge-constitutive interests of the natural and cultural sciences only once we have entered the dimension of self-reflection. It is in accomplishing self-reflection that reason grasps itself as interested. Therefore we come upon the fundamental connection of knowledge and interest when the critical dissolution of objectivism, that is the objectivistic self-understanding of the sciences, which suppresses the contribution of subjective activity to the preformed objects of possible experience. . . . [8]

Here the role of self-reflection is methodological and epistemological. In this passage Habermas accuses the natural and cultural sciences of the same error, that of ignoring the contribution of subjectivity to the "preformed objects of experience." For Habermas, both methods engage in the "objectivation" of the "subject matter" which they study. The natural sciences and the cultural sciences regard nature and tradition respectively as totally determining of the subject. More specifically, aspects of these two "realities," which in truth are dependent upon the thought and action of the subject, are viewed as independent things-in-themselves and hence as independent of or unmediated by the subject. The experience of the self-reflective activity dissolves

these "objectivations," revealing them to be products of the subject and dependent upon it for their existence.

On the side of natural sciences, this mediation by the subject possesses two aspects. First, mediation occurs in the form of the intersubjective agreement of individuals whose language (grammar, meanings and concepts, etc.) originates from a given socio-linguistic context. This mediation involves the decision, through intersubjective agreement, to accept as valid certain empirical observation statements. Secondly, they are influenced in their decision by an overriding interest, that of technical control. While it is clear how self-reflection, as immanent critique, demonstrates the first case of mediation, it is not clear how it derives the second. The resolution of this issue is significant in the development of Habermas's thought, however, it deserves a separate investigation which will be undertaken in Section 4 of this chapter.

For the cultural sciences, Habermas's position would seem to be that the tradition is objectivated as both a form of experience of reality and, hence, as providing the transcendental limits for epistemological study. The subjective influence, in this case, comes from the self-imposed coercion of the individual on the one hand, and the actions of individuals, actions which constitute the existence of social forces that, in turn, mediate the tradition. Once again, however, there is no clear argument for the practical interest.

Although Habermas recognizes a philosophical debt to Fichte for making practical reason the basis of theoretical reason, he must separate himself from the latter's idealism.

> . . . the life of a self-constituting species-subject cannot be conceived as the absolute movement of reflection. For the conditions under which the human species constitutes itself are not just those posited by reflection. Unlike the absolute self-positing of Fichte's ego or the absolute movement of mind (Hegel), the self-formative process is not unconditioned. It depends on the contingent conditions of both subjective and objective nature: conditions of the individuating socialization of interacting individuals on the one hand, and, on the other, those of the 'material exchange' of communicatively acting persons with an environment that is to be made technically controllable. Reason's interest is emancipation, which is invested in the self-formative process of the species and permeates the movement of reflection, aims at realizing these conditions of symbolic interaction and instrumental action; and, to this extent, it assumes the restricted form of the practical and technical cognitive interest . . . the emancipatory interest itself is dependent on the interests in possible intersubjective action-orientation and in possible technical control.[9]

This passage deals with two issues: first, Habermas distinguishes his materialist position from the idealism of Fichte and Hegel; secondly, he offers another hint as to the relationship between the emancipatory interest and the other two cognitive interests.

Habermas has argued for a life-form in which individuals are "given" a context constituted in the form of nature which must be controlled through instrumental action, and a socio-linguistic context constituted by the communicative interaction of human beings. At the end of this passage, however, Habermas appears to want to establish the interest in emancipation as more extensive in its influence, and this argument does not seem to be in agreement with that interest's derivative background. In this argument reason's interest in emancipation is present in the activities directed by the technical and practical interests. However, in order to avoid an apparent inconsistency in Habermas's position, one might understand the "dependence" of the interest in emancipation on the "lower" interest in the sense that the

emancipatory interest "realizes" itself through the activities associated with the other cognitive interests. Another way of expressing this relationship would be to assert that the interest in emancipation and the actualization of individual freedom operates within the context and limitations of the objectifications of the communicative and instrumental forms of action.

To conclude this consideration of the relationship between the interest in emancipation on the one hand, and the technical and practical interests on the other, there have been two points of attack. First, it has been argued that the interest in emancipation and the act of self-reflection are necessary conditions for critically, as opposed to dogmatically, asserted knowledge claims. The critique carried out by Habermas's self-reflection is directed toward all interpretations of reality, regardless of whether these interpretations are formed in terms of the technical or practical cognitive interests. Secondly, not only is the emancipating activity of critical self-reflection the basis for all critically obtained knowledge, the emancipatory interest, although in a sense "dependent upon" and "derivative" in terms of the "lower" interests, does permeate these interests and their activities. This position, which demands the presence of the emancipatory interest in the activities corresponding to the lower interests, is consistent with Habermas's point of view in his inaugural address. As Werner Marx[10] points out, Habermas regards the interest in emancipation as being the expression of humanity's goal, i.e. a society in which individuals enjoy the combination of freedom and responsibility ("Mündigkeit"). The presence of the emancipatory interest throughout

the history of the species expresses the true meaning of history for Habermas (cf Chapter III, Section 3). Thus the derivative status of the interest in emancipation does not signify that the other cognitive interests are "prior" logically or "existentially," but rather that the emancipatory interest begins to function within the context of reality as objectified in terms of these "lower" interests, but attempts to break out to grasp the social reality beyond the methods of these interests.

Finally, before closing this section, the issue of the "necessity" of the influence or actualization of the interests has occurred here in two forms: first, in terms of transcendental functions; secondly, in terms of history. Insofar as there is any experience of the world, the technical and practical knowledge-constitutive interests are necessarily functioning due to their transcendental status. These interests are invariant in themselves and constant. The status of the emancipatory interest is somewhat special, when compared to the other interests.

Although the emancipatory interest is claimed, by Habermas, to be the interest of rational thought itself and to express the goal of human history, it cannot lay claim to a transcendental function in human experience. Its epistemological role is critical as it acts in concert with self-reflection, but, although it may be a necessary condition for individuals to understand reality as it actually is, i.e. the nature of the social forces of domination, it appears that the interest, together, with self-reflection, need a certain "disposition" to self-reflective and liberating action in order for the interest and corresponding action to become active and influential. Commenting upon

Fichte's idea of self-reflection, the interest in freedom, and reason, Habermas says, "In order to remove the blinders of this dogmatism, one must first have adopted the interest in reason as one's own."[11]

It would seem that somehow the individual must either freely adopt or be persuaded through argument to adopt the interest in emancipation, or to engage in self-reflection which will involve emancipation. Obviously Habermas does not hold a mechanistic view of history in which the emancipatory interest functions as a historical law which guides historical events and the actions of historical individuals toward some utopian future where all will share in "Mündigkeit." Nor is he about to condone the "Rousseauian" strategy of "forcing" them to be free. Ultimately then, the success of the project, that of critical self-reflection yielding emancipation, is dependent upon the will of the individual realizing, by his or her own choice, that as human beings their goal is freedom and that this goal is rational. Certainly the individual might be influenced by the social forces of dominance; however, although this coercion and the self-imposed coercion of the subject itself, can lead to self-reflection and the automatic elimination of the latter of these forces of domination, it appears that the individual must choose to adopt the strategy of self-reflection.

Habermas places great weight on being able to demonstrate that "critical theory" can be chosen on the basis of both theoretical and normative justification. The union of theory and interest, a union expressed in the self-reflection of rational thought, means that the choice for "critical theory" as an approach to the understanding of society is a selection made on the basis of a "rational interest"--the

interest of reason in emancipation. The implications of this position can be elucidated by comparing it to Popper's "critical rationalism."

> The rationalist attitude is characterized by the importance it attaches to argument and experience. But neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them. That is to say, a rationalist attitude must be first adopted if any argument or experience is to be effective, and it cannot therefore be based upon argument or experience.[12]

Here in Volume II of The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper faces the dilemma of justifying the choice to engage in the rationalist attitude which is the basis of his own "critical rationalism." In Theory and Practice,[13] Habermas recognizes and credits Popper for espousing an enlightened form of positivism. Popper's notion of an "open society" and the value he places on individual freedom certainly put him beyond the thinking of those who equate technological development and its application to society as the way to the "good life."

However, due to Popper's adherence to the fact/value distinction as an aspect of rational thought, i.e. values and interests must be purged from thought in order for it to be rational, he confronts the problem of the normative justification for choosing "critical rationalism." In the passage quoted, Popper concedes the dilemma himself--ultimately, the choice for rationalism is an irrational decision.

Habermas offers another argument for the choice of the rationalism which is reflected in his idea of "critical theory." Given that he has overcome the fact/value distinction and hence is able to offer a union of theory and practice based upon the union of rational thought and the interest in emancipation, Habermas claims that to opt for

rational thought is a "rational" choice. The basis of this position is that the interest in emancipation is not a value or subjective motive coming to the argument from outside it, but rather, this interest is inherent to rational thought itself. Again, one is not to think of the interest in emancipation as a psychological drive or one of Hume's passions. For Habermas, this is a knowledge-constitutive interest which is shared throughout the species as it develops through its history and ultimately functions as that which gives history meaning and purpose. There can be little doubt that Habermas is courting essentialism in his position. It is difficult to imagine him denying a statement such as; "To be free is to have actualized the essence of being human." Consider the following passage from Theory and Practice.

> Only a reason which is fully aware of the interest in the progress of reflection toward adult autonomy, which is indestructibly at work in every rational discussion, will be able to gain transcendent power from the awareness of its own materialistic involvements.[14]

Thus for Habermas, every rational discussion is influenced by and has as its goal the interest in the achievement of emancipation toward adult autonomy.

However, what kind of advantage does this give Habermas over Popper? Although the decision to adopt the interest in reason as one's own is a rational choice, is its being rational enough to ensure that it will be chosen? There are two stages in emancipation: the first is private, where the individual through self-reflection is liberated from his or her self-imposed coercion and the reifications defended by it; the second is the coercion of the social forces which the individual is now free to investigate and understand. The point is that regardless

of the rationality of a praxis which would lead to the overturning of the contemporary social institutions, the will to do so is still necessary, i.e. regardless of the rationality and correctness of the choice or course of action, an act of will is necessary and this act of will is not guaranteed by the choice for the action being a "rational" choice. The will to achieve rational autonomy and the will to engage in actions which will bring this about are two different functions of the individual will, and having the former does not necessarily entail that one will also have the latter.

The fact is that while the technical and practical cognitive interests are necessarily operational if there is to be any experience at all, the emancipatory interest is contingent in its capacity to effectively influence us.

Section 2

This thesis has followed the development of Habermas's critique of both the analytic-empirical and hermeneutic approaches to the methodology of the social sciences. At this point, having considered the arguments in detail, and having analyzed the role to be played by the introduction of knowledge-constitutive interests, it is now time to step back and assess the nature of Habermas's critical strategy.

In "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," Habermas provides both a critical analysis of the analytic-empirical method and points to problems which must be solved regarding the hermeneutical approach. Throughout this article, Habermas speaks of the "dialectical approach," there is little in the way of explicit explanation as to

what this phrase means. The essay is arranged so that with each issue Habermas contrasts the implications of the analytic-empirical method with that of the so-called "dialectical approach." Put succinctly, the dialectical approach is one which appreciates the possibility of and is able to reveal the nature of a society that is a dialectical totality. Broadly sketched, the main concern of this thesis has been twofold: a) to clarify and investigate the nature of the critiques of the analytic-empirical and hermeneutic methods as offered by Habermas; and b) to assess the progress made by Habermas toward the articulation of a "critical theory of society," prior to the introduction of "rational reconstruction."

The key aspects of Habermas's critique have been self-reflection, immanent critique and the notion of dialectical totality. It is the last concept which is the driving force in Habermas's "dialectical approach." In order to elucidate the notion of "dialectical totality," it is essential to look to Theodore Adorno, as Habermas appears to follow Adorno on this issue. Let us now consider three passages in which Adorno discusses the notions of "dialectics" and "dialectical totality."

> Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint. My thought is driven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt of what I am thinking. We are blaming the method for the fault of the matter when we object to dialectics on the ground . . . that whatever happens to come into the dialectical mill will be reduced to the merely logical form of contradiction, and that . . . the full diversity of the noncontradictory, of that which is simply differentiated will be ignored.[15]

In this passage Adorno expresses the notion of "immanent critique," an essential feature of dialectical thought. Dialectics does not take a

"standpoint" external to its subject matter. The "consistent sense of nonidentity" occurs in thought because of a contradiction between a position as it "appears" to be and the position as it "really is." The difficulties are therefore internal to the position itself and do not arise from assumptions or points of view external to the subject matter under study. Adorno is distancing himself from the idea that dialectics is a model imposed upon its object from the outside. Dialectics is not a formal structure of axioms and principles, but rather a feature of the subject matter itself.

Not possessing any specific definition of knowledge and method, dialectics is at liberty to engage in total critique, embodying the maximum defence against and threat to ideology. It is in this critical spirit that Habermas adopts Adorno's notion of societal totality, and uses it as a critical standard for methodology in the social sciences. As Adorno says: "Totality is not an affirmative but rather a critical category."[16] Simply the possibility of society being an ideological totality is justification for the search for a new method which can reveal the true nature of that totality. The content of this critical notion asserts the possibility of society dominating and deceiving the individuals constituting it. Habermas's critical strategy is to demonstrate that the methods under consideration cannot penetrate critically beyond the "appearance" of the society. In its strongest form, this demonstration shows not only the inability to get beyond the appearance, but the dependence upon or acceptance of the appearance in order that the method can yield epistemological results. In showing this mediation of method by object, Habermas is providing argument for the

position that society is a totality, along with giving a critique of the method.

In confronting the hermeneutical approach, and its subject matter, the grammar of ordinary language and the web of interpretations forming the tradition, Habermas moves one step closer to the subject matter he is really interested in, the social forces which dominate society as a dialectical totality. Our experience of this latter realm is not based upon experience objectified in terms of instrumental action and the technical cognitive interest. Rather, this realm is grasped by us in terms of that web of meanings which constitutes the tradition; at least that is how it must be grasped prior to the development of a new methodology (critical theory) which will allow us to comprehend this realm as it really is, and not through the mere appearances which are provided in the form of the tradition.

Up to this point, the critical role of the concept of "dialectical totality" has been emphasized in Habermas's critique of hermeneutics. In this context dialectical totality functions as a sceptical argument, by pointing out a possible influence on our experience, which the hermeneutical does not have the power to investigate. An immanent critique of hermeneutics, on the other hand, would disclose the true nature of the subject matter by displaying the dependence of the earlier description of experience upon a new and prior level of experience, a form of experience which discloses a new "level" of reality, one which mediates both the earlier form of experience and its description of the world.

On the method's side, this new approach must not be mediated by the experience of the old form of knowledge, i.e. hermeneutical experience. The possibility of the disclosing of the new subject matter depends upon the absence of such mediation. In the psychoanalytic model of investigation, Habermas feels that he has found the method which can provide the experience which is beyond the mediation of the hermeneutical experience based on tradition. It is now time to look more closely at this approach.

Section 3

In Section 1 of this chapter, an attempt was made to clarify and support Habermas's position on the interdependence of knowledge and the interest in emancipation. There are two major difficulties yet to be faced: a) how, more precisely, is self-reflection to accomplish this task of "uncovering" the hidden experience; and b) what are the implications of this discovery for knowledge and the critical theory of society.

As was found in the previous chapter, due to the nature of the problem, one in which the "falsehood" is protected by self-imposed censorship and coercion on the part of the individual holding the belief, we are denied a "purely epistemological" solution. In other words, it would be futile, even given that one shares a common base of "epistemic principles,"[17] to try to persuade an individual to engage in epistemological self-reflection with the hope of uncovering the delusory belief. The point made in Section 1 of this chapter is that, regardless of the intentions of the individual, his desire to

know the truth and to subject all beliefs to rigorous critique, because of this censorship by coercion he will not be able to accomplish the task simply through recognized epistemological techniques and good intentions. The task is twofold: not only must the subject come to realize the error of his belief, but he must also be released from the "causal" force which protects this belief from criticism.

Given a situation of self-imposed coercion, it is not surprising that Habermas considers psychoanalysis as embodying a useful model for critical theory; however, the model itself is not without difficulties. The following analysis of psychoanalysis as a model for critical theory grants Habermas's interpretation of the former method.

To begin with, Habermas regards psychoanalysis as a self-reflective method. Self-reflection is necessary for critical theory because it means that the method will not become a victim of dogmatism. Its critical inquiry will be directed even against itself, meaning that its own foundations must be open to critical scrutiny. The basis of the investigation of psychoanalysis will be provided by four comparisons, made by Habermas, between psychoanalysis and self-reflection. The first comparison runs as follows:

> Analysis has immediate therapeutic results because the critical overcoming of blocks to consciousness and the penetration of false objectivations initiates the appropriation of a lost portion of life history; it thus reverses the process of splitting-off. That is why analytic knowledge is self-reflection.[18]

In this passage Habermas grants to psychoanalysis the dual achievement of removing blocks to consciousness and recovering a lost portion of experience. Psychoanalysis thus can be justifiably described as self-reflective. In removing blocks to consciousness and accomplishing the

disclosure of false objectivations and thus achieving critique, psychoanalysis reflects and realizes the interest in emancipation, and also successfully carries out a critically epistemological inquiry. Both of these achievements are preconditions of self-reflection. To solidify even further the psychoanalytic method's status as self-reflection, it might note that the false objectivation is shown to be erroneous on the basis of the recovered experience, which reveals the falsity of the position. The implication of this situation is that one could argue that the critique is "immanent." It depends upon the history of the individual's experience and not upon any external information.

A confirmation and development of this interpretation is provided by the next passage. Here Habermas claims that there are two moments to the psychoanalytic process: the cognitive and the affective/motivational.

> It is critique in the sense that the analytic power to dissolve dogmatic attitudes inheres in analytic insight. Critique terminates in a transformation of the affective-motivational basis, just as it begins with the need for practical transformation. Critique would not have the power to break up false consciousness if it were not impelled by a passion for critique . . . the pressure of suffering and the interest in gaining health are not only the occasion for the inauguration of therapy but the presupposition of the success of the therapy itself.[19]

On the cognitive side, the critique is carried out due to the epistemological discovery achieved by the analysis. The analytic insight cannot rely on information which it does not discover in the unconsciousness and consciousness of the individual. On the affective/motivational side, the problem is similar to the issue discussed in Section 1 of this chapter. The subject must realize that there is a problem and must desire that it be remedied. Those who espouse pure

epistemological critique must face the same difficulty. If truths are to be found and falsehoods revealed, the individual must have a prior interest in engaging in the proper investigation. In this sense, all search for truth is on the same contingent footing.

Concerning the patient, he

> . . . must be brought to regard the phenomena of his illness as part of his self. Instead of treating his symptoms and their causes as external, the patient must be prepared, so to speak, to assume responsibility for his illness. . . . Because analysis expects the patient to undergo the experience of self-reflection, it demands 'moral responsibility of the content' of the illness. For the insight to which analysis is to lead is indeed only this: that the ego of the patient recognize itself in its other, represented by its illness, as in its own alienated self and identify with it.[20]

The destruction of the false objectivation means that the belief in something existing in-itself and independent of the subject is false. Ultimately, for any reification, the subject must take responsibility. In taking responsibility for the reification and the coercion, the subject is also recognizing his or her own freedom.

The last passage considers the analyst himself.

> . . . The analyst is required to undergo analysis in the role of the patient in order to free himself from the very illnesses that he is later to treat as an analyst. . . .
>
> . . . The physician is inhibited in his own work of psychoanalytic interpretation and misses the right constructions, if, under the compulsion of unconscious motives, he also projects his own anxieties onto his partner or does not perceive of the patient's modes of behaviour.[21]

Taken by itself, the importance of this last comparison with self-reflection indicates, once again, Habermas's concern for the sanctity of the object in relation to the researcher (therapist) and his method. The role of the analyst would ideally be analogous to the "Socratic

Mid-Wife," however, this means that the analyst knows and is able to ask the correct questions. The only way to ensure that the analyst is able to perform his task properly, i.e. without influencing the patient's self-reflection due to the analyst's own self-imposed and unconscious coercions, is to ensure that the analyst himself has undergone therapy beforehand.

At this point, problems in the model begin to reveal themselves. The first difficulty takes the form of the necessity of the analyst to have been a patient prior to working as an analyst. To end a potential infinite regress of analysts, one must presuppose that somewhere along the way there is an individual who has managed to subject himself successfully in this mode of critical self-reflection. But even if this were the case, how would one confirm this unique accomplishment? Certainly analysis of this individual would prove nothing, as he could be the victim of a misinterpretation due to the "compulsion and unconscious motives" of the other analysts. The only option would seem to be this analyst's success with other patients. This source of confirmation, however, also presents problems.

Briefly, the patient's initial reaction to the therapist's "assessment" of the former's unconscious situation cannot be the source of confirmation as to the correctness and success of the "general interpretation" and the liberating action of self-reflection. Neither the patient's own judgment, either affirmative or negative, nor a change in behaviour is a definitive indication and confirmation of the success of the therapy.

Habermas admits the difficulty with confirmation and claims that reliable corroboration is achieved through the ". . . successful continuation of a self-formative process, that is by the completion of self-reflection, and not in any unmistakable way by what the patient says or how he behaves."[22] At the same time, how one is to judge "successful continuation of a self-formative process" is unclear at this point. Once more the problem of corroboration introduces itself.

> Freud is right in insisting that only the further course of analysis can decide a construction's (general interpretation) usefulness or lack of it. Only the context of the self-formative process as a whole has confirming and falsifying power.[23]

How is one to judge the success of the self-formative process? There are two positions confronting each other in the analyst/patient relationship. The "general interpretation" functions like a "general theory" in natural science, in that it represents a complex of aspects which are universal to several specific cases of psychiatric disturbance. The general interpretation functions in an explanatory role with regard to the source of the patient's illness, and, of course, it is the analyst's contribution to the relationship. From the patient's side comes the agreement or disagreement with the interpretation, based upon the apparent recovery of an experience which has been hidden in the unconscious. The patient's account, however, cannot be accepted as either confirmation or dis-confirmation of the correctness and applicability of the general interpretation. But the problems do not end here.

What about the source of these interpretations and their epistemological status? Freud recognizes the difficulty and Habermas agrees.

> The analyst makes use of a preliminary conception of normality and deviance when he regards certain disturbances of communication,

> behaviour, and organic function as 'symptoms'. But this conception is obviously culturally determined and cannot be defined in terms of a clearly established matter of fact: . . . If, however, what counts as a normal or deviant self-formative process can be defined only in accordance with the institutional framework of a society, then this society as a whole could itself be in a pathological state when compared with other cultures, even though it sets the standard of normality for the individual cases it subsumes:
>
> > In an individual neurosis we take as our starting point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to be normal. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background could exist; it would have to be found elsewhere.
>
> What Freud calls the diagnosis of communal neuroses requires an investigation that goes beyond the criteria of a given institutional framework and takes into account the history of the cultural evolution of the human species, the 'process of civilization.'[24]

With this admission, the entire force of the hermeneutical argument comes into play once again. How does one avoid the experiences of tradition in order to discover the true nature of social reality. The context is somewhat altered, but the problem is basically the same. The cultural determination of norms of normality and deviance places the analysis and foundation of such notions firmly in the operating realm of the cultural and hermeneutical sciences. Once again, when confronted with the given socio-linguistic context as the foundation for investigation, Habermas turns to the species as a whole and possesses the optimism that <u>somehow</u> the integrity and "objectivity" of the results will be preserved from the effects of this relativistic context, even though the studies undertaken occur within the tradition of the researcher. The extent of this cultural determination seems to be universal, as not even the self-formative process is beyond it. Here again, the argument would run that our understanding of the self-formative process is determined by the tradition from which we interpret it.

Habermas gives the following account of Freud's response to this challenge.

> Meditating on the historical relativity of the standards for what counts as pathological led Freud from pathological compulsion at the individual level to the pathology of society as a whole. Freud conceives institutions of authority and cultural traditions as temporary solutions of a basic conflict between surplus impulse potentials and the conditions of collective self-preservation. These solutions are temporary because, on the affective basis of repression, they produce the compulsion of pathological substitute solutions. But just as in the clinical situation, so in society, pathological compulsion itself is accompanied by the interest in its abolition. Both the pathology of social institutions and that of individual consciousness reside in the medium of language and of communicative action and assume the form of a structural deformation of communication. That is why for the social system, too, the interest inherent in the pressure of suffering is also immediately an interest in enlightenment; and reflection is the only possible dynamic through which it realizes itself.[25]

Habermas's major addition to and alteration of this position is the point of view that the conflicts basic to the species, in its striving for self-preservation and socialization, take the form of work, language and power. The main question posed by this passage, however, concerns whether or not it provides some sort of solution to the problem of conceptions of normality and deviance being culturally determined. Given the possibility that institutions are involved in repression, one can infer that the notions of normality and deviance are not to be trusted. The society, as a whole, must be emancipated from the repression which keeps these norms in place. The result of Habermas's position, following Freud, is a universal condemnation of social institutions. If one takes this position and also claims that society is a dialectical totality, then critique is necessary. How does one avoid going by the culturally bound notion of normality? For Habermas the preconditions for normal behaviour and normal

communication is the "ideal speech situation," or, in other words, a situation of undistorted communication. This condition is the standard against which to measure any state of affairs that is considered deviant and hence under suspicion of involving repression. In the "ideal speech" situation, individuals communicate, "externally" and "internally," without the influence of repressions or coercions, either conscious or unconscious. Only in the ideal speech situation are the subjects truly free and emancipated. Habermas needs such an absolute standard for normality and the condition of undistorted communication provides it.

In the following passage, the need for an absolute standard is expressed by Habermas in a comment on Freud's explanation of human history.

> Freud clearly set out the direction of the history of the species, determined simultaneously by a process of self-production under categories of work and self-formative process under conditions of distorted communication. . . . Every step on the road to realizing an idea beset by the contradiction of violently distorted communication is marked by a transformation of the institutional framework and the destruction of ideology. The goal is 'providing a rational basis for the precepts of civilization': in other words, an organization of social relations according to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free from domination.[26]

Habermas is supportive of Freud's interpretation of history and the implicit notion that history has meaning constituted in terms of certain invariant goals. For Habermas the goal is clear, and that is the free, rational and responsible individual. Unless the condition of undistorted communication can be achieved, then such a goal for humanity cannot be achieved. In other words, only insofar as the subject or

society is capable of and does engage in undistorted communication can it be said to be emancipated, and only in terms of emancipation can the sceptical charge based on the notion of dialectical totality be countered, for as we have seen, emancipation as understood by Habermas and Freud is a precondition for knowledge.

Habermas has now located the standard which is necessary, however, two questions immediately present themselves: a) What is the origin of this standard? b) How is it to be applied? Concerning the first of these questions, "critical self-reflection" is not the source of this notion of an "ideal speech situation." Habermas comments upon this issue and the limitations of self-reflection in the following passage.

> We no longer find, in dialectical logic, as in a certain way Marx still did, the normative basis for a social theory constructed with practical intent. Of course, the logic of self-reflection, which traces back the formative course of an ego's identity through all involutions of systematically distorted communications and brings this analytically to this ego's awareness, can be called "dialectical" if it is the task of dialectics, in the sense of Hegelian "Phenomenology" (and of psychoanalysis which is not conceived in a scientistic manner), to reconstruct that which has been repressed from the historical traces of repressed dialogues. But what is dialectical is then only the structure of compulsion that dialectical thought explodes by assimilating itself to it. . . . Then, however, our problem is merely differed. For the structure of distorted communication is not ultimate; it has its basis in the logic of undistorted communication.[27]

This passage calls for an assessment of the accomplishments to be credited to psychoanalysis as self-reflection. Habermas seems to be saying here that the best to hope for from critical self-reflection is that it reveals the nature of the problem, i.e. distorted communication. Self-reflection does not reveal the structure that communication should possess, i.e. communication which is "undistorted." It tells us nothing about what undistorted communication would be like.

Self-reflection does, however, reveal a true experience of reality, an experience which has been hidden from consciousness. In Chapter I of Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas regards this as the "determinate negation" of the psychoanalytic process involving the therapist and patient. But what is the true significance of this determinate negation? This is the challenge to Habermas offered by Michael Rosen in his work entitled Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism. Rosen concentrates on what he describes as Habermas's ". . . analogy between the path of determinate negation and the progressive dissolution of illusions characteristic of psychoanalysis. . . ."[28] The relevant passage from Habermas reads as follows.

> The reversal of consciousness means the dissolution of identifications, the breaking of fixations and the destruction of projections. The failure of the state of consciousness that has been overcome turns at the same time into a new reflected attitude in which the situation comes to consciousness in an undistorted manner just as it is.[29]

Rosen takes issue with Habermas's interpretation of the results of psychoanalysis. His claim is that psychoanalysis cannot be a model for, what he calls, "rational progress." For Rosen, the process of 'disillusionment' is a form of progress in that the subject is now free from certain constraints so that he is better able to pursue goals whose achievement was blocked due to this psychological obstacle. However, given that one equates "rational progress" with the "extending" of knowledge, for Rosen, psychoanalysis has nothing to offer.

> Cognitive progress does not consist in rejecting false theories only, but in extending knowledge by means of better ones. . . . The analogy with psychoanalysis diverts attention from the fact that Habermas's picture of determinate negation fails to provide an account of the generation of this new and better content. Even if there is continuity between the initial form of life in which an

> agent holds a false theory and a subsequent one in which he has abandoned it this is not sufficient to speak of progress. Common sense would say--more accurately, surely--that the person who has done no more than reject a theory as false has ended up back where he started.[30]

The Popperian roots of Rosen's position cannot be mistaken. Epistemologically speaking, the process of disillusionment in psychoanalysis is a specific instance of "theory falsification." This interpretation rules out the possibility of determinate negation.

Clearly, Rosen is not correct in describing the results of psychoanalysis as simply and strictly instances of falsification. Certainly, there is falsification of a belief held by the patient, and one might argue that the recovered experience serves to falsify the patient's erroneous belief. However, on the positive side, the patient sees the situation for what it is. The distinction can be made as follows:

Falsification:

I believe that "x" is "R." Hence I believe "Rx." However, this belief is falsified, hence "-Rx" (where "-" is a symbol of negation). In this situation, one is left with "-Rx" and there is no other theory present to serve as an alternative account of "x."

Determinate Negation: the psychoanalytic analogy

I have the belief that "Rx," but it is falsified by information that "Qx." Hence, I am not left with an <u>empty</u> negation of "Rx," but rather it is negated by what serves immediately as a replacement theory, "Qx."

Disillusionment does not simply falsify a previously held belief. On the contrary, it recovers an experience which, not only

destroys the belief in a "pseudo-object," but finds the source of that belief in the subject himself. One might argue that Rosen does not fully grasp the epistemological implications of the disclosed experience. It is positive experience, experience with positive content, which falsifies the original belief. In learning that he is himself responsible for the false belief, the patient also learns the source of the belief.

While Rosen seems to have oversimplified the result of the psychoanalytic approach, there remains the issue introduced in the passage quoted on page 204 of this chapter. There, Habermas grants the power of psychoanalysis to reconstruct the history of the individual's experience, through the recovering of repressed experiences, but this indeed is the problem. The power of critical self-reflection is limited to the sphere of experience and experience, once more, which is interpreted in terms of norms, that are in turn derived from the socio-linguistic context. As both Habermas and Freud admit, this context itself is subject to pathological influences, and Habermas has asserted that in the case of the "dialectical totality," the forces of the social reality mediate the socio-linguistic context to the point of effecting changes in grammar itelf.

Habermas pinpoints the problem in the following passage from the essay entitled "On Systematically Distorted Communication."

> If we consider everyday interpretation within the range of ordinary language or translation from one language into another, or trained linguistic analysis in general, all of them leading to hermeneutic understanding because of its explanatory power. That is, the disclosure of the meaning of specific incomprehensible acts or utterances develops to the same extent as, in the course of reconstruction of the original scene, a clarification of the

> genesis of the faulty meaning is achieved. The What, the semantic content of a systematically distorted manifestation, cannot be 'understood' if it is not possible at the same time to 'explain' the Why, the origin of the symptomatic scene with reference to the initial circumstances which led to the systematic distortion itself. However, understanding can only assume an explanatory function, in the strict meaning of the word, if the semantic analysis does not depend solely on the trained application of the communicative competence of a native speaker, as is the case with simple semantic analysis, but is instead guided by theoretical propositions.[31]

Although "positive" knowledge results from the psychoanalytic therapy, the final interpretation of the disclosed experience is external to the content of this determinate negation. Along with that content to be supplied by the patient and the experience which he will recover, the therapist supplies, from his side of the conversation, a background of theoretical knowledge acquired independently of the psychoanalytic self-reflection of the patient.

The recognition of the necessity for a background of theoretical knowledge signals a major change in the notion of critical theory. The passage quoted above indicates the extent of the validity of the hermeneutical position. Critical self-reflection cannot escape the realm of experience which is mediated by the socio-linguistic context. This denies, in the instance of psychoanalysis, the possibility of a standard arising from the basis of this experience. In claiming that self-reflection's limit is to indicate the structure of distorted communication, it should be noted that self-reflection does this through the experience of distorted communication, but has no understanding of the conditions which have not been met or how the rules have been broken. This knowledge, on the part of self-reflection, would entail a grasp of the conditions of undistorted communication.

The solution to the problem posed in the selection from "On Systematically Distorted Communication" involves the preconception, on the part of the psychoanalyst, of the "structure of non-distorted communication."[32] At this point, however, Habermas has gone beyond the bounds of psychoanalytic research which is based on the experience of the given socio-linguistic context. Habermas now introduces a new theoretical approach, "rational reconstruction."

Section 4

In "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," Habermas apologizes for an oversight in the original text, i.e. his failure to distinguish between "self-reflection" and "rational reconstruction.," Claiming that the use of the term "reflexion" by German Idealism confuses two distinct notions, Habermas asserts the following twofold meaning of the concept.

> . . . on the one hand, it denotes the reflexion upon the conditions of potential abilities of a knowing, speaking and acting subject as such; on the other hand, it denotes the reflexion upon unconsciously produced constraints to which a determinate subject (or a determinate group of subjects, or a determinate species subject) succumbs in its process of self-formation.[33]

The two different areas of operation demand two very different approaches to investigation. Habermas then goes on to distinguish between the two different methods, what have been called in this thesis, "critical self-reflection," and "rational reconstruction."

(a) Criticism is brought to bear on objects of experience whose pseudo-objectivity is to be revealed, whereas reconstructions are based on 'objective' data like sentences, actions, cognitive insights, etc., which are conscious creations of the subject from the very beginning.

(b) Criticism is brought to bear on something particular--concretely speaking, on the particular self-formative process of an ego, or group, identity--whereas reconstructions try to understand anonymous systems of rules wich can be followed by any subject at all provided it has the requisite competences.

(c) Criticism is characterized by its ability to make unconscious elements conscious in a way which has practical consequences. Criticism changes the determinants of false consciousness, whereas reconstructions explicate correct know-how, i.e. the intuitive knowledge we acquire when we possess rule-competence, without involving practical consequences.[34]

The key element in the distinction for (a) is the source and nature of the object domain. Critical self-reflection is fundamentally critical and carries out a task of de-objectification after it has successfully reconstructed the position being investigated. Rational reconstruction does not appear to have a critical function, but is engaged with "objective" data, which do not need critique. The source for both sets of data is the same, the conscious subject and his or her creations.

The distinction in (b) is crucial because here Habermas distinguishes critical self-reflection and rational reconstruction in terms of the relationship of their respective forms of data and results of their investigations to history. In describing critical self-reflection as directed solely toward the "particular" and the "concrete." Habermas ties this form of investigation to a given socio-linguistic or historical context. In trying to understand the particular, critical self-reflection recognizes the limits of its context and does not really escape the sphere of operation of the cultural sciences or hermeneutics. Certainly psychoanalytic critique adds to the information to be considered by these sciences and that data will be controversial in that it will challenge accepted interpretations.

However, the final interpretation of this new data will be achieved in terms of the given socio-linguistic context. Critical self-reflection remains at the level of experiences as they occur to individuals and which form their understanding of the world. To remain at the level of expressed experience is to remain historical with regard to the subject matter of study.

Rational reconstruction, on the other hand, attempts to understand anonymous rules systems which are not determined and do not arise from a given socio-linguistic or historical context. Rather they are present whenever a subject displays a certain competence such as linguistic competence or being a competent speaker. In the case of language and the competent use of it, such rules are essential aspects of a species that engages in a life-form which involves objectifying reality in terms of communicative action. Emphasis must be placed on the ahistorical nature of the data considered by rational reconstruction.

Finally, in (c), Habermas notes that critical self-reflection acts in accordance with the will to and interest in emancipation. Its goal is partially to change the life of the individual and hence is an instrument of praxis. Rational reconstruction, however, reflects no interest or practical intention. Its task is to grasp rules and to understand the intuitive knowledge obtained by those who display competence in acting according to these rules.

Discussing the nature and implications of knowledge gained through rational reconstruction, Habermas says the following in Theory and Practice.

> . . . this type of knowledge has always claimed the status of a special, of a "pure" knowledge; in logic, mathematics, epistemology and linguistics today it forms the core of the philosophic disciplines. This type of knowledge is not constitutive for the objectivating sciences; accordingly, it remains untouched by the technical as well as the practical interest. For sciences of the critical type, which, like psychoanalysis, make self-reflection into a method of procedure, reconstruction . . . appears to have a constitutive significance. . . . It is only reliance upon reconstruction which permits the theoretical development of self-reflection. In this way reconstructions therefore attain an indirect relation to the emancipatory interest in knowledge, which enters directly only into the capacity for self-reflection.[35]

With this new form of knowledge, Habermas introduces a new element in support of establishing a "critical theory" of society. Largely in response to the combined threat of relativism and the effects of a dialectical totality on even self-reflective forms of investigation, Habermas must search for "absolutes." The search, in fact, had already begun with the introduction of knowledge-constitutive interests and their transcendental functions. Having their source in the life-form of the species and being invariant as the conditions for the possibility of any experience, regardless of the given historical context, these interests, in relation to their objectified realms, are more fundamental to our understanding of the world than the given socio-linguistic or historical context. In "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests,"[36] Habermas remarks that these interests can be established only through "rational reconstruction." Two examples of rational reconstructions involve the "universal conditions of possible understanding" or the "general presuppositions of communicative action."[37] and the development of the moral consciousness of the individual ego.[38]

The implication of the latter can be expressed by the claim that if the individual develops morally according to his or her capacity for moral action and judgment, then the individual will be in a position to achieve and enjoy "adult autonomy." Here again is Habermas's optimism concerning the natural development of the individual and the natural development of history--we are proceeding toward "Mündigkeit." The difficulty with achieving this goal takes the form of forces in the social context, self-imposed coercion on the part of the individual, and experience determined by the tradition.

The key to this moral development is a social context, which promotes the ideal speech situation and undistorted communication. Under such conditions, which presuppose the absence of coercion, the moral development of the individual can proceed to its implicit goal.

The success of undistorted communication, in turn, presupposes and involves satisfying the conditions for successful communicative action, or, in other words, the "universal conditions of possible understanding." These conditions for communicative action are expressed by Habermas as redeemable validity claims. If the speaker wants to participate in the process of achieving an understanding (and, for Habermas, the first sentence uttered expresses the desire to reach mutual understanding[39]), then the speaker must raise certain validity claims. These claims mean that the speaker does the following:

> The speaker must choose a comprehensible (verständlich) expression so that speaker and hearer can understand one another. The speaker must have the intention of communicating a true (wahr) proposition (or a propositional content, the existential presuppositions of which are satisfied) so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must want to express his intentions truthfully (wahrhaftig) so that the hearer can believe

> the utterance of the speaker (can trust him). Finally, the speaker must choose an utterance that is right (richtig) so that the hearer can accept the utterance and speaker and hearer can agree with one another in the utterance with respect to a recognized normative background.[40]

If these conditions are satisfied, then communication proceeds "undisturbed."

Returning to the issue of psychoanalysis, it is now time to assess the relevance of this theoretical understanding for the analyst's capacity in explanation. Let us grant that the psychoanalyst has an accurate understanding of the conditions for successful communicative action and undistorted communication. Thomas McCarthy makes the following critical observation concerning the analogous situation of the interpreter and his text.

> Even when it is theoretically grounded in a universal-pragmatic, developmental-logical account of speech and action, the critical interpretation of concrete social phenomena has an irreducibly "practical" moment. The interpreter cannot assume a purely subject-object relation to the interpretandum but must retain the performative attitude of a participant in communication. He must take seriously the validity claims raised by the "text" and at the same time critically examine them.[41]

The main thrust of McCarthy's criticism is that, despite the theoretical grounding, when individuals confront one another in a communicative situation they must return to the ordinary language situation and, hence, are susceptible to the influences of the tradition.

In terms of psychoanalysis, one now has a concept of normal communication which is not bound to a specific socio-linguistic context or given society. However, given McCarthy's critique, one is still reliant upon ordinary language and, hence, susceptible to influences from the tradition when one enters into the analytic dialogue or therapy scenario with the patient.

In commenting upon the four validity claims, McCarthy makes the following suggestions as to how normal communication can be restored if the claims are challenged.

> At the most basic level, if the very comprehensibility of one's utterances is questioned, communication can continue only if the misunderstanding is cleared up in the course of interaction (such as through explication, elucidation, paraphrase, translation, semantic stipulation). Assuming mutual comprehensibility, consensus is endangered if the truth of what one says is challenged. This kind of disturbance can be overcome within the context of interaction by pointing to relevant experiences, supplying information, citing recognized authorities. . . . But it is possible for situations to arise in which the truth of what one says is challenged in so fundamental a way that communication either breaks off . . . or is continued at a different level, that of theoretical discourse in which problematic truth claims . . . are subjected to the force of argument and counterargument. Consensus is no less endangered if one of the interacting parties questions the intentions of the other. . . . If communication is to continue on a consensual basis, mutual trust must be restored in the course of further interaction as the good faith of each party becomes apparent through assurances, consistency of action, readiness to draw, accept and act on consequences. . . . Finally consensual basis of communication is disrupted if one party's right to perform the speech acts he performs is called into question, on the grounds, for example, that his role or status does not entitle him to do so, or that his acts contravene accepted norms and conventions. . . . This type of disturbance can be removed within the context of if interaction by appeal to recognized norms . . ., accepted values, established authorities, and so on. But it is possible for situations to arise in which the rightness or appropriateness of one's speech actions are challenged in so fundamental a way that communication either breaks off . . . or it is continued at a different level, that of practical discourse in which problematic norms, . . ., are subjected to the force of argument and counterargument.[42]

Let us deal immediately with the first and third potential problems for the breakdown of communicative action. Where comprehensibility becomes problematic, McCarthy suggests "explication," "translation," and "paraphrase," etc. All such strategies involve a given socio-linguistic context and ordinary language. Once again the role for hermeneutics, in such a situation, cannot be denied.

The third situation, where there is a loss of trust, can be solved in the ways suggested by McCarthy, or can degenerate into a situation of the second potential type. With persistent failure of attempts at the restoration of mutual trust, either communication breaks off completely, or all claims made by one or either side are subjected to the force of argument and counterargument.

As McCarthy notes, problems of the second and fourth types, truth and rightness, ". . . may call for 'stepping out' of a given action context and right 'into' a discursive situation."[43] In such a situation one has gone beyond communicative action based on consensus (where there is common recognition of validity claims raised by the speakers), to the level of an understanding-oriented communicative action in which this common recognition must be restored. In the case of truth claims, the speakers enter into "theoretical discourse" and in the case of rightness claims, they resort to "practical discourse."

A detailed discussion of these two forms of discourse is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, certain aspects of both are relevant to the present discussion. The success of either form of discourse presupposes what Habermas calls the "ideal speech situation."[44] The key feature of the ideal speech situation is that it rules out coercion and distortion in communicative interaction.

> Ideal nenne Ich eine Sprechsituation, in der Kommunikationen nicht nur nicht durch äuBere kontingente Einwirkungen, sondern auch nicht durch Zwange behindert werden, die sich aus der Struktur der Kommunikation selbst ergeben. Die Ideale Sprechsituation schlieBt systematische Verzerrung der Kommunikation aus. Und zwar erzeugt die Kommunikationsstruktur nur dann keine Zwänge, wenn für alle Diskursteilnehmer eine symmetrische Verteilung der Chancen, Sprechakte zu wählen und auszuführen, gegeben ist.[45]

In this passage from "Wahrheitstheorien," Habermas provides an account of the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation is one in which there are no coercions or external influences operating in the discussion. Even such influences which arise out of the structure of communication itself are ruled out. Also, along with the exclusion of systemic distortion (institutionalized social forces would be an example of the source of such distortion of communication) each participant in the discussion must have equal opportunity to select and execute speech acts.

The main point to be made of the present discussion is that the realization of the ideal speech situation presupposes that the individuals involved are already emancipated. It is difficult to conceive of how individuals who are not already emancipated would be able to engage in "undistorted communication" or the ideal speech situation, or be able to satisfy the conditions for successful communicative action as mapped out by Habermas. The argument here is similar to that offered against the possibility of radical critique without a prior emancipation. Under such conditions, Habermas would seem to be forced back into the given historical or socio-linguistic context in order to effect emancipation. More than a standard is necessary to achieve emancipation. The main difficulty takes the form of the analyst or critical theorist's ability to recognize when the individual is acting without coercion, i.e. when he has been truly emancipated. Presumably the future actions and growth in the critical activity of the individual would be the sole indicator.

To conclude this chapter, rational reconstruction is a radical departure from this historical motif of earlier Frankfurt School thinkers. Critique is no longer strictly immanent, content to point out, in the spirit of Adorno's notion of dialectics, the contradictions in a given society and its institutions. Habermas's notion of rational reconstruction is an attempt to get beyond the socio-linguistic and historical context in order to provide a foundation of theoretical knowledge which will function as standards for critique--standards external to the results of immanent critique. Successful communicative action, for Habermas, is the source of critique, rationality, and the validating of claims to truth and rightness. Given successful communicative action, then all of these issues and their related problems can be solved independently of and immune to external and inhibiting influences from the socio-linguistic or given historical context; again, provided that one is already emancipated.

In terms of the new method, Habermas asserts the possibility of gaining non-nomological and non-culture bound knowledge of the individual human being through rational reconstruction. Issues that were problematic before, such as the intersubjective agreement of the community of scientists, with regard to analytic-empirical knowledge, and the cultural sciences, are no longer problematic for scientists engaged in rational reconstruction. Habermas justifies this position in terms of the type of subject matter and the fact that it is not related to the object domains of cognitive interests. On the other hand, it should be cautioned that, although the socio-linguistic context did not mediate the social forces influencing tradition, it

certainly did serve to mediate our understanding of that world. For Habermas, however, this is not a concern with regard to rational reconstruction and its subject matter.

In charging that self-reflection finds its limit in demonstrating only that there is undistorted communication, Habermas recognizes that that which is based upon and reliant upon the historical context cannot get beyond such a context. The subject matter of rational reconstruction is beyond the historical context and thus immune to historical mediation, at least so Habermas would say.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

This thesis has been devoted to following Habermas's critique of the analytic-empirical and hermeneutical approaches as adopted and adapted in the social sciences, and to the laying of methodological and epistemological foundations for a critical theory of society. Special emphasis has been laid upon the following topics: a) the notion of "dialectical totality" as a critical and sceptical tool for rejecting the methodologies Habermas has considered; b) the nature of critical self-reflection and its limitations; c) a clarification and defence of various aspects of dialectical thinking involved with regard to the critique of analytic-empirical science and the self-reflection of the patient undergoing psychoanalysis; d) an investigation of "knowledge-constitutive interests" with special emphasis on their interrelationships; and e) a brief consideration of "rational reconstruction" and its implications for critical theory.

a) The notion of "dialectical totality" was found to function not as a model or working hypothesis in a positive way, but rather as a critical concept describing at least a potential societal condition with adverse effects on the individuals constituting society and demonstrating the need for comprehensive Ideologiekritik. Using the notion of "totality" as a critical standard, Habermas argues that neither the analytic-empirical nor the hermeneutical approach is capable of the necessary depth of Ideologiekritik. The structuring of Habermas's "dialectical approach," i.e. the presuppositions of the method of self-reflection, does not involve predetermining the nature

of the object to fit the method, but rather forces the method to respond to the possible nature of the object.

b) Self-reflection appeared in two contexts in this thesis. First, it was analyzed in Hegelian terms as a critique of the analytic-empirical method. Emphasis was placed upon a clarifiction of Habermas's immanent critique and interpretation of analytic-empirical science. Secondly, self-reflection was considered as it functioned representing the interest in emancipation. In this instance, self-reflection, by itself did not prove so successful. Both from comments by Habermas and from the analysis of Rosen's criticism, it is apparent that self-reflection failed to achieve a determinate negation or generate the positive content necessary for it independently to constitute critical theory. Insofar as self-reflection did lead to success in terms of emancipation and uncovering "hidden" experience and knowledge, it needed to be supplemented by rational reconstruction.

c) An attempt has been made throughout this thesis to clarify Habermas's use of terminology originating from German Idealism, specifically from Hegel. Special attention was paid to the concepts of "determinate negation," "immanent critique," "dialectical contradiction," and "mutual mediation," with the aim of making this terminology more accessible to those not sharing in the philosophical tradition stemming from Hegel.

d) The interrelationships among the knowledge-constitutive interests, their epistemological roles, and their realms of operation is probably one of the weaker areas in Habermas's grand project. As

has been seen in this study, the relationship between hermeneutical investigation and the standards for accepting basic statements and the meaning of science is somewhat blurred by Habermas's own analysis. The self-reflective critique, which reveals a dialectical relationship between method and object, threatens to place the entire scientific endeavour within the realm of operation of hermeneutics. However, to avoid the relativity involved and the possibility of linguistic idealism, the interest in technical control emerges as not only dominating the language internal to the analytic-empirical approach, but also as somehow simplifying the road to consensus among the community of scientists.

e) The inability of self-reflection to escape the historical context necessitated the development of rational reconstruction. The "dialectical approach" is augmented by "privileged" empirical sciences. However, the task of emancipation remains a problem within the historical context demanding praxis along with non-historical and species universal standards.

Habermas divides reality as it exists "for-us" into three distinct realms: the world of physical things; the world as understood in terms of grammar, language and meanings as used by communicating individuals; and the world of social institutions and their effects upon members of society.

As individual subjects confronting reality and attempting to understand it, we do so largely in terms of language. Habermas sees the socio-linguistic context, hence specific ordinary language, as reflecting the given "tradition," which means, for Habermas, that there

is a serious limitation placed upon the individual's ability to understand society, attain adult autonomy, and engage in praxis which can achieve that end. On the one side, analytic-empirical science is guilty of false objectivity regarding its objects, and on the other, hermeneutics is guilty of false ontologizing of the tradition. An attempt has been made, in this thesis, to clarify some of the erroneous and dubious aspects of Habermas's interpretation of Gadamer.

The three realms of reality collide; however, Habermas is clear on the point that the institutionalized forces of dominance and the reality objectified by instrumental action and technical cognitive interest, both mediate the world interpreted in terms of the tradition. The crucial relationship, for Habermas, is that between the institutionalized forces of dominance in the society, and the tradition or the socio-linguistic context. The mediation spoken of above is one way in each case, with tradition not being able to mediate the other two, but serving only to mediate, in an epistemologically prohibitive way, the individual's understanding of either reality. The main implication of this mediation is the difficulty that any investigation, dependent upon ordinary language and the prevailing web of meanings and interpretations in order to understand and explain society, is doomed to failure because it is dependent upon meanings which function to conceal social forces rather than disclose them.

For Habermas, the most fundamental form of social action is that geared toward reaching an understanding, i.e. communicative action. Given that one is able to discover the absolute conditions for the success of communicative action, then one has a standard, that if

satisfied in practice, will be independent of social forces of coercion. Habermas attempts to escape the realm of ordinary language and the tradition, and to move to the universal conditions for the possibility of successful communicative action in any historical context. However, it must be remembered that the ideal speech situation is only an ideal and demands the achievement of a precondition for its realization. Regardless of the epistemological validity of this standard, in order for it to be actualized in practice, the society must be emancipated beforehand. Hence, one has not escaped the need for an effective form of critical self-reflection and the problems involved with returning to the historical context and liberating the individual from the coercion of the socio-political aspects of the social life-world.

We must now ask just what Habermas leaves us with, outside of some very valuable critical cautions and arguments. The consensus theory of truth and the notion of the power of the better argument, which are discussed in "Wahrheitstheorien,"[1] leave room for both empirical scientific and hermeneutical contributions to the process of accepting or rejecting a truth claim. However, these are the same methods criticized for their shortcomings regarding Ideologiekritik. Before the consensus and the power of the better argument can be worth much epistemologically, the consciousnesses engaged in the search for truth must be freed from self-imposed coercion.

In attempting to pinpoint a specific problem for critical theory, we might return to Popper's concern (cf. Chapter I) directed toward the sociology of knowledge and socio-analytic methods. The difficulty is one of checking, testing the claims made. Regarding our

gaining knowledge of the physical or natural world, granting the role Habermas gives to the technical cognitive interest, it is easy to reach a consensus regarding such knowledge claims. There are testing procedures and they are public. Similarly with the practical interest and hermeneutics. Undisrupted conversation and the successful restoration of dialogue after disruptions are public for those involved and those listening in. In both these cases then there are public means of testing the success or failure in satisfying the interest. The difficulty occurs with the satisfying of the emancipatory interest in the private realm of the individual consciousness and unconsciousness. How do I or anyone else test or check as to whether or not I am free from ideological influence?

Certainly my behavior is the obvious means for others to make such a judgment, however, how can they be sure that their position is not ideologically influenced? The problems with the psycho-analytic model have already been dealt with (cf. Chapter V) and need not be reiterated. Suffice it to say that until Habermas finds a successful mode of investigation, the absolute overcoming of ideology seems impossible. Finally, although there are still problems regarding a foolproof method of Ideologiekritik, Habermas has succeeded in mounting significant critical challenges toward dominant methods of acquiring knowledge of society. In exercising his own critical awareness he has, at least, advanced the cause of total Ideologiekritik.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

[1]Jürgen Habermas, "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," included in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann Press, 1976), 131.

[2]Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann Press, 1976).

[3]John O'Neill, ed., Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (London: Heinemann Press, 1973).

[4]Jürgen Habermas, "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 131.

[5]Theodor W. Adorno, "On the Logic of the Social Sciences," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 107.

[6]Theodor W. Adorno, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften," included in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1970), 125-144.

[7]Karl Popper, "Reason or Revolution?" included in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 288-300.

[8]Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 136.

[9]Theodor W. Adorno, "Introduction," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 12.

[10]Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas & the Frankfurt School. This text offers an in-depth study of the notion of "ideology." (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 4-44.

[11]Ibid., 26-44.

[12]Jürgen Habermas, "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 131.

[13]Johannes Hirzel, eds., Aspects of Sociology: Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Essays are the result of the collaboration of Theodor Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School. Translated by John Viertel (London: Heinemann Press, 1973).

[14]Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), 380ff.

[15]Theodor W. Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 85.

[16]Joseph Agassi, "Methodological Individualism," included in Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, edited by John O'Neill, 185-214.

[17]Ibid., 185-186.

[18]Ibid., 185-186.

[19]Ibid., 185-186.

[20]Ibid., 185-186.

[21]Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 218-219.

[22]Ibid., 213.

[23]Ibid., 215.

[24]Ibid., 215.

[25]Ibid., 219.

[26]Ibid., 219-220.

[27]Ibid., 219-220.

[28]Ibid., 217-218.

[29]Ibid., 217-218.

[30]Theodor W. Adorno, "Introduction," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociolgoy, 10-12.

[31]Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory. Geuss distinguishes between the "contextualist" view held by Adorno and the "transcendental" view of critical theory held by Habermas. The former makes notions of rationality and the good life relative to the individuals of a given socio-historical context. The latter wants absolute standards of rationality, etc., 55-75.

Chapter II

[1]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), ch. 1.

[2]Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 26-31.

[3]G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 58-66.

[4]Ibid., 58-103.

[5]G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie Des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), 79.

[6]Ibid., 79.

[7]Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 91.

[8]Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 312-335.

[9]G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 58-66.

[10]Richard Norman and Sean Sayers, Hegel, Marx and Dialectic: A Debate (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982).

[11]Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, 55-75.

[12]Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Longon: 1972), The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2 (Princeton: 1971).

[13]Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 312-335.

[14]Ibid., 313-314.

[15]Ibid., 314.

[16]Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, edited by Allan Bloom, translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell Univrsity Press,1980), 186.

[17]Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 315.

[18]Ibid., 315.

[19]Ibid., 322.

[20]Ibid., 322.

[21]Theodor W. Adorno, "Introduction," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 9.

Chapter III

[1]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 131-162.

[2]Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1976).

[3]Ibid., 52-53.

[4]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 133.

[5]Ibid., 134.

[6]Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 385.

[7]Ibid., 385.

[8]Ibid., 387.

[9]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 152.

[10]Hans Albert, "Behind Positivism's Back," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 236.

[11]Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 110-111.

[12]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 132.

[13]Ibid., 132.

[14]Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 135.

[15]Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 218.

[16]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 134.

[17]Ibid., 135.

[18]Ibid., 135.

[19]Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 264.

[20]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 138.

[21]Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 266.

[22]Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 357-358.

[23]Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 269.

[24]Ibid., 278.

[25]Werner Marx, "Habermas's Philosophical Conception of History," included in Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1975-76, 339-340.

[26]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 139.

[27]Ibid., 140.

[28]Ibid., 140.

[29]Ibid., 140.

[30]David Hume, A Treatise on Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

[31]Scott Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 139-140.

[32]Jürgen Habermas, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics," see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, 152.

[33]Ibid., 154.

[34]Ibid., 155.

[35]Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, translated by John Viertel (London: Heinemann Press, 1974), 264.

[36]Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, 89.

Chapter IV

[1]Jürgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," translated by Christian Lenhardt, included in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 3 (1973) 157-189, 177-178.

[2]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 25.

[3]Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton, included in Early Writings: The Marx Library (New York: Random House Publishers, 1975), 400.

[4]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 54.

[5]Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, 7-8.

[6]Ibid., 8-89.

[7]Ibid., 9.

[8]Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979), 91-125.

[9]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 25ff.

[10]Ibid., 175-176.

[11]Jürgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979), 222.

[12]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 191-192.

[13]Ibid., 192-193.

[14]Ibid., 193.

[15]Ibid., 193.

[16]Hans Georg Gadamer, "Replik," included in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, edited by Karl-Otto Apel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 307.

[17]David Hoy, The Critical Circle, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 127-128.

[18]Jürgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," included in Understanding and Social Inquiry, edited by Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 335-363.

[19]Hans Georg Gadamer, Kleine Schriften I (Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1972), 125-126.

[20]Ibid., 125-126.

[21]Jürgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," see Understanding and Social Inquiry, 361.

[22]Ibid., 361.

Chapter V

[1]Jürgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," see Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3, (1973), 176.

[2]Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), chapters 1-4.

[3]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 205.

[4]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 205.

[4]Garbis Kortain, Metacritique, translated by John Raffan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 76.

[5]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 205.

[6]Jürgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," see Philosophy of Social Sciences 3, (1973), 176.

[7]Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, 22.

[8]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 212.

[9]Ibid., 210-211.

[10]Werner Marx, "Habermas's Philosophical Conception of History," see Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1975-76, 339-340.

[11]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 205.

[12]Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 230.

[13]Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, 276-277.

[14]Ibid., 281.

[15]Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, translated by E.B. Ashton (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1983), 5.

[16]Theodor W. Adorno, "Introduction," see The Positivist Dispute in Greman Sociology, 12.

[17]Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, 61-65.

[18]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 233.

[19]Ibid., 234.

[20]Ibid., 236.

[21]Ibid., 236.

[22]Ibid., 266.

[23]Ibid., 269.

[24]Ibid., 274.

[25]Ibid., 287-288.

[26]Ibid., 283-284.

[27]Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, 18.

[28]Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 37-38.

[29]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 18.

[30]Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism, 38.

[31]Jürgen Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," included in Inquiry, 13, 205-18, 208.

[32]Ibid., 209.

[33]Jürgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," see Philosophy of Social Sciences 3, (1973), 182.

[34]Ibid., 183.

[35]Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, 24.

[36]Jürgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," see Philosophy of Social Sciences 3,(1973), 178.

[37]Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, 78.

[38]Ibid., 78.

[39]Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 314.

[40]Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, 2-3.

[41]Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 357.

[42]Ibid., 289.

[43]Ibid., 289.

[44]Jürgen Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," included in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz (Pfullingen: Neske Verlag, 1973), 252-260.

[45]Ibid., 252-260.

Conclusions and Summary

[1]Jürgen Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," 238-252.

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